Thursday, 8 November 2012

How Not to Talk about Malala

[Summary: Critics are exploiting Malala’s attack either to prove a point about drones or to “prove” Muslim barbarity.]

by Orbala

Many analysts and critics across a spectrum are exploiting Malala's attack to justify their own political ambitions whether it’s a position on drones or a moment to allegedly prove the barbarity of the Muslim world.

Those who support drones read Malala’s predicament as a reassertion of the Taliban’s destructive force in Pakistani society. They believe that drones are the only possible means to cleanse the region of the Taliban. Others who condemn drones have pointed out that Malala, a victim of the Taliban’s attack, has become an international icon and a heroine while innocent children killed by drones are ignored. The latter group argues that, while Malala is a significant part of Pakistani society and an important and influential teenage leader, it is unfair to condemn the attack of the Taliban on Pakistani soil while ignoring U.S. attacks that kill many more.

Neither side discusses the Pakistani army’s attacks on the people of FATA. The army bombs and utterly destroys lives, homes, and families. The motives for these attacks are disguised under the umbrella of the “war on terrorism,” but, in truth, Pakistan has its own motives in Pashtun-dominated areas, particularly the Waziristan region.  That is one reason among others to believe that the Pakistani state’s role in the destruction of the FATA people and their land is deliberately overlooked. Consistent focus on drones, in fact, facilitates Pakistan’s attacks because it deflects attention from army attacks.

The outcry over drones is partly because they are executed by an outside force, the United States, which drone critics interpret as a form of colonialism. Yet, greater numbers of civilians are killed in Pakistan’s operation in the same region.  Both need to be discussed in such a way that one perpetrator is not privileged over another, such that one is rendered completely invisible and nonexistent, particularly when both claim to share an ultimate aim. So, it is not outlandish to hope that one may soon be able to read equally careful studies about the Pakistani’s army operations in Waziristan, their mission and their impact, in the same way one reads studies on drones.

It is in this context that I find myself wondering what Malala would make of these connections. Would she find the drone discourse too complex to offer a simplified yes or no response to the question of drones? What if she does not appreciate being instrumentalized to support a political discourse?

The Western media, too, has made political use of Malala. For this media, the attack on Malala is “proof” of the barbarity of the Muslim world and hence a justification for Western intervention. Yet, it is important to ask, why Malala now? Why didn’t Malala become a household name during the time when she was speaking out against the Taliban? Why did she only become important after she was attacked? A tentative answer is that before her attack, Malala’s outspoken-ness demonstrated that our oppressors are not completely successful in silencing us because we are still speaking out. We, Muslim women, are still active agents. It would have been unsettling to Western ideas about the passivity of Muslim women.

The American media has falsely convinced its viewers that Malala was shot because she wanted to go to school. It is unfortunate that most viewers have accepted this narrative and failed to ask simple questions like, “Is Malala the only girl in all of Pakistan who goes to school?” The average Muslim woman, or even the average Pakistani woman, does not get shot on a daily basis; millions of girls and women go to school daily, even if there are still many families who deny education to their daughters. Yet, for the Western media, Malala has become a stand-in for the condition of the generic Muslim woman.

Yes, there are issues in the Muslim world—including Pakistan—but many of the experiences of women in the Muslim world are shared by our sisters in the non-Muslim world. Highlighting one Pakistani girl’s case, and misrepresenting it as an attack on any Muslim woman who wants to go to school, not only trivializes the issue but also diverts attention from women’s mistreatment in the rest of the world—including the Western world.

Such a diversion has several problematic implications. It affirms the classic juxtaposition of the “Western” world with the “Muslim” world, supporting political theorist Samuel Huntington’s facile division of the world into mutually exclusive, essentialist civilizational categories in which some, like the West, were “civilized,” while others, like the Muslim world, were “barbaric.” It further suggests that women are perfectly well off in the non-Muslim world, and all that remains to be done is to raise “them”—the “barbaric” Muslim world—to “our” level of civilization. It makes gender issues within the West invisible. 

