QK Archives: Interview Qazi Faez Isa

Published 2007 the news on Sunday
"This is the Law of the Jungle"
- Qazi Faez Isa
Barrister and advocate of the Supreme Court




By Sairah Irshad Khan

Back

Qazi Faez Isa is the son of Qazi Mohammad Isa, the foremost freedom fighter from Balochistan and a close associate of the Quaid, whose efforts were chiefly responsible for Balochistan joining Pakistan.

Q: Would you say that the emergency is tantamount to martial law?
A: This emergency has no legal or constitutional basis. This is something hybrid, which the constitution does not allow or permit. You could call it martial law or any name you want to give it. In other words, it is no law at all; you may call it the law of the jungle.
Q: What are the legal ramifications of the new Provisional Constitutional Order (PCO)?
A: The PCO states that the constitution is held in abeyance. The constitution does not provide for it, the constitution does not envisage a provisional constitutional order. It has zero legal or constitutional sanctity.
We must understand the special nature of the constitution. The constitution declares that each and every citizen of Pakistan, and every person within Pakistan, even if he is a foreigner, has to abide by the constitution of Pakistan. You cannot hold the constitution in abeyance. It defeats the purpose of a constitution. The constitution is not a simple law, it is the paramount law. Article 6 of the constitution says that anybody who tries to abrogate it by force of arms, or otherwise, or assists in its abrogation, commits high treason.
Q: What, in your view, are the legal or ethical limits, if any, of judicial activism?
A: The 1973 constitution is very crucial for the survival of the country. It is the only constitutional document ever to have been promulgated unanimously by each and every member of the National Assembly. Out of 200, 196 voted in favour of it. There were four abstentions, not a single vote of dissent against the passing of the constitution in 1973. In the document, the framers of the constitution provided Article 184, which also stipulated the boundaries of judicial activism. The boundaries are, firstly, that the court can take up only a matter of public importance, and secondly, one that pertains to fundamental rights. So if a wholescale infringement of fundamental rights is taking place, Article 184 enables the Supreme Court to act. This is, of course, in the larger interest of the people. For instance, if a dam that is providing water to say 10,000, or even 1,000 people, is being polluted, their fundamental rights are being violated. They may not have the resources to initiate a case against the violators, but the court can take up the matter. So it is a wonderful device. It's good for the poorer segments of society, it protects them and it supports them - and it is very much a matter of fundamental rights. Now if I have a personal dispute with somebody, this doesn't come into the picture at all. So, the test is fundamental rights and public importance. If the Supreme Court takes notice of a matter which does not fall within these two conditions then it can be said to be acting beyond its jurisdiction.
Q: The parameters of judicial activism set by the constitution notwithstanding, there has been a debate in certain quarters about some of the recent rulings of the Supreme Court under Justice Iftikhar Chaudhry, namely the release of the Lal Masjid militants and the order to the authorities to pay blood money to the families of those killed in the operation on the masjid. In light of the extraordinary circumstances prevailing in the country, how wise were these decisions? Is there any provision for when the law can be modified in the larger public interest?
A: The chief justice did not pass any orders in the matter of Lal Masjid that you are referring to. Instead, orders were passed by Justice Nawaz Abbasi and Justice Javed Buttar, who, incidentally, were among the first to have been offered the oath under the PCO and who took the oath under the PCO. Furthermore, what I have been able to understand of the Lal Masjid scenario, it's the government itself which has made it into a large issue. The government claims it is committed against terrorism, but what does the federal minister for religious affairs say? He says in the media that the two brothers [Maulanas Ghazi and Aziz] had arms in their cars, but he intervened and got them off. Isn't he supporting terrorists?
There are many laws to arrest somebody, there are anti-terrorism laws, anti-subversion laws and others. What the courts say is to please proceed according to these laws. If people are terrorists, lodge an FIR, arrest them, there is a whole mechanism provided. You can't just pick up a person and keep him incommunicado for years. That becomes a missing persons case. The Supreme Court has never said to release people who are guilty of terrorism or even suspects in terrorism cases. The court says to process them according to law or make laws if the [existing ones] are deficient. To simply pick up people and detain them, however, is unconstitutional. The courts have no option but to release such persons - a person is, after all, innocent until proven guilty.
