Sword and Reason among Pashtuns:
NOTIONS OF INDIVIDUAL HONOUR AND SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY IN
AFGHANISTAN
By Bernt Glatzer (1)
Since its beginning the recent Afghan jihad was not only directed
against an alien invasion and an imported ideology, but also against
obsolete internal political structures which long before 1978 had
encroached on traditional values without improving the standard of
living of most people. After the withdrawal of the Red Army the
country is still under heavy influence from outside powers which do
not allow Afghanistan to come to terms with her own social and
political problems. A case in point is the recent emergence of the
powerful Taliban movement whose success is partly due to the support
by Pakistan. On the other hand the Taliban are an indigenous
movement whose motives of action are rooted in the norms and values
of a large part of the traditional society. In order to analyze the
present civil war in Afghanistan indigenous as well as exogenous
factors have to be taken into consideration as well as the motives
of the acting persons who consciously reflect their role in local,
regional, interregional, inter-ethnic, and international contexts.
In spite of Afghanistan's retrogression into a pre-state situation,
and in spite of all the violence and terror the media are so eager
to report on, there is a remarkable process going on in the country:
in most areas of Afghanistan civil life has returned and
rehabilitation with and without international aid is proceeding
successfully and fast (Christensen 1995, Donini 1996). This proves
that civilian values and practices counterbalance those of the
"Pathan warrior".
This paper will mainly deal with Pashtuns - the largest single
ethnic group in Afghanistan. "Afghan", "Pashtun", "Pukhtun", have
originally been synonyms and are still understood so by a large part
of the local population, although the Afghan state officially
includes all ethnic groups under this term.
Half of the 17 to 20 million Pashtuns live in Afghanistan the other
half in the Pakistani provinces NWFP and Baluchistan.
They were called the world's largest tribal society (Spain 1963)
because of their number and their all embracing genealogical charter
which links the thousands of Pashtun tribes to one apical ancestor.
Although comparative research among different social groups in
Afghanistan is lacking we have no indication that there are
significant differences between the ethnic groups as notions and
concepts of person and Islam is concerned. The reason why I
concentrate on the Pashtuns is that we have more detailed and
elaborate emic and etic sources on personal norms and values of
Pashtuns than on other ethnic groups in Afghanistan, namely the
pashtunwali, a charter of ethnic pride and self understanding many
times written down in a systematic way.
The Pashtun ideology of war and violence, of the martial and heroic
behaviour of the men is named tura (lit. "sword"). However,
readiness for violence and war is but one aspect of the traditional
ideal of a male person; the other aspect is aql: "reason",
particularly in the sense of social responsibility.
A man of aql is one who reasons and acts in an integrative social
way, he is hospitable and generous, he grants asylum, reaches to
balanced social judgments and is able to act as a mediator in
conflicts.
The concept of tura and aql includes to know when to draw the sword
and when to put it back to the sheath, when it is time fight and
when it is time for caring for the welfare and unity of one's
family, clan, tribe or of wider social units, up to the Muslim umma,
depending on one's social horizon.
When we consider the duality of tura and aql we may understand why
bands of anarchic Afghan warriors were able to inflict heavy defeats
to the super powers of their time, and why most tribal warriors laid
down their arms the day after their victory and went home to plough
their fields - some for the first time in their life(2).
The Image of the Noble Warrior
Several times in Afghan history invasion armies, superior in number,
technique, and organisation, received "bleeding wounds"
(Gorbatchev). Persians, Moghuls and the British had to make this
experience. After three major defeats the latter had to give up the
plan to colonize the country. E.g. in 1842 the attempt of the
British General Governor of India to occupy Afghanistan permanently
and to enthrone a puppet Amir ended in complete disaster, the
British ambassador got assassinated and the British garrison with
more than 16,000 soldiers and their attendants perished during
retreat in the gorges of eastern Afghanistan. Even in distant
Germany this event became a subject of poetry:
"Mit dreizehntausend der Zug begann,
Einer kam heim aus Afghanistan."
[with thirteenthousand the campaign began,
one came home from Afghanistan]
(Theodor Fontane quoted from SNOY, p.73)
In London this defeat was felt with particular pain and shame
because it was not the armies of imperial Russia or of another big
power which inflicted this set-back to British expansion but
unorganized bands of "savages". During the following assessments of
the disaster the "savages" soon mutated to noble warriors, to
descendants of Alexander the Great or to "Aryans", i.e. they were
styled as a sort of Europeans against whom to loose was not
considered that shameful. The unspoilt Afghans were said to have
preserved all the male virtues of antique times and were depicted as
a model for the contemporary youth, similarly as Tacitus idealised
the ancient Germanic virtues. It was Mountstuart Elphinstone,
officer of the East India Company, researcher and influential
writer, who in 1815 laid the foundation for the idealization of the
Afghans in his famous "Account of the Kingdom of Caubul". In open
sympathy he compared the anarchic and fiercely egalitarian
("republican" as he called them) Afghaun tribes with the most noble
human groups the Scottish aristocrat and humanist could think of,
that is with Scottish clans and with Greek-Roman republicans.
Afghan intellectuals, poets and authors, traditionally multilingual,
were well aware about what was said and published on their people
and country even in England, they were of cause pleased to see their
people so advantageously characterized and they added to it in their
own writings and teachings. No wonder that the ideal image of the
Pashtun/Afghan as the noble, gallant, dauntless and generous warrior
soon became the subject of legends and elaborated ethnic and tribal
self representations among the Pashtun tribes who lived not too far
from British-Indian cultural influences (the ones between Kabul and
Peshawar, Swat and South Waziristan). From there the image was
taken-up again by European authors and was further elaborated,
particularly when more British military defeats at the North West
Frontier were to be explained. Thus in intercultural collaboration
an elaborate image of the ideal Pashtun personally was created. The
eastern Pashtun tribes who had to deal with their mighty eastern
neighbor merged this personal image with Islam and with their more
traditional tribal law to a canon of Pashtunness, the pashtunwali.