Indeed, Malala represents all women rightfully demanding to practice their right to speak up against injustices as well as any other right that they rightly believe are inherent to them. But Malala is not a symbol of Muslim women’s resistance to mistreatment and injustices— she is in fact a symbol of the resistance of all humans, irrespective of their religious, sexual, gendered, racial, national, and all other identities. She represents the mind, Muslim or not, that is deemed a threat to the social structure of any given society, the voice that is constantly but unsuccessfully silenced because of its power, its potential to bring change that many in any given society often fear. This change should not be limited solely to women’s right to schooling; it should include all people’s human rights—which encompass the rights of all marginalized and “othered” individuals and groups, particularly those against whom discrimination of various sorts has historically been normalized. It is this symbolism of Malala’s case that helps us to understand and appreciate Malala’s struggle as one that all humans, particularly all marginalized groups of people, can relate to, empathize with, and perhaps even sympathize with.

Obviously, the attack on Malala must be condemned widely, and Malala deserves justice; what I am critiquing is the course of conversations surrounding Malala. We may have little control over the Western media’s instrumentalization of Malala to represent all Muslim women as passive victims on whose behalf the West should intervene. But, we must not allow Malala’s case to be used to make Pakistani army operations invisible by incessantly talking about drones to the exclusion of the army operations.  

The writer is a student of Islamic Studies and Gender Studies. She blogs at orbala.blogspot.com and tweets @qrratugai.

A version of this article was published at tanqeed.org.

Monday, 5 November 2012

Pakistan: Spending its way into social inequality

by Saleem

Discretion Vs Rules in Federally Funded PSDP Projects Allocation

The overall size of the Public Sector Development Programme (PSDP) for the Financial Year (FY) 2012-13 is Rs 873 Billion as approved by National Economic Council (NEC) and reported in the budget documents of the Ministry of Finance1.  Different components of the PSDP can be summarized as below;

Table 1
S.No
Area
Funds Allocations as per Budget FY 2012-13
1.
Federal Ministries/Divisions
Rs 207        Billion
2.
Corporations
Rs 80.382  Billion
3.
Peoples Works Programs (PWPs)
Rs 27          Billion
4.
Special areas
Rs 36.055  Billion
5.
ERRA
Rs 10          Billion
6.
Provincial PSDP
Rs 513        Billion

                                                                    Total PSDP

Rs 873       Billion
   
                                               
After the adoption of 7th NFC award in December 2009 with consensus among the federating units, which is applicable to the budgets in FY 2010-11 and onwards, the share of Provincial PSDP has been considerably increased as more resources were transferred from federal government to the provincial governments.  Earlier, the 5th NFC award, which was adopted in 1997 and valid for five years, was in place till 2010 as no consensus has been reached over the 6th NFC award. Under the 7th NFC award, the financial autonomy of the provinces has been ensured by increasing their share in the divisible pool from 50 percent to 56 percent in 2010-11 and 57.5 percent from 2011-12 onwards2. The size of the provincial governments Annual Development Programmes (ADPs), thus, increased considerably.  This is a healthy sign for the federation of Pakistan as provinces can now devise their own developmental schemes in accordance with the development requirements of its own people with more resources at their disposal.

However, there is still considerable amount of funds left with the federal government in federal PSDP to be utilized in the public sector development projects (See Table 1) of national importance. These include Funds available with the Federal Divisions/Ministries and Peoples Works Programmes (PWPs) among others. 

Should these funds be utilized throughout Pakistan under some Rules or should it be ‘discretionally’ used by the Chief Executive (PM) or his federal ministers?  There should be no room for discretionary allocations of these funds and strict rules are needed to maintain the regional parity while distributing these resources across different federating units.  This is the main point of this write-up and to show it I will try to highlight two such areas where extensive discretionary powers with the PM/Federal Ministers distort the allocation of these funds where some provinces are preferred while others were ignored. To me, this may ultimately increased alienation among the deprived provinces and their elected representatives will echo their voices in the parliament.
One Such area where discretionary allocations were made is from the PSDP allocation to the Planning and Development (P&D) Division.  P&D Division is one of the 41 other federal divisions which were allocated with funds to be used under PSDP (See PSDP 2012-13 published by Planning Commission of Pakistan). The total PSDP allocated to this division is Rs 37.840 Billion3. Out of this total amount, Rs 22.2 Billion has been allocated to some 25 projects across the country on some very vital programs in the social and development sector. These projects include, for example, Population Welfare Programs (part of the Vertical Programmes) for four provinces and GB, AJK & FATA. The shares allocated to different federating units indicate the proportionate share of each region according to its size. This is fair enough as the shares indicates the proportionate share of each region according to its size and that rules were adopted to maintain regional parity. However, the remaining funds of Rs 15.7 Billion were block allocation under 4 ambiguous heads namely a) Challenge Fund; b) Feasibility studies; c) Project Prefatory Funds & d) Develoved/closed Projects Liability. The funds allocated under these four heads are as under;

