Thursday, 28 January 2016

Presence of rhinoceroses in Afghanistan ( in the vicinity of Khyber pass) in 16th century

Shared by Baz Gul


Sidi Ali Reis was an Ottoman Admiral of Indian ocean fleet in 1553 A.D, during the reign of Suleiman the great. In 1553 he was commanded to fetch back the remains of a fleet which had been left stranded in Basra, Iraq by another officer. When he was preparing to leave Basra, his fleet was attacked by Portuguese and Sidi Ali barely escaped with few vessels to the coast of Gujarat in India. From there he traveled back overland through Pakistan, Afghanistan, Iran and Azerbaijan , reaching Istanbul via Baghdad in 1556. He wrote about his experience during the four years of travel in a book called "Mirat ul Memalik". Sidi Ali Reis related how he traveled from the Punjab in present-day Pakistan towards Kabul. His party reached

"the town of Pershuer, i.e. Peshawar. Soon after, we crossed the Khaiber Pass, and reached Djushai. In the mountains we saw two rhinoceroses (Kerkedans), each the size of a small elephant, they have a horn on their nose about two inches long. In Abyssinia these animals are more plentiful. (Mirat ul Memalik, English translation by Vambery, 1899, pp-64-65)

Word "Kerkedan" used by Sidi Ali Reis is Persian designation of the rhinoceros. The two rhinoceros were seen in the mountains in the vicinity of Khyber pass. Sidi Ali traveled from Peshawar into the mountains , and he mentioned the animals only after saying that he crossed the Khyber pass. Its quite possible that Sidi Ali saw the rhinoceroses across the border in present-day Afghanistan. Thus based on Sidi's work it can be concluded, that rhinoceroses was still known in this region until middle of the sixteenth century. 


Sidi Ali Rais. Image credit altayli.net




Credit: www.rhinoresourcecenter.com

Alam Khan Lodi عالم خان لودی

(This is the biographical note about Alam Khan also known as Alaudin Shah, the uncle of  Sultan Ibrahim Lodi. He changed the course of history of India, and of Afghans, by inviting and involving Mughals in the civil war of Indo-Afghans, in league with Daulat Khan Lodi, the governor of Punjab)


Alam Khan Lodi, son of Sultan Bahlol Lodi, was holding at the latter's death in 1489 AD, the governorship of the pargana of Rapri (Mainpuri district, U.P) and Chandwar (near Firuzabad town, Agra district, on the Jamuna bank). The Bahluli nobles arraying themselves as supporters of prince Barbak Shah (son of Bahlul), governor of the Punjab and Delhi and prince Azam Humayun Khan (grandson of Bahlul), Nizam Khan seated himself on the throne of Agra and Delhi, through the support of Umar Khan Sarwani, the Wazir. Prince Alam Khan being a partisan of prince Azam Humayun Khan, governor of Kalpi Sarkar (Jalaun district, U.P) was ejected by Nizam Khan (who had taken the title of Sikander Shah) soon after, from Rapri and Chandwar. He fled to his kinsman , Isa Khan Lodi, governor of Patiali (Etah district, U.P). Alam Khan, later on, submitted to Sikander, his powerful brother, who pardoned him and conferred on him the governorship of Etawa district instead. Alam Khan's son, Tatar Khan Lodi, was allowed to retain the governorship of Buksor, in the present Unnao district of Awadh.

We do not hear any more of Alam Khan in the chronology of the sultanate of Delhi and Agra during the last of the reign of the Sultan Sikander Lodior that of his son and successor Sultan Ibrahim, till we find him suddenly in the kingdom of Gujarat during the reign of Qutbuddin Muzaffar Shah (1511-1524 AD). It cant be definitely said whether he went there during the reign of Sultan Sikander . On the other hand if he had remain submissive to his brother , its is rather strange that he is not mentioned at all. He is not mentioned to have been implicated in the plot attempted by 22 nobles of his Kingdom in 1501 , to dethrone him and place in his stead prince Fateh Khan, his younger brother. The plot having been  divulged to the Sultan, he deported or executed all of the participators. The deported nobles like Said Khan, Babo Khan, Rai Ganesh, took refuge in the Gwalior where from they were expelled by Raja Mansingh at the protest of the Sultan. Many of the conspirators including Tatar Khan Lodi of the Punjab seems to have made their way to the kingdom of Gujarat. But it cant be said whether Alam Khanwas one of them. Alam Khan according to the testimony of recorded history, came to the kingdom of Gujarat during the reign of Ibrahim Lodi, and in 1523-24 AD, he stated, one day to Muzaffar Shah, that he had been staying with his majesty for a good time and asked for his permission to depart and contest his paternal throne, in response to an invitation sent to him by the nobles of the Punjab who had been tired of the right-handed and oppressive poking of Sultan Ibrahim. Alam Khan got the permission to his fortune. The Sultan gave him, in addition, suitable amount for outfit and preparations. It is not unlikely that Alam Khan was a member of the confederacy of the nobles of eastern districts, who under Islam Khan, son of Azam Humayun Khan Sarwani, rebelled against Sultan Ibrahim Lodi during the early part of his reign. The league included Said Khan, governor of Lucknow Sarkar, Bahar Khan Nuhani of the Sarkar of Bihar and Nasir Khan Nuhani, governor of Ghazipur.

The rebels were however defeated by Ibrahim after hard and contested battles fought in Awadh. Daulat Khan Lodi, governor pf Punjab, revolted some time later and had the support of his many sons who held districts in that province , and also officers and zamindars of the localities. Daulat Khan in order to strengthen his cause, invited Alam Khan from Gujarat because the latter had a better claim to the sovereignty of the country. Alam Khan thus came away in the Punjab though his sons Bhikan Khan and Jalal Khan remained attached to Sultan Ibrahim, the latter up to the battle of Delhi, in 1525. the fourth indian expedition of Babur (1525), resulting in the conquest of Punajb, was undertaken at the request of the party of Afghan nobles, headed by Alam Khan Lodi and Ghazi Khan Lodi, sons of Daulat Khan Lodi, who went to Kabul with presents which included Indian Mangoes and 'Pan' (Betel-leaf). After the conquest of Punjab, Alam Khan was given by Babur the Jagir of Dipalpur (Montgomery district, Punjab, Pakistan) and Ghazi Khan was given Sultanpur instead of Lahore which he coveted. Alam Khan could not retain his jagir for long time, he was driven away by Daulat Khan. Alam sought Babur's intervention against Daulat Khan who had meanwhile driven away the Baburi officers from Punjab. While at Kabul, Alam Khan appears to have entered into a pact with Babur to the effect that Babur would help Alam to regain his paternal throne, and that Babur would remain in the occupation of Punjab. After Babur's departure to Kabul, Alam approached his (Babur's) officers in the Punjab for the promised help but they refused to do so unless Ghazi Khan Lodi whom they distrusted had given hostages as pledge for good conduct. Upon this, Alam Khan entered into a treaty with Daulat Khan , agreeing to transfer to Daulat the Punjab and retaining for himself , the rest of Lodi empire. It was perhaps on this occasion that he publicly assumed the title of Sultan Alauddin Alam Shah, a name by which he is most often distinguished from his name-sakes.