Pashtunwali the Ethnic Self Representation
ELPHINSTONE used "pashtunwali" only in the sense of the customary
law of the Afghans. In RAVERTY's Pashtu Dictionary of 1860
pashtunwali became "...the manners and customs of the Afghan tribes,
the Afghan code." More than hundred years later among eastern
Pashtuns pashtunwali is used as the "... explicitly known part of
their system of values and norms by which they believe to differ
positively from all Non-Pashtuns". In West Afghanistan the term
pashtunwali is unknown, there the traditional norms are called rawaj
which in terminology and content hardly differs from those of their
neighbours.
In West Afghanistan the term for the ideal person is ghairatman, but
Pashtuns there do not claim a monopoly. An Aymaq or Tajik may be as
ghairatman as a Pashtun, differences are considered rather in
degree. (more on ghairatman see JANATA & HASSAS). The pashtunwali of
the eastern Pashtuns serves as a model and an orientation for
education, as a guide line and measure of values for solving
conflicts, as a marker of contrast against ethnic aliens and also as
an invitation card for peaceful visitors (hospitality has first
priority in pashtunwali). With its threatening list of martial
self-characteristics it also serves as a deterrent to less peaceful
visitors.
Eastern Pashtuns have codified their ideal of person, thus offering
us easy access to their scale of values and to their motives for
action, but we may easily overemphasise the more spectacular or
violent aspects of pashtunwali such as tura and place them out of
context neglecting the more subtle points which complete the image
of person and without which we cannot understand complex sequences
of actions.
I base this paper of Pashtun ideals of person mainly on Alfred
JANATA's and Reihanuddin HASSAS's research on "The Good Pashtun", on
Willi STEUL's monograph on the pashtunwali, and on my own
ethnographic research among western Afghan nomads in the years 1970
- 1977 and on my experiences as relief worker from 1990 through 1993
in Afghanistan and Pakistan.
Nang: Dignity, Honour and Shame
The central term in pashtunwali is nang: honour and shame, dignity,
courage and bravery. A nangialay brings honour and fame to his
tribe. To be called benanga ("shameless", "undignified") is the
worst possible insult in Pashtu and a deadly threat to the social
position of the insulted. Killing the insulter is an accepted way of
regaining one's nang and thus of one's social status.
sharm is a decisive part of nang. sharm can well be translated by
the English shame, which encompasses shame in the sense of noble
modesty and its contrary shamelessness. If a boy greedily devours
his meal his father will tell him "sharm nalare?!" ("don't you have
shame?", "aren't you ashamed?"); but if a man does not prevent his
unmarried daughter from flirting with neighbour's son people would
say "sharm nalari" ("he has no shame") which is an extremely serious
insult and can only be answered by a very impressive action. sharm
has mainly to do with the behaviour of the women of the group whose
honour is at stake and with male control over the female half of the
society.
The relation to women can be seen clearer if we analyse the term
namus, which belongs to the complex of nang. It means privacy and
the protection of its sanctity. In the narrower sense namus relates
to the integrity, modesty and respectability of women and to the
absolute duty of men to protect them. In its wider sense namus means
the female part of the family, of the clan, tribe and of the Afghan
society; in the widest sense it is the Afghan home land to be
protected.
Although namus includes the inviolability of women and the duty to
protect their honour it does not imply that women stay passive. In
Pashtun folklore boldly acting heroines are praised such as Malalay
who has played a decisive role to win the battle of Maywand in the
Second Anglo-Afghan war, 1878-80 (more on male-female relations
among Pashtuns see TAPPER, in war see SHALINSKY). Yet in general men
consider young women to be less able to think and act rationally, to
have less self-control and to be more inclined to sexual activity,
in short they are believed to be an easy prey to any seducer who
comes along. Thus men feel obliged to fight for maintaining their
namus, i.e. first of all to keep the women of their families under
tight control, and to protect the women from their own "weaknesses".
Even more feared than the actual behaviour of women is the
neighbours' gossip, that is what erodes namus most effectively and
what is most difficult to control. Better do not let anybody see the
women. In urban areas this leads to an increasing compulsion for
women to wear full veil or to remain hidden behind the walls of the
family compound. Since the early 1970-s I noticed seclusion of women
(parda) to expand into the countryside, a process which gained
momentum during the recent "holy" war. I estimate that more than a
million of women have experienced parda for the first time in their
life when they arrived at the refugee camps in Pakistan.
Very many Afghan consent that parda is not an indicator for strength
and effective maintenance of namus, rather to the contrary, as I was
repeatedly told by nomads and peasants in Northwest Afghanistan: A
strong man can trust his womenfolk and is sure that no outsider
would dare to come near to them, only weaklings need to hide and
lock-up their women (cf. TAPPER 1991: ). In fact the refugee camps
in Pakistan and Iran were places of disturbed social and demographic
relations. During the war ca. 80 % of the camp population were
women, children and very old men, and the relatively small number of
younger men felt quite insecure in that alien environment, thus the
strict observation of parda observed in the camps was indeed a sign
of weakness and people believed they had no alternative how to
maintain namus.
In pashtunwali the inviolability of women and of land is closely
connected or considered as practically identical. Common sayings
are: "The way to the women leads over the land." and "He who cannot
protect the integrity of his family cannot protect anything, anyone
is free to snatch away from him what he wants, his possessions, his
land." Most authors on Afghanistan agree that threatened namus is
the most common cause for violent conflicts. When mujahedin were
recruited for jihad they were told, besides religious arguments,
that the (common) namus of the Afghans was threatened. In fact, in
1978 the first uprisings against the new socialist regime broke out
when the new socialist Afghan regime sent young activists from Kabul
to the provinces in order to force girls and women to school. Not
that people were principally against female education, but they felt
it was neither the state's nor any other's business to interfere in
matters where females are involved. So far the public and the
private spheres were always kept neatly separate. People, though
grudgingly, did pay tributes to rulers or even accepted military
conscription, but the state's transgression of the line between the
public and the private (namus) meant war.