Table 2
        S.No
‘Ambiguous’ Heads in PSDP with Serial Numbers
Funds Allocated in FY 2012-13
           1.
26. Challenge Fund
Rs 10 Billion
           2.
27. Feasibility Study
Rs 2.5 Billion
           3.
28. Project Preparatory Funds
Rs 2.2 Billion
           4.
29. Devolved/Closed Projects liability
Rs 1.0 Billion

                                          Total
Rs 15.7 Billion
 
According to the preface of the PSDP document of 2012-13 (published by P & D division under its secretary Asif Bajwa) , the ‘Challenge Fund’ will be the first step in setting fresh trends in the Public Sector Development arena to align PSDP with the objectives of New Growth Strategy announced by the Planning Commission of Pakistan.  The document says that this fund will be available to provinces for making ‘innovative projects’ targeting at ‘creative cities’ and ‘promoting youth skills’. I think it will be good to quote the entire 3rd paragraph of the preface to the PSDP 2012-13 document here
                “For the year 2012-13, the elements of New Growth Framework form the basis of allocation of resources. Measures have been taken to align PSDP with the objectives of new growth strategy. Federal PSDP 2012-13 sets fresh trends in the public sector development arena. As a first step ‘Challenge Fund’ has been created. This fund will be available to provinces for making innovative projects targeting at creative cities and promoting youth skills’
 In the total PSDP of Rs 37.84 billion of the Planning & Development Division, the money allocated to the challenge fund was Rs 10 Billion. As of today, Rs 9.6 billion has been spent on various projects under this head  which means the funds were utilized in the first four month of the fiscal year as budget was presented in June, 2012 (this is a remarkable! achievement as normally PSDP projects are faced with slow utilization which often lead to lapse of funds).  

This is also in complete violation of the rules set by P & D Division where a maximum of only 20% of the total cost in each quarter can be released during the first two quarters of the fiscal year4. Now please have a look at the projects which were approved and where funds were allocated are as under (I personally ‘collected’ this list from the P & D Division as access to information is the right of every citizen Now!); 


Table 3

Projects
Funds Allocated in FY 2012-13
A.
 Challenge Fund

1.
M-4 Motorway Multan
Rs 1,000  Million
2.
Multan Inner Ring Road including 6 Interchanges
Rs 100     Million
3.
Khanewal-Multan Inter District Road (Bosan Road)
Rs 400     Million
4.
Dualization of Mandra to Chakwal Road
Rs 2,100  Million
5.
Dualization of Sohawa to Chakwal Road
Rs 350     Million
6.
Execution of 33 Miscellaneous development Schemes in NA-51 Gujar Khan
Rs 1,650  Million
7.
Kacchi Canal (Phase-I, Balochistan)
Rs 4,000   Million

                                                                                               Total
Rs 9,600   Million
B.
Feasibility Studies
Rs 50.0     Million
1.
Establishment of COMSATS institute of IT, Jaffarabad
Rs 1.7       Million
2.
Inspector General Development Projects, Balochistan
Rs 126.3   Million
3.
Rainee Canal (Phase-I) Sindh
Rs 2,000   Million

                                                                                               Total
Rs 2,178   Million

                                                                                    
While the funds allocated to Kachi Canal in Balochistan and other transfers from ‘Feasibility Studies’ to Balochistan make sense as it may be used by the federal government to reduce the grievances of the people of Balochistan but ignoring KP & FATA altogether clearly shows that while distributing these regional parity was not maintained.  The ‘domicile’ of these projects corresponds with the domiciles of our two illustrious Prime Ministers i.e. Punjab.  It is not in my knowledge whether this apparent inequality in funds allocation is somehow accounted for in somewhere else or not (I will feel happy if I am corrected).