Alauddin's troops swelled to 40 thousands. He marched straight upon the city of Delhi , being reinforced by Ismail Khan Jilawani and Jalal Khan Jighat and nearly overwhelmed Sultan Ibrahim's army in an organized night-attack. The situation was retrieved by Sultan Ibrahim Lodi, who stood calmly at the center though the flanks had collapsed and delivered an attack on Alam's troops engaged in collecting booty , as soon as the day dawned , Jalal Khan son of Sulatn Alam fled towards the Doab and Alam Khan took the same way till he reached the fort of gingata in the Dooris. He later surrendered himself to Mir Khalifa , Babur's Wakil-us-sultana. He walked into Babur's court naked and greatly distressed. Babur condoned his treachery and didnt speak speak a word of reproach. On the other hand every body in the court stood up when Alam Khan was brought in.

Alam Khan is next noticed as commanding the left center of Babur's army at the battle of Khanwa in which his son Jalal Khan was also present. Earlier he held the nominated command of a section of Babur's army at Panipat. Alam Khan is described in Babur's memoirs as a "prince who has near access to the Royal majesty". He seems to have left Babur soon after , for , we learn from Babur. about the capture by the Mughals, of one of Alam Khan Lodi in the battle of Dalman on the bank of Gumti. Badauni identifies him with Alam Khan  Lodi. He was sent as a prisoner to Qila-i-Zafar in Badkhshan where from he escaped and reached Gujarat via Baluchistan and Sindh, during the reign of Bahadur Shah. He became, along with his sons, one of the principle instruments in stiffening the attitude of Sultan Bahadur towards Humayun. Humayun in his third letter to Sultan Bahadur complains of unfriendly act of the Gujarat in giving asylum to his rebel Kinsman Zaman Mirza and Alam Khan bin Bahlul Lodi and demanded Zaman's surrender or expulsion from Gujarat. Bahadur rejected Humayun's demand and at the suggestion of Tatar Khan bin Alam Khan , placed 20 lacs of tankas at the disposal of Tatar Khan for equipping an army. Tatar Khan boastingly marched towards Bayana with a view to capture Agra. His mercenary troops deserted him in large numbers. He gave a fight to Mirza hindal with his remnants near Bayana and was defeated and slain.

Alam Khan is not mentioned in the troubled days of Bahadur Shah's struggle with Humayun . Evil days befell Gujarat after Bahadur Shah's death in 1537 AD. A contest developed between powerful nobles for the custody of the King's person. When Daria Khan raised Mahmud II on the throne, Alam Khan became attached to the former as the custodian of the palace , and commanded a portion of Daria Khan's army and shared his defeat in the hands of Safdar Khan entitled Alam Khan. Daria Khan saved his life by flight to Sher Shah Sur at Delhi . Alam Khan Lodi and Shujaat Khan were executed by order of Mahmud II after his triumphant entry into Ahmadabad at the instigation of Jargi, the bird-catcher. Their bodies rotted for three days before being buried by Safdar Khan. Thus ended the tragic career of Sultan Alauddin Alam Lodi. If he was 25 years old at the death of his father in 1489 (he must have been older than that , for his son Tatar Khan held the governorship of Buksar at that time) his age a2 years. He was too ambitious to follow a line of action with consistency. Nor can he be exonerated for inviting a foreign prince to invade India and obtain in the conquered land a firm footing. He turned a patriot after realizing the error when he joined Ghazi Khan for expelling the Mughals from Punjab and fought his nephew Ibrahim Lodi at the same time. He failed because fighting enemies at two fronts is a difficult game and that too by a rebel leader. During his second stay in Gujarat, he being in dotage, plays an almost insignificant part. A scheming rebel without great qualities of a soldier doesnt deserve a better fate.


(Excerpts from "Proceedings of All Pakistan history conference, 1951, from  Dr.A.Haleem's article, from page-218 to 223)

Shared by Khan Barmazid

Thursday, 21 January 2016

QK: CPEC a backgrounder

Exclusive to QK by S.Afridi.


This is an overview of the China Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) timeline from its inception to the present.

Background:

Prior to drafting the 11th Five Year Plan (2006-10) in late 2004 the NDRC Task Force forecasted considerable obstacles to China’s growth. Despite bold targets for internal reform and the extension of commercial activities beyond China’s East coastal regions, a consensus emerged within NDRC’s think tanks that growth at 10+% would be unsustainable beyond 2010 and would taper down to below 7% by 2015 beyond which an average 3% growth rates would be ambitious. Despite the course of reform proposed in the plan to counter identified obstacles to rapid growth (local monopolies, uneconomic segmentation of internal markets, required consolidation for primary industries) there was a single prominent hurdle to China’s growth ambitions; Sustaining China’s energy consumption. China’s Primary Commercial Energy Consumption beyond 2030 raised alarming possibilities.

China’s foreign trade dependence grew from 40% to 64% and energy consumption had come at a high cost in inefficient resource consumption. Resource conservation, which became an important feature of the 11th Five Year Plan, though novel, would not allow growth targets to be met beyond 2010. The entire resource utilisation model had to changed before the 12th Five year Plan and the cost of resource consumption had to be lowered considerably (almost 17%) for central provinces (Sichuan, Shaanxi & Chongqing) to be ‘opened up’. The ‘guideline’ indicated the growth model had to change from being based on ‘growth by resource consumption’ to one driven by ‘growth through resource utilisation efficiency’. Access to economically advantageous primary resources became a central feature for future plans.