Tura - the Sword
nang the honour and dignity of a Pashtun has two sides:
(1) An aggressive one with readiness to fight until self-sacrifice -
this is symbolised by tura, the sword;
(2) Reason and social responsibility (aql). aql is deliberate and
prudent behaviour which is intended to benefit one's family and
one's wider social entities up to the entire ethnic group, nation
(if such a notion exists) and even up to the entire Muslim umma. It
reaches from material support to participation in councils, to
jurisdiction and mediation in conflicts. These two sides of nang are
connected with different ages in life: The ideal persononality of a
young man is supposed to be dominated by tura he may be hot headed
and ready to draw the sword (tura) (today Kalashnikow) at the
slightest provocation. Aggressiveness is his first reaction,
reasoning comes second. The virtue of tura does not need to be
tempered by the young man's own aql , it is supposed to be checked
by the aql of the elders, the "white beards" (spin giri).
Consequently boys are educated to obey the elders.
Many Pashtun clans/tribes have tribal militias (arbaki, lashkar) to
execute the decisions of the egalitarian councils (jirga), bound by
the discipline of the militia the tura of the youngsters is guided
to socially accepted objectives.
During my time as an aid worker I experienced this in the eastern
Afghan province of Paktia: In spite of a large pre-war German
development project with its deep impact on the local
infra-structure the tribal social organisation remained intact and
functioning; in 1992, after the break-down of the Kabul Najibullah
regime most mujahedin of Paktia went home, participated in the
rehabilitation of their villages and land or rejoined the tribal
militia. Organisations who helped in the rehabilitation task were
provided arbaki (tribal militia) as guards. Thus in a situation
where state and government were absent civilian life returned rather
smoothly.
tura always relates to an individual. It is not sufficient to belong
to a group or unit of bold fighters, every one has to prove his tura
in single actions. The turialay, the man who embodies tura gains his
distinction by individual acts. He fights first of all for his
personal honour and autonomy, then for that of his family and clan.
A strong motive for displaying tura is to demonstrate one's own
equality and autonomy and consequently that of one's family and clan
and to demonstrate one's refusal to bow down before any arbitrary
power.
The mujahedin commanders were usually understood as primi inter
pares, the mujahedin respected their fighting and tactical
experience and most importantly their logistic abilities, every
mujahed considered himself to be on the way to become a commander.
The latter had to prove constantly their superiority, there was no
effective military command structure which could impose a commander
arbitrarily on any band of mujahedin.
Obedience to the tribal elders does not contradict the egalitarian
principle. The elders are understood as the representatives of
reason and tradition, of the collective will of the clan/tribe, but
they have to take care that their decisions are understood by the
younger as just and as in accordance to the generally accepted
values, they cannot expect the younger to obey automatically.
The highly individualistic stile of the Afghan mujahedin's fighting
was feared by the military planners on both sides and considered as
a great strategic problem. Even the Afghan mujahedin parties in
Peshawar lost control, their function was reduced to logistical
tasks and to public relations. I think the success of the Afghan
mujahedin against the hierarchically well organised Red Army lies in
the fact that the anarchic and chaotic actions of the Afghan rebels
were absolutely unpredictable for any professional strategist. On
the side of the mujahedin there was no military command to deal
with, if one commander was eliminated several new ones replaced him
instantly.
Education
Education to tura begins early. Fathers scuffle and mock fight with
their little sons of three to 10 years of age and allow them even to
hit their fathers who would return a friendly clap in order to
encourage the little fighter to another round. Harmless fighting
games between boys are applauded. The education is
non-authoritarian, a father is considered to be an example, not a
penal authority.
Children are present in guest houses, at tribal councils and
whereever serious decisions are made, in this way they are
introduced to pashtunwali and to the traditional values and thier
practical applications.
Girls and boys are educated towards the same values of person,
parents see to it that pashtunwali is internalised by girls as much
as by boys, girls also are present in public councils and listen
carefully. It is generally believed among Pashtuns that women are
more strict at pashtunwali then men and less ready to compromise
when matters of honour and shame are at stake. The following story
of a very popular Pashtun hero may serve as an example for what
Pashtuns conceive of an ideal personality.
It is the story of Ajab Khan an historical figure who has challenged
the British Empire and serves even nowadays as a model for
education:
The Cantonement of Kohat, south of Peshawar was one of the strongest
military fortresses of the British Empire, from here campaigns were
launched against the hostile and rebellious Pashtuns of the tribal
areas along the British-Afghan frontier. Pax Britannica may have
prevailed elsewhere, the garrison of Kohat was constantly at war.
The year 1923 was no different, this time a punitive campaign was
carried out against the Bostikhel, a sub-tribe of the Afridi north
of Kohat. At this occasion British soldiers trampled into the huts
of the Bostikhel and allegedly came too close to the ladies, anyway
the namus of the Bostikhel was serously violated and the clan in
uproar. A few weeks later young Ajab, a Bostikhel together with two
companions, sneaked at night into the Cantonment of Kohat, through
its multiple security cordons. They raided the bungalow of an
officer named Ellis and kidnapped his daughter Molly. The men with
the girl made good their escape and the next days they paraded in
triumph through the Afridi land making a laughingstock of the
Empire. In Kohat, Delhi and London emergency committees were formed
and the media reported wordwide with pitty for the girl and with
mockery for the toothless English Lion.
A military action to save the girl was out of the question, all the
British Government could do was to threaten the Bostikkhel and even
the entire Afridi tribe with frightening consequences.
In the mean time an English nurse walked into Afridi land all alone
and unarmed, met Ajab and persuaded him to release the Girl. After
three weeks Molly Ellis was back to Kohat - unharmed. The British
demanded strongly from the Afridi to hand over Ajab to the British
which the Afridi of course refused, but this was a very serious and
conflicting problem for the Afridi tribal council: The extradition
of Ajab would have been a breach of pashtunwali but not to hand him
over would have had very dire consequesences, there was little doubt
that the British would repeat what they had done in 1919 when their
war planes bombarded Pashtun villages.
Now came Ajab's second act by which he completed his heroic deed and
by which he earned the honorary title of khan: Realising that he had
brought his tribe into serious trouble he voluntarily emigrated to
North Afghanistan where he died a natural death in 1961 as a highly
honoured khan. He had saved his tribe from drastic punitiv actions
of the British by renouncing everything which a tribe offers to the
individual: protection, social security and warmth, in short: social
life. Expulsion from tribal land is the severest punishment a tribal
court can award, and volunary exile is considered the highes
sacrifice a Pashtun can offer.