Another such area is Peoples Work Program (PWPs) named as Special Programmes in PSDP 2012-13. A total of Rs 22 Billion were allocated in the initial budget as documented in June, 2012. There are media reports that another Rs 10 Billion were added to this particular head on the request of PM thus increasing the total amount to Rs 32 Billion. There are no such rules for the allocation of these funds (as no details were given how this money will be utilized across different federating units). This may depends solely on the discretionary authority of the PM and his ministers to utilized these funds5. There are media reports that almost all the funds under PWPs were utilized within the first four months of the budget by the new Prime Minister/ Federal Ministers on his selected projects.  The media reports indicate that these funds are mainly used for ‘vote-buying’. I have no problem as such with vote-buying as all government does it everywhere in the word but I am interested to know the ‘geography/domicile’ of this vote-buying. If votes are purchased in all four provinces, FATA, GB & AJK then it can be tolerated but if vote-buying is mainly restricted in Multan or Gujjar Khan (Punjab) at the expense of other areas then it becomes problematic.  
And by the way this is not limited to this year budget only as it is a recurrent practice.  Every year, in the federal budget, an amount is earmarked to keep it in large Block Allocation without any projects under its head. Last year the Federal Government used heads of a) feasibility study; b)Other requirements and c) devolved subjects at Federal level to ‘hide’ these block allocations to be used with discretionary powers of the PM/Federal Ministers.  

Now it is good that the share of the provinces from divisible fools have been increased but should the remaining funds with the Federal Government be spent in disregard of the provincial allocation? And the problem is that this is not the ONLY case where such disparities exist in the Federal PSDP. All such allocations spent on discretionary powers of the Chief Executive (in this case with the PM) will increase inequalities across different regions.


Lessons learned!
1.       There should be no discretionary authority of the chief executive or his ministers over the funds in federal PSDP. The same should also apply to the provincial governments. There should be clear and transparent rules for resource allocations across the different regions.
2.       No ambiguity should be kept in the federal budget as the representatives of the countries can discuss each and every component of the PSDP in both National Assembly and Senate of Pakistan.
3.       The existing Rules with the P & D regarding the utilization of the PSDP should be strictly followed.    

 -The writer @saleemiss is a PHD student 

Refrences:


1.       Source: Budget in Brief 2012-13, Ministry of Finance & Public Sector Development Programme 2012-13, Planning & Development Division, Government of Pakistan.
2.       Source: Pakistan Economic Survey 2011-12, Ministry of Finance, Government of Pakistan.
3.       Source: Public Sector Development Programme 2012-13, Planning & Development Division, Government of Pakistan page 75-76.
5.       Some rules can be easily devised here as in the case of initial launching of the BISP program where each elected MNA/Senator was given with 8000 BISP forms to be distributed in their respective constituency thus maintaining regional parity!

Friday, 2 November 2012

Art of the day: A girls journey

ed note - the captions have been chosen by QK team

by Sesapzai
A slave to ignorance 

The Awakening
'When i looked into her eyes all i could feel was love' -Abasin Yousafzai






The escape

Tuesday, 30 October 2012

Tappey: The art of Pashtun folk poetry

this article has been edited from its original format. please include any corrections in the comments

by Rahmat Shah

Tappey ( Landay) is a form of folk poetry and consist of couplets, the first one consist of nine syllables and the second thirteen.
This format of poetry is described by some to consist of one and one half verses. The author is generally unknown. Some of them have names of authors or national figures and heroes attached.

Tappey are started with a fond opening word of ya qurbaan, meaning respect to the listener or the subject. Tappey are sung with loud melodious voice and could be accompanied by Mengay, Tabla, tembal, Baja and setaar. Tappey are generally sung over weddings, celebrations or just to tide over the long winter nights.

In weddings ceremonies it might have the form of two-person duet presented by male and female singer or two male singers. Tappa covers all forms of pashtun life ranging from love, passion, anger, hate, wars, history, heroes and villains.

Tappa : Cities and geography


The rugged pakhtun terrain from the borders of Chitral to Chaman and Ammu to the Abasin is the source of inspiration in the form of Tappa. It is therapy for the soul of the inhabitants of these mountains and valleys.

The Tappey will often include references to the cities of Pekhawer, Kabul, Kandahar, Nangrahar, Chaman, Mardan, Swat, Bajaur, Nowkhar, Krapa and Tirra as well as the landmark mountains like Khyber, Tatarra, Malakand, Tirra and Elam. Other themes are Islam religious in spiritual, through mentioning spiritual leaders of the past like Pir baba and Kaka saib. As well as the fragrant flowers like Kashmale, rose and Chambele to mention a few.