The Opening up of the Central Provinces of China and the provision of competitive energy to these provinces faces considerable geographical hurdles. Their link to the West passes through the narrow gateway of Gansu beyond which lies the Xinjiang and its main trade nodes, Urumqi in the North & Kashi/Kashghar in the South. Much like its other Asian economic rivals (Japan & S-Korea) of the 90s, China’s growth is dependent upon access to natural resources and minerals from outside its economic region. The most economically competitive resources lie further afield to China’s North (Mongolia & Russia), West (Central Asia) and South West (Iran & GCC). Without economically viable access to these resources China’s plans to ‘open’ its central provinces to sustain its rapid growth would falter.

Though other primary resources (financial-capital, human-capital etc) also formed a major part of the Five Year Plans referred to in the article the focus will be limited to the question of trade in energy and mineral related primary resources which are of the utmost importance to the area of focus.


CPEC Timeline:

Though the Karakuram Highway (KKH) was constructed during the 1980s, in truth neither the Chinese economy nor that of Pakistan was able to take advantage of KKHW for decades after its construction. On China’s part, the tense Western border with the Soviet Union made any real effort to develop its Western regions a non-starter. Xinjiang was viewed by Beijing through a security lens, not an economical one. The softening of Moscow’s direct grip, emergence of strong and uncompromising post-Soviet dictatorships in Central Asia with an under-developed resource base changed Beijing’s outlook and the rise of China’s internal market economies coupled with their resource consumption also assisted in the bringing a less combative stance on its Western border. As a result the task force for the 9th Five Year Plan (FYP) proposed a course of action to encourage a concerted effort by China to facilitate trade in base industry raw materials from its Western and Northern neighbours.
Meeting these goals of the 9th FYP manifested itself in China’s instrumental role in the creation of the Central Asian Regional Economic Cooperation (CAREC) with the ostensible goal to increase trade and cooperation between post-soviet central asian states however China’s investment in CAREC programs tilted heavily towards promoting and safeguarding base industry raw material imports from the region into China. This also accounts for the slow progress of CAREC on inter regional connectivity, other than with China, since its launch in 1997 with the assistance of ADB. Having established the treaties and bilateral relationships necessary for raw material imports from Central Asia, the task force for the 10th FYP proposed further investment into securing the import of natural resources through a structured and sustainable mechanism. This led to concerted efforts into constructing the West-East Pipeline System as part of the 10th FYP to form the bedrock of China’s future resource imports from Central Asia. The Taskforce for the 11th FYP proposed the acceleration of investments into the region post the completion of the first phase of the West-East pipeline project (in 2004). This manifested in the revamping of China’s role in CAREC which resulted in China raising the stakes by involving the European Bank for Reconstruction & Development (EBRD), Islamic Development Bank, United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), World Bank (WB) and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) in September 2004 to fund CAREC projects. The result was a concerted effort by CAREC, led by China, to provide a blueprint for future collaboration and regional trade in the form of CAREC’s Comprehensive Action Plan (2006).

These developments along with China’s bilateral and multilateral negotiations within Central Asia had not gone unnoticed by the then government of Pakistan which was involved in negotiations with China for a Free Trade Agreement (FTA) and which saw China’s growing focus and investment in Central Asia as an opportunity to propose a strategic partnership to China based on trade and extending China’s regionalism efforts to secure resources. The series of discussions between China and Pakistan during 2005 led to the formal acknowledgement of Pakistan’s offer to create a “Trade & Energy Corridor” between the two countries linking the Arabian Sea port of Gwadar to Kashghar/Kashi in China’s Xinjiang. Pakistan’s primary focus in these discussions was to open up Pakistan’s ‘National Trade Corridor’ (NTC) program for China’s investment and cooperation. The Chinese Embassy in Pakistan made the formal announcement to acknowledge the corridor and establish a set of “Early Harvest” projects centred around a bilateral free trade zone and the consideration of a ‘Trade & Energy Corridor’. Subsequent discussions between Pakistan and China from November 2006 onwards focused around numerous projects forming part of three separate programs.

The Three Programs:

1. Short-term (Early Harvest):
Utilise existing infrastructure development projects to build a land route linking two bilateral Special Economic & Free Trade Zones of Kashghar & Gawadar utilising, realigning & upgrading the existing KKH and link it to Pakistan’s Motorway Program as part of NTC.

2. Medium Term:
Establish a “Trade and Energy Corridor” by building a dedicated rail and land route from Gwadar’s Container Terminal to advance freight and commercial traffic to Kashghar. Build power projects focused upon the utilisation of Pakistan’s Coal reserves in Sindh and River water systems in Northern Pakistan.

3. Long term:
Build Oil, Refining, PetroChemical & Storage Complex at Gwadar, with Oil & Gas pipelines from Gwadar to Kashghar extending into the 2nd phase of the West-East Pipeline Complex in China and linking China’s Gas field investments in Iran to Pakistan’s PetroChemical Complex and Pipeline.
Establish a dedicated Freight Railway Route (including Oil Frieght) from Gwadar’s Container Terminal (& Petrochemical Complex) to Kashghar. This rail-link would be formally incorporated into CAREC’s dedicated Rail-Link for Central Asia. Further the program proposes to establish a link between the Eurasian Continental Land Bridge to Peshawar, with bifurcating offshoots from Quetta into Iran leading into Turkey/EU & Quetta into Kandahar leading into Central Asia.

In order to facilitate the utilisation of the Short Term Program, the NDRC task force constituted in November 2008 for the 12th FYP proposed ‘formally’ bringing Pakistan into the fold of CAREC and realign and incorporate Pakistan’s Planning Commission’s own National Trade Corridor Improvement Program (NTCIP) into CAREC’s Corridors. Pakistan was formally inducted into CAREC in 2010 and NTCIP’s Motorway Program was linked with CAREC to provide funding for its completion as an extension to CAREC’s Corridor 5. China State Construction & Engineering Corporation Limited (CSCEC) was tasked to conduct the feasibility study for completing Karachi-Faisalabad Motorway as part of NTCIP. A further proposal was made to link the two CAREC Corridor 5 nodes of Peshawar and Quetta with each other to facilitate resource extraction from China’s mining investments in Afghanistan and would also function as the parallel road route to the long term dedicated railway route and pipeline structure from Gwadar to Kashghar. Both the NTCIP Motorway program and the linking of CAREC Corridor 5’s nodes of Peshawar and Quetta were to be completed before the Mid-Term Review of the 13th FYP in August 2018.