For the British this was not enough, the Bostikhel had to pay 42,000
Rupees and Ajab's own land and village was destroyed.
As it can be expected from an heroic epic, Ajab Khan and the girl
are believed to have fallen in love to each other, but contrary to
the rest of the story this is not proven (for more on the story see
SPAIN p. 154ff).
Epilogue:
In 1982 I met Miss Ellis in Islamabad, she had followed an
invitation of the Government of Pakistan. Accompanied by the
Governor of the NWFP she was driven triumphantly from Peshawar to
Kohat right through parts of the Afridi country. The streets were
lined by jubilant Pashtuns and relatives of Ajab Khan offered to
carry her on their hands all along the way where she had been
abducted, which she friendly declined.
This story ilustrates tura and the core values of the ideal and
idealised Pashtun person. The colonial power had severely violated
the namus of the Afridi. An impressive symbolic retaliatory action ,
an attack on the namus of the British was seen as the only way out
from disgrace in the eyes of the rest of the Pashtuns. Disgrace is
considered as weakness, as social inferiority, if I cannot kill the
one who disgraced me I have to disgrace him also, otherwise I would
accept my permanent social weakness and inferiority.
By a particularly dare-devil act as the one of Ajab, disgrace can
even be turned into honour and fame. Ajabs deed is considered by the
Pashtuns so brilliant because it was an individual act (with only
two companions). Only individual acts lead to honour and fame which
then may radiate to the whole clan or tribe.
The Whole Man: khan and Commander
As mentioned already the ideal male personality consists not only of
tura but also of aql (reason and wisdom) as Ajab proved by voluntary
exile.
Unchecked tura is expected from boys, later social virtues are
added: responsibility for family and for the wider social world. The
aim of an ambitious Pashtun is to become khan , i.e. one who has
proved tura, who is sharp in thinking and just and prudent in his
judgements, who is an acknowledged expert of pashtunwali , who
exercises generous hospitality and who is ready to share his wealth
with adherents, guests and with people under his protection.
A khan also provides economic benefits to his clients, e.g. a nomad
khan organizes for his people access to pastures and deals with
state authorities, among the peasants the khan cares for irrigation,
provides access to improved seeds or even attracts foreign aid
organizations to carry out projects in his area. The khan 's
oppinion has weight in the local councils and tribal assemblies. His
power and influence is weighed by the number of his clients and of
his guests in his hujra, his guest house, whom he can expect to take
his side in a conflict. A khan is called to settle quarrels and to
act as a speaker of his adherents.
E.g. I met one khan who used his fluent German to speak at
solidarity functions for Afghanistan in Germany in order to raise
funds for his people in Tani (East Afghanistan) - a genuine task for
a khan.
During the last war in many Afghan areas the khan was replaced by
the commander (comandan). Now other leadership qualities were on
demand, e.g. access to wepons, money and to food supplies from
Pakistan or Iran. Commanders had to join one of the mujahedin
parties who were the main distributers of military supplies. The new
leaders needed military abilities and had to be physically able to
march long distances on foot, because the fronts were constantly
moving. Many of the old khans could not cope with these new tasks
and fled along with their clients to Pakistan leaving their place to
the new commanders.
Islam, Martyrs, and Victors
So far Islam was not mentioned much in this paper. The Pashtuns
understand pashtunwali as an expression of practical and true Islam.
Other Muslims may be of a different oppinion. During the war when
Arab mercenaries critisised their Afghan comrades for deviations in
Islamic practice bloody conflicts arose, e.g. when Arabs tore down
flags at Afghan graves. Pashtun claim they are genuine Muslims, not
converts as the Iranians, Turks or Pakistanis. As their legend goes,
Qais Abdurrashid the apical ancestor of all Pashtuns in his Afghan
mountains heard of the Prophet in distant Arabia, went there and
became one of the Prophet's first disciples at a time when most
Arabs still fought against Islam.
In fact the basic values of honour, shame and readiness to fight
(for a just cause, of course) do not contradict the canonic
scriptures of Islam, the pashtunwali rather elaborates on them or
sets slightly different accents. In official Islam fighting without
a "just" cause is not acceptable and also not just for the honour
and fame of an individual. A Pashtun would answer that the unbridled
fighting spirit of young men has to be directed to reason and
responsibility, and this is where Islam comes in.
The Islamic concept of jihad is not new in Afghanistan. Afghan
mullahs called for jihad against the British infidels many times.
After the Soviet invasion in 1979 when jihad was declared again, the
whole complex of the Islamic concept of warfare and its terminology
was available. Now the warrior was not only an arbaki and a turialay
but a mujahed , "the one who fights the jihad". The refugees are not
just pitiable displaced people who lost everything, but they bear
proudly the honorary title muhajer (plural muhajerin) as the Prophet
on his Exodus (hijra) to Madina. The one who aids the mujahedin and
muhajerin and gives asylum to the latter as the Pakistanis and
Iranians is an ansar as the Prophet's friends in Madina (CENTLIVRES
& CENTLIVRES-DEMONT). He who dies in the just war is a martyr of
religion, a shahid ("one who bears witness for his belief"), he goes
to heaven irrespective of his former sins.
NOTES:
(1) Revised text of a paper presented at the 14th European
Conference on Modern South Asian Studies in Copenhagen August 1996,
Panel 4: Concepts of Person, Sainthood and Power in South Asia. The
original title of this paper was "Being Pashtun - Being Muslim:
Local and Translocal Concepts of Person in Afghanistan". During the
process of revision the emphasis of the paper got changed making it
necessary to change the title too.
In the original text some of the Pashtun terms have diacritical
marks which are not possible to produce in this ASCII format.
(2) The size of the "armies" of the present war lords fighting for
Kabul are relatively small in numbers (some ten thousands) compared
to the male population engaged in agriculture (millions). The
atrocities of this civil war are due to sophisticated modern weapons
not to the numbers of fighters.