Tappa and the beloved 

The tappey speaker is descriptive on what he wants from his love. He compares the beauty of his love without devotion to a flower without fragrance.The beloved has to have wafa (loyalty) or heart felt devotion, she is mentioned with great reverence and respect, her lips are red, face ruby white and eyes, clear, shining, full of passion and beautiful like the flower of nargis (narcissus).

Her hair is long and consists of jet-black locks often compared to day and night. Some tappey describes the face of the beloved as roohani as Islam and the hair as pagan and kafiristan.

The lover never has a chance to marry the girl of his dreams. It is satisfying to dream and imagine seeing her fetching the water in the water pitcher Mangey from the water bank Guuder or well.

One historian noted this commonality between Pashtun and Jews by reading the frequent mention of water bank and wells in our folk poetry. He noted the same in the Israelites, like Moses, Jacob and many others who fell in love with their wives by wells and fountains.

Tappa and emotions

There are other themes, there is the Sohbat, the unending love talk of lovers and the state of bless, longed for in many verses. The beltoon the other fellow who has the same love interest is a hateful soul. He is waham and waswasa and the extreme fear of being accepted by the family and the beloved. The fond neglect or Makeiz exhibited by the beloved does not allay the fear either or remedy the situation.

Tappa: When love is like a bird

The beloved is not trustworthy she may fall for the talk of the beiltoon who is like Latoo, a bird that changes his tone frequently to attract his own kind in the forest. Tapoose tour kargha the crow is an ugly bird at times it brings bad news, by repeatedly crowing in front of the house. The qa qa of the crow inspires aw and fear of loss.

The Tappey covers the constant struggle of the pashtun with nature, the harsh weather, and drought. With all those wars, struggle for existence and survival I wonder how Adam Khan and Durkhaney pulled a love affair, so successful to be remembered for generations.

Some Tappey 

Guloona Dir Di Khudai Di DirKki,
Da Sabar Gul Ba Khpal Ashna La Warkawoma

The garden is full of flowers but I have to present the flower of patience to my friend.

Khude Me Bacha Qurr’an Me Pir De
Rasul-lah Ba Shafae’t Za Ma Kaweena.

God is my King,
The prophet will plead for my blessing.

Da Pir Baaba Lare Di Sakhte
Da Gulo Lakhte Jenay Sta Da Para Zam’a

The journey to the Mazaar of the saint, Pir Baaba is harsh and difficult
But I have to do it for the girl who is as beautiful as a flowering branch.

Zaan De Zarho Jamo Ke Jorhe Ka
Laka Pa Wran Kele Ke Bagh Da Gulo Weena.

She dressed herself in tattered clothes and
Looks like a garden of flowers showing through the ruins of a village.

Ka Da Zelmo Na Pura Na Shwa
Fakhr-e Afghana Jenekey Ba De Gateena.

If the young lads of the land failed to achieve the goals of Bacha Khan the pride of the Afghan nation; then it will be the lasses  for the achievement of his dreams and mission.

Meena Zari De Na Qabli Gi
Janaan Pa Ghetto Khelqu Zaan Hesaba We Na.

The gestures of the lovers are rejected, because of the great difference of class; the love interest has no time for the poor lovelorn.

Akher Ba Wran She Pekhawara
Da Nangrahar Juna Khere Derta Kaweena..

The lasses of Nangrahar are praying for the demise of Peshawar city; as they miss their lads attracted by the glitter of the City.

Ma Da Shamshaad Lekhta Ganrhale
Da Mere Zoya Da Azgho De Dakka Krhama.

I was dreaming of you as a beautiful cypress tree,
Instead you turned out to be a thorny bush.

Che Da Ayaz Pa Mekh Sheida Sho
Mahmood Bacha Da Ghulamano Ghulam Shuna.

Mahmood Ghaznvi uplifted the one time slave Ayaz to such a high position,
that the king sought his advice in the matters of the state as if the slave was the ruler and the ruler was the slave..

Bes Ka Pa Degha Zay’e Pregda
Soke Che Kheista Ashna Lari Ghamjan Ba Weena

Let us close and leave these Tappey alone,
Those who have a beautiful lover, have to put up with some sadness…


- original article by Rahmat Shah

Friday, 26 October 2012

The Pashtun disconnect

A version of this article was published by THE NEWS 23rd October 2012 and can be viewed here here

Barely a week ago a young girl was brutally attacked by extremists, but this young girls name was not Malala Yousafzai, instead this nameless victim was a 11 year old had acid thrown on her face in Kandahar district of Afghanistan. While this event went unnoticed elsewhere outrage poured out in Pakistan and across the world as news about the horrific attack on Malala spread.