For the Medium and Long Term Programs NDRC launched a formal study (2008-12) with assistance from the Planning Commission of Pakistan (with considerable work by National University of Science and Technology (NUST) Pakistan and Tsinghua University China) which was incorporated into a larger, more comprehensive study of extending China’s trade and resource import routes under the coming 13th FYP (later announced as the Silk Route Economic Belt initiative). In early 2013 the initial Feasibility Study & Preliminary Design for the Pakistan-China “Trade and Energy Corridor” from Kashghar to Gwadar was approved by NDRC and shared with the Government of Pakistan for its approval. The proposed route linked the upgraded KKH to Pindi Gheb and then Pindi Gheb to the NTCIP junction on the M8 motorway onwards onto Gwadar. Furthermore, Pakistan’s Trade and Energy Corridor was to linked with West to East routes in order to provide viable and economically competitive extraction routes into China’s investments in raw material fields within Iran and Afghanistan. Pakistan existing railway route, main line 2 (ML2), was to be upgraded and developed as the main route linking Gwadar to Kashghar. The target for the completion of the Trade and Energy Corridor was between prior to the Mid-Term review of the 14th FYP in August 2023.

In June 2013 a new government took office in Pakistan and Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif directed efforts to be made to bring completion times on the Trade and Energy Corridor forward to ensure project completion within 2017 and prior to the next General Election in 2018. The inability to provide firm commitment on 2017 completion times led to an alternative “Early Harvest” route being proposed to the Chinese government in the Prime Minister’s visit to China in July 2013, soon after taking office, to formally sign 25 agreements relating to the ongoing Trade and Energy Corridor. The amended proposal was to upgrade the existing National highway Five (N-5) to ensure completion of a viable route by 2017 and the upgrade of the existing railway Main Line One (ML1) to ensure completion by 2017. Pakistan also agreed to undertake the funding gaps for the amended proposals. Both the amendments ensured that the railway and road routes utilised existing infrastructure and passed through the Prime Minister’s electoral heartland, especially Lahore. The existing projects that formed the Short Term Program for the “Trade and Energy Corridor” were bundled together with the amended proposals and repackaged into a grand scheme labelled as the China-Pakistan-Economic Corridor (CPEC).

Though no formal announcement was made for the amendment to the N-5 route, maps had been issued by the Planning Commission and also through the various think tanks, including the Pakistan-China Joint Think Tank, showing the N-5 route beginning at the N-15 node at Hasan Abdal and ending at Khanewal, via Lahore, to be the main route for CPEC. During the subsequent year the PMLn government faced increased pressure in the Senate of Pakistan by the ANP, PPP and PMLq representatives to declare the formal route of CPEC. As part of the previous government some representatives from all three political parties are aware of the original negotiations with the Chinese government and the feasibility studies conducted by NDRC for NTCIP’s Trade and Energy Corridor. Before the Senate Standing Committee on Finance and Revenue the secretary of planning acknowledged that changes had been made to the original recommendations of the NDRC but had been done so on the request of the Chinese Ambassador and not by the government of Pakistan. The government of Pakistan suffered a setback after the Chinese Ambassador to Pakistan declined any role by himself or his government in any amendments. Shortly afterwards the Minister for Planning acknowledged the existence of three separate routes and that the government would concentrate on an “Eastern” route (via Lahore) to reap the benefits of Early Harvest Projects. After enduring a year of opposition and political pressure the government of Pakistan finally went on to publish maps for three separate routes;

Western Route: NDRC’s proposed linking of Corridor 5 nodes of Peshawar & Quetta with Gwadar (part of NDRC’s Short Term Program being funded through CAREC)

Central Route: Long Term Trade Energy Corridor as per NDRC study
(part of NDRC’s Medium Term Program)

Eastern Route: NTCIP’s Motorway program amended with an extension to Lahore (N-5 upgrade).
(part of NDRC’s Short Term Program with an amendment to link Lahore)

Despite efforts to amend the route to the Prime minister’s request, concerted opposition has ensured that CPEC would not follow the N-5 contour, from its intersection with N-15 at Hassan-Abdal, to Lahore. However the Lahore-Khanewal section of the amendment has been incorporated into the original NTCIP proposal.

In summary, after two years of trying to amend the original plans laid down by NDRC the PMLn government’s total contribution to the original short term program has been the inclusion of the Lahore-Khanewal stretch into the Motorway program and the inclusion of the ML1 railway upgrade.

Perspective:


Just to put things into perspective, CPEC is part of a wider picture. As part of the 13th FYP the Government of China has identified eleven (11) separate nodes for land based trade imports and between them they provide six (6) trade corridors. Pakistan is linked to a single (1) node out of eleven (11) and part of a single (1) trade corridor out of six (6).

The 6 Corridors have been given the following informal names:

1. CMREC (China-Mongolia-Russia Economic Corridor)
2. NELB (New Eurasian Land Bridge)
3. CCWAEC (China-Central & West Asia Economic Corridor)
4. CICPEC (China-Indo-China Peninsula Economic Corridor) – Greater Mekong Sub-region
5. CPEC (China Pakistan Economic Corridor)
6. BCIMEC (Bangladesh-China-India-Myanmar Economic Corridor)

Note: – the most ambitious and politically sensitive corridor in terms of its goal, extension & effect on Asia & the World’s Political Economy is the BCIMEC. It was originally proposed during the 2008 Task Force for the 12th FYP by the government of Yunan as a Third Eurasian Land Bridge. It is also the most unlikely to materialise as proposed.

Tuesday, 25 August 2015

Meeting Ahmad Faraz


republished to commemorate the poets death anniversary on the 25th of August

My Encounter with Ahmed Faraz

I didn’t know Ahmed Faraz personally. But as students at Peshawar we often saw Faraz on the university campus. He taught Urdu. He was a noted poet even then, but among students he was known equally, if not more, for his bohemian lifestyle.

Peshawar University, built at the foot of the Khyber hills, was then 5 miles away from Peshawar city with almost nothing in between except the old Tehkal village on one side of the road and the new and elegantly built University Town on the other. Double decker G.T.S buses ran back and forth at regular intervals ferrying students between the city and the campus. Today, it’s hard to tell where the city ends and the campus begins. The urban sprawl has spread like a cobweb on both sides of the road

Saddar was the happening part of the city. In the evenings, the students would descend upon Saddar to watch movies, to gossip in the cafés, or to simply walk up and down the short stretches of the main Saddar Road and Arbab Road watching people. The Capital and Falak Sair were the two cinemas that showed English movies; Silver Star and Café Alig were popular cafés; The Green Hotel, located at the end of the bazaar also served Murree beer in a bar tucked upstairs. (Prohibition came later, in 1972, when JUI’s government came into power with Mufti Mahmood as the chief minister.) A few hundred yards down the road, the upscale Dean's Hotel retained its quaint colonial architecture and continued to serve mulligatawny soup and caramel custard and, of course, beer and other drinks, in a more formal setting.