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NOTIONS OF INDIVIDUAL HONOUR AND SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY IN
AFGHANISTAN
By Bernt Glatzer (1)
Since its beginning the recent Afghan jihad was not only directed
against an alien invasion and an imported ideology, but also against
obsolete internal political structures which long before 1978 had
encroached on traditional values without improving the standard of
living of most people. After the withdrawal of the Red Army the
country is still under heavy influence from outside powers which do
not allow Afghanistan to come to terms with her own social and
political problems. A case in point is the recent emergence of the
powerful Taliban movement whose success is partly due to the support
by Pakistan. On the other hand the Taliban are an indigenous
movement whose motives of action are rooted in the norms and values
of a large part of the traditional society. In order to analyze the
present civil war in Afghanistan indigenous as well as exogenous
factors have to be taken into consideration as well as the motives
of the acting persons who consciously reflect their role in local,
regional, interregional, inter-ethnic, and international contexts.
In spite of Afghanistan's retrogression into a pre-state situation,
and in spite of all the violence and terror the media are so eager
to report on, there is a remarkable process going on in the country:
in most areas of Afghanistan civil life has returned and
rehabilitation with and without international aid is proceeding
successfully and fast (Christensen 1995, Donini 1996). This proves
that civilian values and practices counterbalance those of the
"Pathan warrior".
This paper will mainly deal with Pashtuns - the largest single
ethnic group in Afghanistan. "Afghan", "Pashtun", "Pukhtun", have
originally been synonyms and are still understood so by a large part
of the local population, although the Afghan state officially
includes all ethnic groups under this term.
Half of the 17 to 20 million Pashtuns live in Afghanistan the other
half in the Pakistani provinces NWFP and Baluchistan.
They were called the world's largest tribal society (Spain 1963)
because of their number and their all embracing genealogical charter
which links the thousands of Pashtun tribes to one apical ancestor.
Although comparative research among different social groups in
Afghanistan is lacking we have no indication that there are
significant differences between the ethnic groups as notions and
concepts of person and Islam is concerned. The reason why I
concentrate on the Pashtuns is that we have more detailed and
elaborate emic and etic sources on personal norms and values of
Pashtuns than on other ethnic groups in Afghanistan, namely the
pashtunwali, a charter of ethnic pride and self understanding many
times written down in a systematic way.
The Pashtun ideology of war and violence, of the martial and heroic
behaviour of the men is named tura (lit. "sword"). However,
readiness for violence and war is but one aspect of the traditional
ideal of a male person; the other aspect is aql: "reason",
particularly in the sense of social responsibility.
A man of aql is one who reasons and acts in an integrative social
way, he is hospitable and generous, he grants asylum, reaches to
balanced social judgments and is able to act as a mediator in
conflicts.
The concept of tura and aql includes to know when to draw the sword
and when to put it back to the sheath, when it is time fight and
when it is time for caring for the welfare and unity of one's
family, clan, tribe or of wider social units, up to the Muslim umma,
depending on one's social horizon.
When we consider the duality of tura and aql we may understand why
bands of anarchic Afghan warriors were able to inflict heavy defeats
to the super powers of their time, and why most tribal warriors laid
down their arms the day after their victory and went home to plough
their fields - some for the first time in their life(2).
The Image of the Noble Warrior
Several times in Afghan history invasion armies, superior in number,
technique, and organisation, received "bleeding wounds"
(Gorbatchev). Persians, Moghuls and the British had to make this
experience. After three major defeats the latter had to give up the
plan to colonize the country. E.g. in 1842 the attempt of the
British General Governor of India to occupy Afghanistan permanently
and to enthrone a puppet Amir ended in complete disaster, the
British ambassador got assassinated and the British garrison with
more than 16,000 soldiers and their attendants perished during
retreat in the gorges of eastern Afghanistan. Even in distant
Germany this event became a subject of poetry:
"Mit dreizehntausend der Zug begann,
Einer kam heim aus Afghanistan."
[with thirteenthousand the campaign began,
one came home from Afghanistan]
(Theodor Fontane quoted from SNOY, p.73)
In London this defeat was felt with particular pain and shame
because it was not the armies of imperial Russia or of another big
power which inflicted this set-back to British expansion but
unorganized bands of "savages". During the following assessments of
the disaster the "savages" soon mutated to noble warriors, to
descendants of Alexander the Great or to "Aryans", i.e. they were
styled as a sort of Europeans against whom to loose was not
considered that shameful. The unspoilt Afghans were said to have
preserved all the male virtues of antique times and were depicted as
a model for the contemporary youth, similarly as Tacitus idealised
the ancient Germanic virtues. It was Mountstuart Elphinstone,
officer of the East India Company, researcher and influential
writer, who in 1815 laid the foundation for the idealization of the
Afghans in his famous "Account of the Kingdom of Caubul". In open
sympathy he compared the anarchic and fiercely egalitarian
("republican" as he called them) Afghaun tribes with the most noble
human groups the Scottish aristocrat and humanist could think of,
that is with Scottish clans and with Greek-Roman republicans.
Afghan intellectuals, poets and authors, traditionally multilingual,
were well aware about what was said and published on their people
and country even in England, they were of cause pleased to see their
people so advantageously characterized and they added to it in their
own writings and teachings. No wonder that the ideal image of the
Pashtun/Afghan as the noble, gallant, dauntless and generous warrior
soon became the subject of legends and elaborated ethnic and tribal
self representations among the Pashtun tribes who lived not too far
from British-Indian cultural influences (the ones between Kabul and
Peshawar, Swat and South Waziristan). From there the image was
taken-up again by European authors and was further elaborated,
particularly when more British military defeats at the North West
Frontier were to be explained. Thus in intercultural collaboration
an elaborate image of the ideal Pashtun personally was created. The
eastern Pashtun tribes who had to deal with their mighty eastern
neighbor merged this personal image with Islam and with their more
traditional tribal law to a canon of Pashtunness, the pashtunwali.