In a month where a teenaged young girl was brutally attacked in Swat, a bus of students was attacked en route to Parachinar and a bomb blast in Darra Adam Khel killed dozens, the Pashtun disconnect has become even more obvious. While there was outrage at these attacks amongst Pakistani’s both Pashtun and non-Pashtun, as well in Afghanistan there was no uniformity in the outrage. In fact what was a common thread was how disconnected the outrage was and how difficult it was for Pashtuns to rally against it. This disconnect is further reflected by other examples, violence in Karachi, the siege of Parachinar, large scale displacement of people from the Federally Administered Tribal areas that does not trigger as much a response from Pashtun society as other Pan Islamic or state nationalist causes do.

To understand this disconnect one has to first look at two major outside factors, Afghanistan and Pakistan’s relationship and the events of September 11th 2001. What happens in Afghanistan is intertwined with happenings in Pakistan and vice versa. So while Afghanistan refused to recognise Pakistan’s independence in 1947, the Pakistani government in 1997 was the first state to recognise the Taliban dominated Afghan government. It was also around the same time sixteen years ago, that the former Afghan President Najibullah was murdered and horrifically tortured by a Taliban mob. It was an event that attracted little attention amongst Pashtuns in Pakistan but it was a sign of things to come. The events of 9/11 were another turning point, with the exceptions of Aimal Kasi and Faisal Shahzad the proportion of Pashtuns involved in terrorism attacks has been tiny but the consequences have been huge.

So why is there such a Pashtun disconnect? Geography, history and even law are some of the key reasons. Despite being Pakistan’s second biggest ethnicity they are divided into those residing within KP (Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa where they are a clear majority), in FATA, Balochistan, small pockets in Punjab and a large number in Karachi. The divide between the Pashtuns of Balochistan and KP has been maintained since Yahya Khan disbanded the one unit and merged the Chief Commissioner's Province of Baluchistan with the Kalat state to form a new province. Legally each area is influenced by a different code of law, with KP being governed by the same laws as mainstream of Pakistan, Malakand agency was governed by the old provincially administered tribal areas which was then replaced with a variation of Islamic law. Similarly the recently reformed Frontier Crimes regulation govern FATA and essentially put the people of the region in a legal grey area open to abuse.

In political terms there is no real representative of Pashtun society in the way the PPP does in Sindh or the PML-N does in Punjab. This is despite an electoral system which eschews in favour of Pashtuns in Balochistan and particularly in the senate where because of the same inter provincial split they can form a plurality. In fact if historical trends tell us anything it is that the Pashtun voter in K-P tends to vote predominantly for national party’s, while the Pashtun voter in Balochistan splits between the nationalist vote and the JUI-F. FATA remains largely driven by other influences being that the citizens did not have the right to vote till 1997 and did not have the right to contest openly under political party’s till 2010. To put that in context till 1997 no FATA MNA had ever sat in the opposition benches until Latif Afridi was elected. The last remaining factor is Karachi which despite its sizable Pashtun population the vote was divided until the new middle class came of age. This divide reflects in many other ways, there has never been a Pashtun prime minister, nor a Pashtun speaker of the national assembly. Where Pashtuns have been better represented is within the military establishment and bureaucracy. In terms of the Army recruitment and representation remains reflective of the percentage of the population, in the mid 90’s one served as COAS, and in the last decade several generals have been a stone’s throw from becoming the Chief of the Army staff. Within the bureaucracy however things have changed, from the days of influential bureaucrats like Roedad Khan to Ghulam Ishaq Khan becoming President; on last count, only three out of 49 Federal secretaries were from KP, none from FATA and no Pashtun secretaries from Balochistan.

The modern Pashtun voter shares many similarities with the Punjabi voter, for both the turning point was Zia-ul Haq’s 1985 election, which reinforced the business class interests and established a system of patronage. This ‘class of 1985’ as one writer noted, intertwined its business interests with politics. In the Punjab, this manifested in the election of politicians like Chaudhry Nisar who have remained undefeated since 1985 and the increasing conservatism of the society. By contrast in KP this class was uprooted in the 2002 MMA election sweep. The only notable exception electorally in the Pashtun belt is Aftab Sherpao, with the exception of 1985 election which he did not contest, has been winning since 1977 consistently.