London Book Depot was the big bookshop; Bandbox was the drycleaner; Medicose was the chemist; Rathore was the men’s tailor, who not only spoke English in British accent with his clients but also asked a puzzling question, when taking measurements of the trousers, which side do you keep the ‘dressing’?”

Not far from these places, on the main Saddar Road, across the bus stop, was this little paan-and-cigarette shop that did brisk business. Faraz often stopped at this shop. He would come on his noisy motorbike, stop in front of the shop and, without switching off the engine or getting off the bike, buy his cigarettes and paan and breeze away. The alacrity with which the vendor stepped out of his stall to serve Faraz suggested that Faraz had either a running account with the vendor or perhaps he was an ardent fan of the poet – or both.

I clearly remember watching Faraz stop at the paan shop one evening when I was waiting for my bus at the bus stop across the street. He stopped his motorbike without switching off the engine, with his one foot against the curb and the other still on the footrest of the bike, both his hands clutching the bike handles, revving the engine up and down as if he were in a bike race ready to take off. The vendor, familiar with Faraz's routine, quickly prepared a paan and, instead of handing it to him, slipped it in Faraz's mouth, like a mother would a piece of food in a toddler's mouth. Faraz bolted into the dusk. He seemed to be in such a hurry. Probably, he had promises to keep.

Several years later, I encountered Faraz in a different setting. Faraz, already a teacher with some seniority (I don't remember his exact academic rank), was appearing in an exam in a different subject at the examination center at the Forest College hall. I happened to be the "examiner"!

Having returned from the US, I had just started teaching at Peshawar University. One of the jobs that university teachers did – and probably still do -- during the summer holidays, for extra money, of course, was to act as superintendents and invigilators at different examination centers. I happened to be the superintendent that summer at the Forest College hall.


A superintendent was responsible for the overall conduct of the examination while a number of invigilators assisted him in supervising specific rows of examinees in the hall. At a typical examination center, there would be 60 to 100 examinees in different subjects. A few minutes before the examination started, all the doors of the hall were closed, the superintendent read aloud the rules of the exam, the question papers distributed, and the examination would start at the dot of the hour, in total silence. The silence was broken only by the whirring of the ceiling fans and the shuffling of the pages of answer-books -– and clearing of throat by the nervous examinees when they were running out of time.

There was a long list of rules that governed the conduct in the examination hall, but the three cardinal rules were: No cheating! No noise! No smoking! If anyone broke any of the rules, the superintendent was required to terminate his exam and send him out of the hall.

Fifteen or twenty minutes into the exam that morning, when the usual hush descended on the hall, I smelled cigarette smoke. I looked around and noticed Faraz puffing on a cigarette and a pack of Three Castles lying on his table. The invigilator of the row politely requested Faraz to put out the cigarette but Faraz paid no heed to him. Much to my discomfort, the smoking ball landed in my court.

I approached Faraz gingerly and reminded him of the no-smoking rule. He looked genuinely puzzled as if wondering why were we making such a fuss about something so frivolous. He said he could not “do the paper” without smoking. In other words, he wanted us to make an allowance for his handicap and possibly, we thought, for his seniority and status. I told him the rules didn’t allow that. Realizing that we wouldn’t bend the rules for his rank or renown, Faraz did not argue further. He put out his cigarette and proceeded to write the paper with increased frenzy to make up for the time he had lost in the argument.

I do not know how well did he do in that particular exam, but down the years when Faraz's fame soared and I, too, began to appreciate his poetry, I felt a bit of remorse in denying Faraz his fix when he needed it most. But I would console myself by saying that I was simply applying the rules, and that I denied him something that was not good for him, anyway.

Fast forward to 2005-06. The venue: the picturesque PAF club at the foot of the Margalla hills, Islamabad. The club premises look organized and clinically clean. About 30 odd guests, men and women, are gathered at an afternoon reception organized by the PAF Finishing School for women, where they teach a variety of subjects ranging from culture, communication to culinary skills, and from literature to landscaping. The only thing common among the people gathered in that room is that they have lectured, at one time or another, at the Finishing School or are involved with its administration. The new director of the school is introducing herself and explaining the program for the new semester. Everyone is politely listening to the speech.

A few minutes into the speech, the smell of cigarette smoke wafts in the clean air of the room. Everyone in the room senses it but ignores it. I turn around to see the source of the smoke. It was none other but Ahmed Faraz puffing away at his cigarette, oblivious to the non-smoking environment.

After the speech, while everyone was having tea, I approached Faraz, introduced myself and, pointing to his cigarette, jokingly reminded him of the incident in the Forest College hall many years ago. I don't know if he remembered it, but he laughed and gave the impression that he did, and said, "Main do cheezain nahin chorr sakta. Ek cigarette aur doosra darrhi." I cannot do two things: Give up cigarettes or grow a beard.

The last time I saw Faraz was in the summer of 2008, at a mushaira at the annual gathering of Pakistani-American doctors (APPNA), at the Marriot Hotel in Washington, DC. Faraz shared the stage with Aitzaz Ahsan, Gopi Chand Narang and few other intellectuals and poets. He looked in good health. The mushaira lasted late into the night. Faraz sat there, without smoking. He knew the rules here. He occasionally sipped from what looked like a glass of water. When his turn came, he recited several poems in his deep, resonant voice, mostly from memory, to a thunderous applause from the audience and requests for more.

When the mushaira ended, Faraz hurriedly walked to what he thought was his room. But his key wouldn’t work on the lock. Thinking that it was the wrong door, he tried the key on the adjacent rooms, but they wouldn’t open either. Finally, with the help of the organizers, it was found that Faraz had checked in at a different hotel across the street, but had totally forgotten about it.

Faraz was a restless soul. May he rest in peace!



azizakhmad@gmail.com



A variation of this piece was published in The News in 2008.