Pashtunwali the Ethnic Self Representation
ELPHINSTONE used "pashtunwali" only in the sense of the customary
law of the Afghans. In RAVERTY's Pashtu Dictionary of 1860
pashtunwali became "...the manners and customs of the Afghan tribes,
the Afghan code." More than hundred years later among eastern
Pashtuns pashtunwali is used as the "... explicitly known part of
their system of values and norms by which they believe to differ
positively from all Non-Pashtuns". In West Afghanistan the term
pashtunwali is unknown, there the traditional norms are called rawaj
which in terminology and content hardly differs from those of their
neighbours.
In West Afghanistan the term for the ideal person is ghairatman, but
Pashtuns there do not claim a monopoly. An Aymaq or Tajik may be as
ghairatman as a Pashtun, differences are considered rather in
degree. (more on ghairatman see JANATA & HASSAS). The pashtunwali of
the eastern Pashtuns serves as a model and an orientation for
education, as a guide line and measure of values for solving
conflicts, as a marker of contrast against ethnic aliens and also as
an invitation card for peaceful visitors (hospitality has first
priority in pashtunwali). With its threatening list of martial
self-characteristics it also serves as a deterrent to less peaceful
visitors.
Eastern Pashtuns have codified their ideal of person, thus offering
us easy access to their scale of values and to their motives for
action, but we may easily overemphasise the more spectacular or
violent aspects of pashtunwali such as tura and place them out of
context neglecting the more subtle points which complete the image
of person and without which we cannot understand complex sequences
of actions.
I base this paper of Pashtun ideals of person mainly on Alfred
JANATA's and Reihanuddin HASSAS's research on "The Good Pashtun", on
Willi STEUL's monograph on the pashtunwali, and on my own
ethnographic research among western Afghan nomads in the years 1970
- 1977 and on my experiences as relief worker from 1990 through 1993
in Afghanistan and Pakistan.
Nang: Dignity, Honour and Shame
The central term in pashtunwali is nang: honour and shame, dignity,
courage and bravery. A nangialay brings honour and fame to his
tribe. To be called benanga ("shameless", "undignified") is the
worst possible insult in Pashtu and a deadly threat to the social
position of the insulted. Killing the insulter is an accepted way of
regaining one's nang and thus of one's social status.
sharm is a decisive part of nang. sharm can well be translated by
the English shame, which encompasses shame in the sense of noble
modesty and its contrary shamelessness. If a boy greedily devours
his meal his father will tell him "sharm nalare?!" ("don't you have
shame?", "aren't you ashamed?"); but if a man does not prevent his
unmarried daughter from flirting with neighbour's son people would
say "sharm nalari" ("he has no shame") which is an extremely serious
insult and can only be answered by a very impressive action. sharm
has mainly to do with the behaviour of the women of the group whose
honour is at stake and with male control over the female half of the
society.
The relation to women can be seen clearer if we analyse the term
namus, which belongs to the complex of nang. It means privacy and
the protection of its sanctity. In the narrower sense namus relates
to the integrity, modesty and respectability of women and to the
absolute duty of men to protect them. In its wider sense namus means
the female part of the family, of the clan, tribe and of the Afghan
society; in the widest sense it is the Afghan home land to be
protected.
Although namus includes the inviolability of women and the duty to
protect their honour it does not imply that women stay passive. In
Pashtun folklore boldly acting heroines are praised such as Malalay
who has played a decisive role to win the battle of Maywand in the
Second Anglo-Afghan war, 1878-80 (more on male-female relations
among Pashtuns see TAPPER, in war see SHALINSKY). Yet in general men
consider young women to be less able to think and act rationally, to
have less self-control and to be more inclined to sexual activity,
in short they are believed to be an easy prey to any seducer who
comes along. Thus men feel obliged to fight for maintaining their
namus, i.e. first of all to keep the women of their families under
tight control, and to protect the women from their own "weaknesses".
Even more feared than the actual behaviour of women is the
neighbours' gossip, that is what erodes namus most effectively and
what is most difficult to control. Better do not let anybody see the
women. In urban areas this leads to an increasing compulsion for
women to wear full veil or to remain hidden behind the walls of the
family compound. Since the early 1970-s I noticed seclusion of women
(parda) to expand into the countryside, a process which gained
momentum during the recent "holy" war. I estimate that more than a
million of women have experienced parda for the first time in their
life when they arrived at the refugee camps in Pakistan.
Very many Afghan consent that parda is not an indicator for strength
and effective maintenance of namus, rather to the contrary, as I was
repeatedly told by nomads and peasants in Northwest Afghanistan: A
strong man can trust his womenfolk and is sure that no outsider
would dare to come near to them, only weaklings need to hide and
lock-up their women (cf. TAPPER 1991: ). In fact the refugee camps
in Pakistan and Iran were places of disturbed social and demographic
relations. During the war ca. 80 % of the camp population were
women, children and very old men, and the relatively small number of
younger men felt quite insecure in that alien environment, thus the
strict observation of parda observed in the camps was indeed a sign
of weakness and people believed they had no alternative how to
maintain namus.
In pashtunwali the inviolability of women and of land is closely
connected or considered as practically identical. Common sayings
are: "The way to the women leads over the land." and "He who cannot
protect the integrity of his family cannot protect anything, anyone
is free to snatch away from him what he wants, his possessions, his
land." Most authors on Afghanistan agree that threatened namus is
the most common cause for violent conflicts. When mujahedin were
recruited for jihad they were told, besides religious arguments,
that the (common) namus of the Afghans was threatened. In fact, in
1978 the first uprisings against the new socialist regime broke out
when the new socialist Afghan regime sent young activists from Kabul
to the provinces in order to force girls and women to school. Not
that people were principally against female education, but they felt
it was neither the state's nor any other's business to interfere in
matters where females are involved. So far the public and the
private spheres were always kept neatly separate. People, though
grudgingly, did pay tributes to rulers or even accepted military
conscription, but the state's transgression of the line between the
public and the private (namus) meant war.