Everything the Supreme Court did was according to the law and constitution. It cannot be accused of doing something for its personal interest. On the other hand, on the very same day that the proclamation of emergency was issued, Major General Arshad Waheed announced that the military had released 25 militants in exchange for 213 army officers whom the militants had taken captive. So who is releasing these people? Had the court said to release them? Let's put matters in their true perspective.
Q: In his address to the nation following the proclamation of emergency, General Musharraf spoke about the arrests of various law enforcement personnel and of the collision course the judiciary had chosen to embark on vis à vis the executive, which had "paralysed the state machinery and demoralised the law enforcement agencies." How would you respond?
A: The Supreme Court has said a number of times that if the government does what it is required to do, there would be no need for it to take any action. The Supreme Court will be more than happy not to do anything. It is only when the government is so thoroughly incompetent that the Supreme Court has to initiate action in all matters, in environmental matters, in building matters - even in traffic matters in Karachi. There is so much corruption everywhere. The Supreme Court has only been intervening because its jurisdiction has been invoked, under Article 184, in matters of public importance affecting fundamental rights. They have never acted beyond this domain. And the general public has been very pleased whenever the Supreme Court has acted. The poorest of the poor support the actions of the Supreme Court.
You must also realise that in this parliament, there is no opposition. In fact, there is no parliament. These parliamentarians are a burden on the exchequer, and you and I are paying for them. We have the largest cabinet in the world. What it does, we don't know. There are no question and answer sessions, matters are not decided in the parliament, nothing is debated. I think the Supreme Court played a very valuable role because without it there would have been anarchy on the streets and probably much worse. So the Supreme Court offers people a ray of hope.
Q: Do you believe the emergency was entirely triggered by the judgement of the bench hearing the case for General Musharraf's election to the presidency?
A: A request was made from the lawyers side that a full court should hear the matter. You will recollect that before this judgment, there was another petition which was heard by a nine-member bench. Out of these, four of the judges said that the president could not file his nomination papers. The others dismissed the petition on a technicality saying that the person who had filed it was not an aggrieved person. In the second constitution of the bench, those gentlemen who had decided against Musharraf said that since they had already decided the matter, their conscience would not permit them to be part of this bench. So the new bench was probably the most sympathetic bench available that the president could get. You will recollect that it was headed by Justice Javed Iqbal, who, when the chief justice was removed, was made the acting chief justice by no less a person than General Musharraf himself. So where is there cause for grievance? If you're not happy even with those who are perceived to be supporting you, does that mean you should get your own court?
Q: Presidential aspirant Justice Wajihuddin made some observations recently. He said that those who were to benefit from the NRO - quite pointedly the PPP - were in collusion with President Musharraf. He also pointed out that the new chief justice of the Supreme Court, Abdul Hameed Dogar, had been elevated to the Sindh High Court by the PPP government, the implication being that his elevation was certainly not anathema to the PPP. Do you agree?
A: I don't know if Justice Wajihuddin has made these statements. I don't want to comment upon conjecture and surmises.
Q:Justice Javed Iqbal went on record to state that Aitzaz Ahsan, as counsel for Justice Wajihuddin Ahmed, the plaintiff in the case, had prolonged the proceedings unnecessarily. He maintained that considering Aitzaz's "political affiliations, he did not deploy what could have been a devastating argument against Musharraf's nomination papers." Do you concur with this allegation?
A: I would say that Aitzaz Ahsan is a reputable counsel. I think these comments are certainly not justified.
To say that Aitzaz, because he is affiliated with the Peoples Party, intentionally mishandled the case, is absolutely untrue. We all know that Benazir Bhutto is not happy with Aitzaz Ahsan, so the last person that she would be listening to or vice versa, would be Aitzaz Ahsan.
Q:What happens now to all the rulings that had been made by the Supreme Court prior to the proclamation of emergency? Can they be overturned?
A: Each and every judgment of the Supreme Court stands unless it is overruled.