Friday, 17 July 2015

QK archives: The problem of Pakhtunistan

3

19 February 2003

The problem of Pukhtunistan

Dr. Sher Zaman Taizi

This area was called Pukhtunkhwa (Pukhtun Quarter, according to Bellew) or Paktika (according to Herodotus) and mentioned by many Pushto poets in their verses as Pukhtunkhwa since 11th century. The famous couplet of Ahmad Shah Abdali,
Da Dili takht herauma cheh rayad krhm,
Zma da khkule Pukhtunkhwa da ghre saroona.
I forget Delhi when I recall,
The mountain peaks of my beautiful Pukhtunkhwa.
During World War I, German and Turk governments sent a joint delegation to Kabul to win favour of Amir Habibullah Khan. The Amir was a protégé of the British government. He delayed the delegation for over a year without any positive response. There were some revolutionaries and Afghan leaders including a brother of the Amir named Nasrullah Khan who were in favour of the delegation and wanted the Amir declare Jihad.
That delegation included Kazim Bey, a Turk minister and special envoy of the last Sultan of Turkish Usmania dynasty - Mohammad V (known as Mohammad Khamis) who was virtually the Caliph of the Islamic world. In un-divided India, imams read the Khutba in his name in their Friday sermons. When the British government engineered plots to dethrone him, the Muslims of India launched a movement in his favour in the name of Khilafat movement which bore the Hijrat movement in 1920s.
Kazim Bey carried a farman from the Khalifa in Persian. It was addressed to “the residents of Pathanistan.” It said: when the British were defeated, His Majesty the Khalifa, in agreement with allied States, will acquire guarantee for independence of the united state of Pathanistan and will provide every kind of assistance to it. Thereafter, I will not allow any interference in the country of Pathanistan. (Ref: Pukhtunkhwa Kiyun Nahin by Dr. Mubarak Ahmad Chagharzai; 1989; PP: 138-139).
The word Pathanistan is not Persian but Indian. It shows that the Khalifa had already acquired the consent of the Muslim leaders of India or these leaders might have motivated the Khalifa to first liberate the Pukhtuns' land (Pathanistan) to build up a strong base against the British Empire in India. Any how, this farman was distributed in the tribal belt.
When the British Empire decided to leave India after its division in two separate States - Bharat and Pakistan - the Khudai Khidmatgar movement led by Bacha Khan opposed the division. Although the Congress had agreed to the division, all the other major parties of India including Jamaat Islami, Jamiat-ul-Ulema-e-Hind (Mufti Mahmood’s) and Ihrar also opposed it. However, the British government of India proposed a referendum in NWFP for India or Pakistan. Bacha Khan demanded that it should be Pakistan or Pukhtunistan. On 21 June 1947, Khudai Khidmatgar leaders met under the presidency of Amir Mohammad Khan (father of Nasim Wali Khan) at Bannu and declared that Pukhtuns did not accept India or Pakistan. Hence, the one-sided referendum was manipulated in favour of Pakistan. But the hero of the referendum, Amin-ul-Hasanat the Pir of Manki Sharif, later repented his role in the referendum and joined Bacha Khan. According to his will, his body was lowered in the grave by Bacha Khan.
Pakistan was created. Khudai Khidmatgar leaders assembled at Sardaryab on 3 and 4 September 1947 and passed a resolution that that accepted the ground reality that Pakistan had come into being. They would leave in Pakistan as its bona fide citizens. They however opposed the dismissal of Dr. Khan Sahib and installation of Qayum Khan as the Chief Minister, but decided to refrain from making any sort of disturbance and difficulty for the new state.
Bacha Khan took oath as member of the Legislative Assembly of Pakistan and in his maiden speech demanded that NWFP should be given the name of Pukhtunistan. At one point, when Prime Minister Liaquat Ali Khan tried to interrupt him and said something mentioning Pathanistan, then Bacha Khan scolded him that he had said Pukhtunistan and not Pathanistan.
Qayum Khan arrested Bacha Khan and then allowed indiscriminate firing at a gathering at Babra killing several hundred people, who demanded release of Bacha Khan. Hisaction and brutal policies were criticised by the major dailies, particularly the Civil and Military Gazette.
The Afghan government managed to gather a number of tribal elders in Kabul on 01 September 1949, which demanded Pukhtunistan and then formed even a sort of shadow government under the presidency of the Faqir of Ipi. 
Qayum seized that opportunity and linked the movement of Bacha Khan to Afghanistan and India and one-sided propaganda was launched against Bacha Khan. This policy of Qayum Khan suited the resolution drawn in what was called “secret document” prepared in 1948 by a few immigrant Muslim League leaders headed by Liaquat Ali Khan. That resolution was aimed at pushing the native leaders to into obscurity to enable the immigrant leadership to hold the power.
Field Marshal Ayub Khan indicated the difference between the Pukhtunistan of Utmanzai and the Pukhtunistan of Kabul in his book Friends Not Masters. However, the immigrant bureaucracy stuck to its policy to alienate the native leaders, including Bacha Khan, Abdul Samad Khan, Abdul Hamid Bhashani and G.M. Syed.
In the meantime, the government used all its resources to introduce Urdu, the language of a few hundred thousand immigrants, as the national language. The first voice was raised by Khwaja Nazim-ud-Din against this policy, which, eventually, led to bifurcation of Pakistan and creation of Bangla Desh.
Zia-ul-Haq agreed with Bacha Khan to change the name but he contended that the term Pukhtunistan had become controversial. Bacha Khan suggested Pukhtunkhwa. But, again, some hitch was created and Zia-ul-Haq asked Bacha Khan to suggest another name. In response, Bacha Khan wrote a letter (in Pushto) to the President to give up his efforts if he was so much constrained.
The assembly of the nameless province passed three resolutions to give province the name of Pukhtunkhwa, but the federal government did not honour the resolutions.
It is now high time that the ulema give attention to this problem and fulfil the wish of the last Caliph of Islam, Mohammad V, to name the province as Pukhtunistan.
(Daily The Statesman, Peshawar, 24 February 2003)

Friday, 10 July 2015

Bizzare history: The Pakistan-Afghanistan confederation plans

Originally published by the Nation in 2005. No copyright infringment intended

'A Pathan Odyssey'