Tura - the Sword
nang the honour and dignity of a Pashtun has two sides:
(1) An aggressive one with readiness to fight until self-sacrifice -
this is symbolised by tura, the sword;
(2) Reason and social responsibility (aql). aql is deliberate and
prudent behaviour which is intended to benefit one's family and
one's wider social entities up to the entire ethnic group, nation
(if such a notion exists) and even up to the entire Muslim umma. It
reaches from material support to participation in councils, to
jurisdiction and mediation in conflicts. These two sides of nang are
connected with different ages in life: The ideal persononality of a
young man is supposed to be dominated by tura he may be hot headed
and ready to draw the sword (tura) (today Kalashnikow) at the
slightest provocation. Aggressiveness is his first reaction,
reasoning comes second. The virtue of tura does not need to be
tempered by the young man's own aql , it is supposed to be checked
by the aql of the elders, the "white beards" (spin giri).
Consequently boys are educated to obey the elders.
Many Pashtun clans/tribes have tribal militias (arbaki, lashkar) to
execute the decisions of the egalitarian councils (jirga), bound by
the discipline of the militia the tura of the youngsters is guided
to socially accepted objectives.
During my time as an aid worker I experienced this in the eastern
Afghan province of Paktia: In spite of a large pre-war German
development project with its deep impact on the local
infra-structure the tribal social organisation remained intact and
functioning; in 1992, after the break-down of the Kabul Najibullah
regime most mujahedin of Paktia went home, participated in the
rehabilitation of their villages and land or rejoined the tribal
militia. Organisations who helped in the rehabilitation task were
provided arbaki (tribal militia) as guards. Thus in a situation
where state and government were absent civilian life returned rather
smoothly.
tura always relates to an individual. It is not sufficient to belong
to a group or unit of bold fighters, every one has to prove his tura
in single actions. The turialay, the man who embodies tura gains his
distinction by individual acts. He fights first of all for his
personal honour and autonomy, then for that of his family and clan.
A strong motive for displaying tura is to demonstrate one's own
equality and autonomy and consequently that of one's family and clan
and to demonstrate one's refusal to bow down before any arbitrary
power.
The mujahedin commanders were usually understood as primi inter
pares, the mujahedin respected their fighting and tactical
experience and most importantly their logistic abilities, every
mujahed considered himself to be on the way to become a commander.
The latter had to prove constantly their superiority, there was no
effective military command structure which could impose a commander
arbitrarily on any band of mujahedin.
Obedience to the tribal elders does not contradict the egalitarian
principle. The elders are understood as the representatives of
reason and tradition, of the collective will of the clan/tribe, but
they have to take care that their decisions are understood by the
younger as just and as in accordance to the generally accepted
values, they cannot expect the younger to obey automatically.
The highly individualistic stile of the Afghan mujahedin's fighting
was feared by the military planners on both sides and considered as
a great strategic problem. Even the Afghan mujahedin parties in
Peshawar lost control, their function was reduced to logistical
tasks and to public relations. I think the success of the Afghan
mujahedin against the hierarchically well organised Red Army lies in
the fact that the anarchic and chaotic actions of the Afghan rebels
were absolutely unpredictable for any professional strategist. On
the side of the mujahedin there was no military command to deal
with, if one commander was eliminated several new ones replaced him
instantly.
Education
Education to tura begins early. Fathers scuffle and mock fight with
their little sons of three to 10 years of age and allow them even to
hit their fathers who would return a friendly clap in order to
encourage the little fighter to another round. Harmless fighting
games between boys are applauded. The education is
non-authoritarian, a father is considered to be an example, not a
penal authority.
Children are present in guest houses, at tribal councils and
whereever serious decisions are made, in this way they are
introduced to pashtunwali and to the traditional values and thier
practical applications.
Girls and boys are educated towards the same values of person,
parents see to it that pashtunwali is internalised by girls as much
as by boys, girls also are present in public councils and listen
carefully. It is generally believed among Pashtuns that women are
more strict at pashtunwali then men and less ready to compromise
when matters of honour and shame are at stake. The following story
of a very popular Pashtun hero may serve as an example for what
Pashtuns conceive of an ideal personality.
It is the story of Ajab Khan an historical figure who has challenged
the British Empire and serves even nowadays as a model for
education:
The Cantonement of Kohat, south of Peshawar was one of the strongest
military fortresses of the British Empire, from here campaigns were
launched against the hostile and rebellious Pashtuns of the tribal
areas along the British-Afghan frontier. Pax Britannica may have
prevailed elsewhere, the garrison of Kohat was constantly at war.
The year 1923 was no different, this time a punitive campaign was
carried out against the Bostikhel, a sub-tribe of the Afridi north
of Kohat. At this occasion British soldiers trampled into the huts
of the Bostikhel and allegedly came too close to the ladies, anyway
the namus of the Bostikhel was serously violated and the clan in
uproar. A few weeks later young Ajab, a Bostikhel together with two
companions, sneaked at night into the Cantonment of Kohat, through
its multiple security cordons. They raided the bungalow of an
officer named Ellis and kidnapped his daughter Molly. The men with
the girl made good their escape and the next days they paraded in
triumph through the Afridi land making a laughingstock of the
Empire. In Kohat, Delhi and London emergency committees were formed
and the media reported wordwide with pitty for the girl and with
mockery for the toothless English Lion.
A military action to save the girl was out of the question, all the
British Government could do was to threaten the Bostikkhel and even
the entire Afridi tribe with frightening consequences.
In the mean time an English nurse walked into Afridi land all alone
and unarmed, met Ajab and persuaded him to release the Girl. After
three weeks Molly Ellis was back to Kohat - unharmed. The British
demanded strongly from the Afridi to hand over Ajab to the British
which the Afridi of course refused, but this was a very serious and
conflicting problem for the Afridi tribal council: The extradition
of Ajab would have been a breach of pashtunwali but not to hand him
over would have had very dire consequesences, there was little doubt
that the British would repeat what they had done in 1919 when their
war planes bombarded Pashtun villages.
Now came Ajab's second act by which he completed his heroic deed and
by which he earned the honorary title of khan: Realising that he had
brought his tribe into serious trouble he voluntarily emigrated to
North Afghanistan where he died a natural death in 1961 as a highly
honoured khan. He had saved his tribe from drastic punitiv actions
of the British by renouncing everything which a tribe offers to the
individual: protection, social security and warmth, in short: social
life. Expulsion from tribal land is the severest punishment a tribal
court can award, and volunary exile is considered the highes
sacrifice a Pashtun can offer.