In electoral terms, again the Pashtun voter tends to be fragmented, so in KP, no single party has ever formed an outright majority. In Balochistan, neither the Pashtun nationalists nor the JUI-F have been able to claim the Chief Minister’s seat or the Governors position. In the 1970 election the old National Awami Party’s biggest electoral success was not in the late Wali Khan’s home province but in fact in Balochistan where the Baloch turned out heavily in favour of the party.

Even the ANP’s success in 2008 election was limited, winning 13 out of over 40 pashtun dominated seats nationally was limited to Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa and in particular their traditional support in the Peshawar valley and Malakand agency. The PPP’s support amongst the Pashtun voters has been consistently strong since 1970, with a vote bank in the 2008 elections in most areas ranging from Bajaur in FATA to Dera Ismail Khan in KP. This is similarly the case with the JUI-F which has a broad vote bank from Mansehra to Quetta. The Pakistan Muslim League historically had significant support in the region from the old Frontier Muslim League. Several famous leaders attained senior party and political positions, ranging from the late Aslam Khattak to Nawaz Sharifs close associate Sartaj Aziz. With the advent of the PPP, the Muslim League has relied heavily on the Hazara belt in Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa , is now dependent on so called ‘electables’ in FATA, Karachi and Balochistan.

Hailing from Pakistan’s seraiki belt the cricket star turned politician Imran Khan’s Pakistan Tehrik-e-Insaf, has remained consistently more popular in K-P than in Imran Khan’s home province. In fact it was K-P was where Imran Khan polled the most votes, in Malala’s Swat district, during his disastrous 1997 electoral outing.

This political fragmentation of the power amongst the Pashtuns has had a major impact in economic terms. The problem with estimating this accurately is that much of the statistics used are based on the geographical divisions mentioned earlier on. So according to the UNDP’s most recent survey poverty levels in KP are 7% higher than the national average. If one discounts the wealthier districts of the Hazara belt (Abbotabad and Haripur) and includes FATA where poverty is double the national average, poverty in the Pashtun belt poverty levels are much higher than the national average ( conversely it means the Baloch poverty levels are even higher if adjusted for the Pashtun districts).
This dismal state is also reflected in the decline in the Pashtun presence amongst Pakistan’s business elite. While several Pashtun families were mentioned by Dr. Mahbub ul Haq in 1968 list of twenty two families; by 1990 that list had changed dramatically showing a clear relative decline. The larger undocumented Pashtun economy is difficult to calculate, again showing a fragmentation, with the interprovincial transport trade, transit trade to Afghanistan, expatriate money from the Middle East and the Karachi Pashtuns having increasing influence. An even bigger factor is the presence of ISAF personnel 100,000 next door and hundreds of billions of dollars being spent in an impoverished area. This has led to huge distortions in the Afghan and Pakistan economy which has anecdotally led to a shift in power away from traditional centres like Peshawar and Quetta towards places like Kabul, Islamabad, Dubai and Karachi.

What all this tell us about the TTP and the Taliban in Pakistan? It tells us that the terms insurgency, or terrorism, or lawlessness are all right and wrong in different situations and different settings.

More importantly it suggests that the attack on Malala is not an isolated event and it remains to be seen whether the backlash against it will be. For things to change, it is imperative for the Pashtuns to challenge ignorance and extremism which itself cannot be done without introspectively looking and reconnecting.


Monday, 22 October 2012

Any relief for Chitral?

by Siraj Ul Mulk


Two happenings are rapidly contributing towards disturbing the peace that we continue to enjoy in Chitral despite the unfortunate happenings in the rest of our province:


  1. The speedy and accelerated rise in the number of madrassa’s in our Mulkhow valley since the past four years.
  2. The closing down of tourism business consequently affecting the economy of Chitral in an adverse manner.


Both these factors are a direct result of the poor understanding of our district at our provincial level compounded by the poor quality of the officer in charge of the district police in Chitral.

Let me give some specific examples:

Last month the police was found protecting a man named Zahid Salarzai who had sneaked into Chitral impersonating as “a captain from the Pakistan Army”. Even the vehicle turned out to be a stolen vehicle. This incident has happened soon after another person from the tribal area had been escorted and entertained by the Chitral police saying he is “the son of Asfandyar Wali Khan of ANP” until the man’s true identity was discovered as a notorious man named Naushad Ali Khan from Landi Kotal. Both these cases are in court in Chitral.