HUMAYUN GAUHAR
The history of Pakistan is a history of missed opportunities. Read Aslam Khattak's autobiography, 'A Pathan Odyssey', and you will find out. It speaks of our many moments that went ungrasped, moments that passed us by, chances to change destinies for the better that went a begging. What makes the book unique is that it is a first hand account by a very long life, nearly a hundred year history written by a man who not only saw it happen but often participated in its making at different levels. Born in 1908, soon after Lord Curzon ceased being Viceroy of India, the grand old man is now 97 years old. Why, when he went up to Oxford in 1928 my father was only five years old!
One of the most famous incidents of the Raj was the kidnapping of the British girl Mollie Ellis in 1923 by Ajab Khan Afridi because he felt that the British had insulted his tribe. Mollie was the daughter of the British Commander of the Kohat cantonment. It was Aslam Khattak's father, Khan Bahadur Kuli Khan, who rescued her. A grateful British gave him the title of Kaiser-i-Hind. The unkind rumour soon started that "Kuli Khan arranged the kidnapping himself so that he could win honour and renown by the rescue." I suppose we were a cynical people even then.
I learned of two missed opportunities from his book. The first was regarding Jammu & Kashmir. It seems that we could have had Kashmir had we had grasped the opportunity. Says Aslam Khattak: "One story had it that Sardar Patel, the Indian Minister of the Interior, sent a message to Quaid-i-Azam through Mian Iftikharuddin that India would be prepared to hand over Kashmir and its majority Muslim population to Pakistan if Pakistan would agree to Hyderabad going to India. The Quaid-i-Azam is alleged to have replied that Kashmir was ours and Hyderabad was a legal case." Now if this account is correct, for Aslam Khattak does not claim to be a participant in it, it is for historians to shed light on it.

The other missed opportunity was Afghanistan. Our relations with this neighbour of ours were strained from the outset. The Afghan authorities had believed that their Pukhtoon brethren in Pakistan would be subjugated and ill-treated by the Punjabis (this bogey seems to have started early but it seems memories of Hari Singh die hard) and that before withdrawing, the British should grant some sort of independence to the tribes. So a month before independence, in July 1947, Afghan Prime Minister Shah Mahmood went to London seeking support for some kind of independence for the tribes. But the British Foreign Secretary told him that the NWFP was an integral part of India, which was recognised by the Afghan Government. Thus, after a referendum, the Frontier went to Pakistan. Says Aslam Khattak: "Unable to achieve realisation of its interest in the Frontier internationally, the Afghans turned to a demand for an independent state of Pushtunistan. They pushed it with diplomats in Kabul and the newly created United Nations Organisation. They provided money and arms to dissident tribesmen and gave them refuge and schooling in Kabul. They voted against Pakistan's admission to the UN." How times were to change. Thirty-two years later, it was Pakistan that was to give refuge and schooling to three million Afghans who fled the Soviet occupation.
The missed opportunity came in 1956-57 when Aslam Khattak was first our First Secretary and then Ambassador in Kabul. By then we had a full-blown 'Afghan Problem'. Prime Minister Suharawardhy called a meeting in which Army Chief General Ayub Khan "dismissed our neighboring country in proper Sandhurst style. 'Afghan problem?' he said gruffly. 'What is the Afghan problem? A little strategic bombing and an armoured thrust would settle it once and for all!.'" It was then that Pakistan, with Aslam Khattak in 'Track Two' mode, so to speak, started the proposal for a Pakistan-Afghan confederation. He wanted to get Prime Minister Sardar Daud on his side because "Daud honestly believed that the Pathans were oppressed in Pakistan. He considered it a duty to help his brethren. He may also have been suspicious about the 'A', for Afghan (Afghanica) province in Pakistan. Did it mean we wanted to take over his country? At the same time, we thought that Daud was in league with India and bent upon dividing our country with Delhi. As was often the case in such circumstance, both sides were wrong." Daud was King Zahir Shah's first cousin and married to the King's sister. It was he who eventually deposed Zahir Shah. Khattak went to see Daud and told him that he wanted "to remove the misunderstanding between our countries..."

Next, Khattak separately met the "royal uncles", Shah Wali and Shah Mahmood, and took them into confidence. "I told him that Pakistan and Afghanistan would have to form a confederation if they were to survive threats from the USSR and India." After considerable humming and hawing both agreed to take the idea further. "Now I was ready to try my hand with Sardar Daud, whom I thought would be my most difficult hurdle." After Daud had made his complaints and Khattak had clarified them, including the letter 'A' in the name 'Pakistan', they decided that there should be an exchange of visits between King Zahir Shah and President Iskander Mirza. Actually both President Mirza and Prime Minister Suhrawardy went to Kabul together, which is highly unusual. While King and President were involved in ceremony, the two Prime Ministers started talking. After they left, Khattak continued the dialogue with Daud, who "suggested that we include some friendly missions in our discussions, such as Turkey and the USA. Sardar Daud said that the Americans should foot the bill of our mutual development projects when we confederated. Both sides would maintain internal autonomy, he proposed, but they would form a Central Government for defence, foreign policy, foreign trade and communications. The Prime Ministers would rotate."

If you are surprised at how far the dialogue went, there was more. Feroz Khan Noon had replaced Suhrawardy as Prime Minister. Khattak raised the question of head of state of the confederation with him. "In his grand way [Noon] said we should have no difficulty accepting King Zahir Shah as the constitutional head of state. 'After all, for some time after independence we had a Christian queen. Now we would have a Muslim man'. President Mirza concurred in this." When Khattak next met Daud, he said that "...a confederation was the correct step to realise our common destiny. I noted that Pakistan was a democratic country and asked what would be the position of the King. He promptly replied, 'We shall be a republic if Pakistan so desires.'" So here was Pakistan ready to accept the constitutional monarchy of Zahir Shah in the new Pak-Afghan confederation and there was Afghanistan prepared to become a republic.
As to the USA, Aslam Khattak says, "The Americans agreed to help in a big way. They were prepared to enlarge Karachi harbour and to develop another port. They agreed to provide fifty locomotives and five hundred wagons and to extend the Chaman railway to Kandahar and the Torkham rail line to Jalalabad. Sardar Daud wanted them to extend the Jalalabad railhead to Kabul and to commit to connect Kandahar and Kabul by rail." They had actually got into post-confederation details.