For the British this was not enough, the Bostikhel had to pay 42,000
Rupees and Ajab's own land and village was destroyed.
As it can be expected from an heroic epic, Ajab Khan and the girl
are believed to have fallen in love to each other, but contrary to
the rest of the story this is not proven (for more on the story see
SPAIN p. 154ff).
Epilogue:
In 1982 I met Miss Ellis in Islamabad, she had followed an
invitation of the Government of Pakistan. Accompanied by the
Governor of the NWFP she was driven triumphantly from Peshawar to
Kohat right through parts of the Afridi country. The streets were
lined by jubilant Pashtuns and relatives of Ajab Khan offered to
carry her on their hands all along the way where she had been
abducted, which she friendly declined.
This story ilustrates tura and the core values of the ideal and
idealised Pashtun person. The colonial power had severely violated
the namus of the Afridi. An impressive symbolic retaliatory action ,
an attack on the namus of the British was seen as the only way out
from disgrace in the eyes of the rest of the Pashtuns. Disgrace is
considered as weakness, as social inferiority, if I cannot kill the
one who disgraced me I have to disgrace him also, otherwise I would
accept my permanent social weakness and inferiority.
By a particularly dare-devil act as the one of Ajab, disgrace can
even be turned into honour and fame. Ajabs deed is considered by the
Pashtuns so brilliant because it was an individual act (with only
two companions). Only individual acts lead to honour and fame which
then may radiate to the whole clan or tribe.
The Whole Man: khan and Commander
As mentioned already the ideal male personality consists not only of
tura but also of aql (reason and wisdom) as Ajab proved by voluntary
exile.
Unchecked tura is expected from boys, later social virtues are
added: responsibility for family and for the wider social world. The
aim of an ambitious Pashtun is to become khan , i.e. one who has
proved tura, who is sharp in thinking and just and prudent in his
judgements, who is an acknowledged expert of pashtunwali , who
exercises generous hospitality and who is ready to share his wealth
with adherents, guests and with people under his protection.
A khan also provides economic benefits to his clients, e.g. a nomad
khan organizes for his people access to pastures and deals with
state authorities, among the peasants the khan cares for irrigation,
provides access to improved seeds or even attracts foreign aid
organizations to carry out projects in his area. The khan 's
oppinion has weight in the local councils and tribal assemblies. His
power and influence is weighed by the number of his clients and of
his guests in his hujra, his guest house, whom he can expect to take
his side in a conflict. A khan is called to settle quarrels and to
act as a speaker of his adherents.
E.g. I met one khan who used his fluent German to speak at
solidarity functions for Afghanistan in Germany in order to raise
funds for his people in Tani (East Afghanistan) - a genuine task for
a khan.
During the last war in many Afghan areas the khan was replaced by
the commander (comandan). Now other leadership qualities were on
demand, e.g. access to wepons, money and to food supplies from
Pakistan or Iran. Commanders had to join one of the mujahedin
parties who were the main distributers of military supplies. The new
leaders needed military abilities and had to be physically able to
march long distances on foot, because the fronts were constantly
moving. Many of the old khans could not cope with these new tasks
and fled along with their clients to Pakistan leaving their place to
the new commanders.
Islam, Martyrs, and Victors
So far Islam was not mentioned much in this paper. The Pashtuns
understand pashtunwali as an expression of practical and true Islam.
Other Muslims may be of a different oppinion. During the war when
Arab mercenaries critisised their Afghan comrades for deviations in
Islamic practice bloody conflicts arose, e.g. when Arabs tore down
flags at Afghan graves. Pashtun claim they are genuine Muslims, not
converts as the Iranians, Turks or Pakistanis. As their legend goes,
Qais Abdurrashid the apical ancestor of all Pashtuns in his Afghan
mountains heard of the Prophet in distant Arabia, went there and
became one of the Prophet's first disciples at a time when most
Arabs still fought against Islam.
In fact the basic values of honour, shame and readiness to fight
(for a just cause, of course) do not contradict the canonic
scriptures of Islam, the pashtunwali rather elaborates on them or
sets slightly different accents. In official Islam fighting without
a "just" cause is not acceptable and also not just for the honour
and fame of an individual. A Pashtun would answer that the unbridled
fighting spirit of young men has to be directed to reason and
responsibility, and this is where Islam comes in.
The Islamic concept of jihad is not new in Afghanistan. Afghan
mullahs called for jihad against the British infidels many times.
After the Soviet invasion in 1979 when jihad was declared again, the
whole complex of the Islamic concept of warfare and its terminology
was available. Now the warrior was not only an arbaki and a turialay
but a mujahed , "the one who fights the jihad". The refugees are not
just pitiable displaced people who lost everything, but they bear
proudly the honorary title muhajer (plural muhajerin) as the Prophet
on his Exodus (hijra) to Madina. The one who aids the mujahedin and
muhajerin and gives asylum to the latter as the Pakistanis and
Iranians is an ansar as the Prophet's friends in Madina (CENTLIVRES
& CENTLIVRES-DEMONT). He who dies in the just war is a martyr of
religion, a shahid ("one who bears witness for his belief"), he goes
to heaven irrespective of his former sins.
NOTES:
(1) Revised text of a paper presented at the 14th European
Conference on Modern South Asian Studies in Copenhagen August 1996,
Panel 4: Concepts of Person, Sainthood and Power in South Asia. The
original title of this paper was "Being Pashtun - Being Muslim:
Local and Translocal Concepts of Person in Afghanistan". During the
process of revision the emphasis of the paper got changed making it
necessary to change the title too.
In the original text some of the Pashtun terms have diacritical
marks which are not possible to produce in this ASCII format.
(2) The size of the "armies" of the present war lords fighting for
Kabul are relatively small in numbers (some ten thousands) compared
to the male population engaged in agriculture (millions). The
atrocities of this civil war are due to sophisticated modern weapons
not to the numbers of fighters.
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