A month ago, under a new name, one of the banned militant outfits was allowed to make a fiery hate speech in the Goldur Masjid in Chitral. Again last month when people in police uniforms and without identity papers were intercepted in front of a bank by the Chitral Scouts, the DPO ( instead of appreciating the alertness of the scouts) reacted by registering a false case of possession of alcohol against a scouts soldier the next day of this incident.

Chitral river, pic courtesy author
Four years ago people would scorn if asked what chances Maulana Fazlur Rehman’s JUI had to contest a National Assembly seat from Chitral. Today, with the help of his mushrooming madressa’s he has become a major player.

Tourism is a major bread earner for a large section of Chitrals population. Especially hotels, shopkeepers, jeep drivers and people in high villages wanting to serve as porters. This DPO works over-time to harass the few ordinary tourists who have been lucky to get an NOC to visit Chitral but he turns a blind eye on people establishing madrassa’s in our district for dubious reasons.

In the very early days of the Swat disturbances I used to ask my friends there what they made of the imbroglio. A large percentage of them would comment that they cannot help seeing an official hand behind the mischief makers. I am reminded of those words each time I see our DPO going about his duty to protect the peace that he has inherited in our district.


- writer Siraj Ul Mulk Retired army Officer, retired Airline pilot, is now in the hospitality and agriculture business in Chitral and the owner of Hindukush Heights Chitral www.hindukush.com.pk

Thursday, 18 October 2012

An Open Letter to the World about Malala

An Open Letter to the World by Malala Yousufzai

Obviously, this WAS NOT written by Malala. But read on anyway. Maybe you'll like something you see.

If you are here, you probably know my story, so I'll cut to the chase and address the people of this world directly. Before I do that, I'd like to extend my heartfelt appreciation for all the love and dua pouring in from around the world.


1) To the men:
Dear brothers, I appreciate the love. I really do. I see you talking about how reprehensible this act of violence is and I see you voicing your hate for Taliban and all. But let us step back and think about this for a second. Why are we even talking about me here? Why am a big deal? I'm a big deal because we live in times where fathers and brothers not only discourage their women from speaking out, but are actually an impediment in their way. Every house has a Malala, you just need to stop muffling her voice!


And I entreat you my brothers. Don't stand in vigils for me, don't make placards and protest. Instead I want you to go make a change in the world around you. Stop objectifying women. Love them and treasure them. Cut back a little on your vanity-expenses and educate someone instead. Make an actual, measurable, physical change in your attitude towards women and their welfare. Use your imagination, use your education. Be the great men you were meant to be!


2) To the women:
Sisters, I appreciate the love. I really do. But talking about it Twitter, or writing a blog post about me doesn't really help anyone. If you truly believe all the great things you say about me, then bring about some change in your own self. No matter where you live in this country, you can always find someone illiterate. Take some time out of your schedule and teach someone for an hour every day. I know you love the things you buy and I wont tell you to stop. I'll ask you to cut back a little and donate it to education. Be the women you were meant to be. Be the women of change. Don't fall victim to a consumerist social structure that objectifies you every day. Do something great with your life, and watching Hamsafar or spending sprees doesn't cut it.

3) To the Taliban:
Nice try guys, you have to do better than this to kill me. Maybe you'll kill me the next time you come for me, maybe you wont. You know what you cant kill? The will of Malala, the idea of Malala, and that pain in your heart that a 14 year old girl stood her ground against you. You were born of women, and you were raised by women, and I hope someday, you'll realize that you can't really kill us all.

4) To the Government of Pakistan:
We are a country of great people. STOP SELLING US SHORT!

5) To the "We are Malala" crowd:
No you are not. You know why? Because you aren't in a hospital bed right now. Actually, you aren't even on someone's hit list. And if you really think about it, you didn't give a crap about my cause till I got shot. You don't become a Malala by protesting on Twitter. Simple as that.

To the people who read this: I obviously think every one (including myself) is at fault for what Malala is going through right now. If you did something sentimental but utterly ineffective in reaction to Malala's shooting, and I forgot to mention you, I apologize.

You can follow @Jibbyd on Twitter and on his blog at thehimgrim.wordpress.com