Then came mistakes. Daud came to Pakistan and while inspecting a shipyard in Karachi a bullet ricocheted off a ship and hit Aslam Khattak instead. Undaunted, they decided to bring Ghaffar Khan into the equation. He was released from prison and sent to Kabul, where he agreed to help in removing Pakistan-Afghan differences provided President Mirza agreed to hold a referendum on the One Unit. Mirza agreed. The American Ambassador in Karachi assured Ghaffar Khan through the American Ambassador in Kabul that the referendum would be held. But it wasn't. "I have never known," says Aslam Khattak, "exactly why he did not go ahead and do the job that he said he would. He may have got word from some important Pathans in Pakistan that, if the Afghans stopped speaking about the Pushtuns, the Punjabis would literally turn them into camp followers and second-class citizens. At any rate a great chance to change the face of history was missed." Indeed. Let's leave it at that. So much water has flown since then. But consider. If the confederation had happened, it would have automatically meant the end of the Parity Principle and One Unit because the anti-democratic 1956 Constitution would have had to be changed. There would have been no Ayub Khan regime and East Pakistan may still have been with us. The Soviets would not have such a large country. No Soviet occupation means no Jihad. No Jihad means no Mujahideen. The Americans could not have created Osama bin Laden. No Osama means no 9/11.
E-mail: hgauhar@nation.com.pk

Thursday, 4 June 2015

QK Archives Wali Khan his fathers shadow

QK archives
Originally published by chowk.com in 2006



Khan Abdul Wali Khan: His Fathers Shadow?
H P January 25, 2006

A few personal memories of an honest and straightforward politician of Pakistan

I first met Khan Abdul Wali Khan with a group of students in the late 70s. My graduation still had a few more months to go and I was planning to continue in politics after graduating from student politics that I had joined in the volatile year of 1977.

By that time, Khan Wali Khan had lost his aura. He had made wrong choices in 1973 and paid a price. His party had split and Gen. Zia ul Haq was not happy with his party’s pro- Afghan leanings. Bacha Khan was still in Kabul in a self imposed exile and Wali Khan was looking for ways to bring him back to Pakistan.

It was quite obvious that there were difficulties ahead in Afghanistan. The news of proliferation of Jihadi organizations all over NWFP, especially in the tribal belt, were not encouraging for the progressive and liberal politics in NWFP and in Pakistan.

He talked about Afghanistan and Bacha Khan. It was an informative session but it was quite apparent that he was about ready to give up on politics in Pakistan alhough he kept encouraging us to fight on, repeatedly mentioning that we have a long way to go before Pakistan becomes a democracy.

Just a few years ago, Wali Khan was the leader of the Opposition in the first elected National assembly of Pakistan. There were stories about how Prime Minister Z A Bhutto was scared of him and on many occasions avoided meeting with Wali Khan preferring his close lieutenant and the Baloch leader Mir Ghaus Bux Bizenjo.

Physically, Wali Khan was an imposing figure standing well over six feet tall. With dark glasses to hide his loss of an eye, he was always difficult to read. Wali Khan also had an annoying habit during his leader of the opposition days, to issue threats of dire consequences and often talked about moving chains beyond the Attock Fort. That did not endear him to the people in Punjab.

Eventually Bhutto and the army were able to take advantage his often redundant outbursts when they brought the first Baloch Government of Balochistan down and had the army move in Balochistan to suppress resistance by the National Awami Party.

It was not the first time that the National Awami Party or NAP was in trouble with the army. NAP was banned during the army operations in East Pakistan in 1971. It was the only party in West Pakistan that stood up for Bengalis and condemned the army action in East Pakistan. That was the proudest moment in the lives of many NAP workers as they sincerely believed that they were fighting to save Pakistan by supporting Pakistanis of the Bengali origin. Later on, I met many former NAP workers who always excitedly talked about the dark days of 1971 when either they were behind bars or were distributing leaflets against the army in the darks of nights in different Pakistani cities.

Some old timers told me that Wali Khan himself was not ready to confront the army but always had words of encouragement for students and Labor leaders in NWFP and supported their families when they were in jail.

Unlike Khan Abdul Ghaffar Khan, some would say, Wali Khan often showed his reluctance to take the authorities on. He was always a vocal opponent but when the time came to confront Gen. Ayub or Gen. Yahya Khan, he moved back to Wali Bagh, Charsadda in NWFP, reading a huge collection of books that he had acquired.

Today when I look back, I feel that Wali Khan never actually fulfilled his promise. He inherited a strong tradition of personal sacrifices, selfless political and social work of Khan Abdul Ghaffar Khan and the Khudai Khadmitgar movement. On many occasions, in different parts of NWFP, I remember meeting old Surkhposh who still loved Ghaffar Khan but could never get excited about Wali Khan and his leadership. They always showed up to listen to him but the enthusiasm that they had for Ghaffar Khan was never there. Perhaps, that was the reason the surkhposh movement, a genuinely secular political movement, slowly died in NWFP giving rise to the current religious political parties.

Wali Khan spent almost three years in jail in Hyderabad prison. The jail Superintendent was our family friend and a proud Sindhis nationalist. He always wanted to help the NAP leaders that included Wali Khan, Bizenjo, Mengal, and many others but this was the first time that Wali Khan was incarcerated for a long period of time. He was bitter and wanted to get out of the jail at any price. He did not appreciate the jail limitations and once slapped the Superintendent. That destroyed that gentle soul. He resigned. When I met Wali Khan for the last time and on finding out that I was from Hyderabad, he asked me about the Superintendent. He felt sorry for what he did and wanted me to convey his apologies to him.

That jail term actually ended Wali Khan’s short-lived political career in Pakistan. He wanted to come out of the jail and wanted to go back to Wali Bagh and his books. He reportedly made a deal with the army and his wife Begum Nasim Wali Khan, joined the rightwing ISI sponsored alliance that eventually led to the army coup of Gen. Zia ul Haq in Pakistan.

Interestingly, Begum Nasim Wali Khan was a phenomenal orator in both Urdu and Pashto. Her speeches against Bhutto and the Peoples’ Party moved crowds all over Pakistan in 1977. People in Karachi, Lahore, and Hyderabad would come to every rally where she was the main speaker. She made so many friends in Punjab that often people wondered as to why she was not the NAP leader instead of Wali Khan. She was articulate and made her case to Punjab with eloquence and dignity.

That aside, after 1977 Wali Khan the politician, had embarked on a slippery slope that continued to slide. He made compromises with the army, left his Baloch friends, refused to allow the liberals from Sindh and Punjab to join his political party, and finally declared “Islam humara deen” in his party’s manifesto.

Historians would judge Wali Khan’s contribution to Pakistani politics better than I could but if someone were to write the history of the Surkhposh movement in NWFP, they would not remember Wali Khan with the kind of reverence that was reserved for Khan Ghaffar Khan.

On Pakistan’s national political scene, he would still be remembered as a politician who for most of his career worked under the huge shadow of Khan Ghaffar Khan, but at times was able to bring a kind of honestly and straightforwardness to Pakistani politics that was often lacking in the politicians that worked under the different Muslim League banners.