Q:Can it be overruled by the current bench of the Supreme Court?
A: There is only one Supreme Court, there is no new Supreme Court. Anybody who takes oath under the PCO is violating the constitution and thus cannot be accepted or recognised as a judge.
Q:That notwithstanding, this is not the first PCO, and whatever their legitimate position, the courts have continued to function…
A: There is one big difference this time… this has never happened before. In all the earlier instances the Supreme Court found some fig leaf to justify military intervention by inventing the doctrine of necessity or by other means. The difference this time is that on the day of the proclamation of emergency and the issuance of the PCO, a seven-member bench of the Supreme Court struck down the PCO. The Supreme Court held, "The order states, no judge of the Supreme Court or the High Courts including chief justices shall take oath under PCOs or any other constitutional step. Any further appointment of the chief justice of Pakistan and the judges of the Supreme Court and chief justices of High Courts and judges of provinces under the new development shall be unlawful and without jurisdiction." So there is an order operating. And what are the consequences of violating this order? Article 190 of the constitution stipulates that all executive and judicial authorities in Pakistan shall act in aid of the Supreme Court. So it is a binding order on each and every one of us. There is no way out of this order now. The fundamental difference this time is that the Supreme Court immediately convened and seven judges, the chief justice and the senior-most judges of the Supreme Court, including the second and the third, Justice Rana Bhagwandas and Justice Javed Iqbal, passed this order. So it carries a lot of weight. The judges went on to state, and this is very interesting, "The chief of army staff, corp commanders, staff officers, and all concerned of civil and military authorities are hereby restrained from acting on the PCO." I think this concludes the matter and there is no fig leaf this time.
Q:What happens to all the judges who refused to take oath? Do they just go home?
A: No, they continue to be judges under the constitution and law.
Q:The courts will function without them. So will it not be just in name - unless the PCO is rescinded?
A: The only courts in Pakistan that can function are under those judges who took an oath under the 1973 constitution. All those who were judges on November 3, continue to be judges. In the constitution of Pakistan, there are only three ways a High Court or Supreme Court judge can be removed. One, if he dies in office. Second, if he resigns his office. Third, if the supreme judicial council removes him. The framers of the constitution, and this happens everywhere in the world, knew that you must provide security to a judge of the Supreme Court because he would be deciding sensitive matters and at times when you have powerful parties arrayed against you, for example the government or the president, you want to ensure that the judge is not going to be worried about his job. So there is absolute security of tenure. A Supreme Court or High Court judge cannot be removed at all. The minute you do that you fall foul of Article 6 and you are guilty of high treason. So Justice Iftikhar Chaudhry remains chief justice, and there is no other. Sabihuddin Ahmed is chief justice of the Sindh High Court. It is as simple as that, it's black and white.
Q:How do you see the future of the judiciary?
A: The future couldn't be bleaker. You can't have democracy without an independent judiciary, you can't have democracy without an independent media. Each and every officer of the armed forces and the civil bureaucracy, each and every member of parliament, should be asked about the oath they took under the constitution. Schedule 3 prescribes an oath of office for every one of them, as it does for the president of Pakistan and the prime minister. Under this oath they all swear to preserve and protect the constitution. So now each member of parliament, each federal minister, each provincial minister, each member of provincial assembly, the chairman of the Senate, each one is violating their oath of office. So either they don't have the consciousness, or the conscience. Have they not read the oath that they took? Are they protecting the constitution when they go by this order which says that the constitution is held in abeyance?

Q:So is there going to be no fight-back by the legal fraternity?
A: The legal community is not entering the courts at this time.
Qoesn't that affect all those whose cases desperately need to be heard?
A: Would you want a case to be heard by a person who has now sworn - and this is very important - not to challenge or to entertain any challenge against the proclamation of emergency or the PCO. Both these devices have been used to take away your fundamental rights. So if they decide to close, for instance Newsline, for printing this interview, what is your recourse? None. Ordinarily you would have gone to the High Court and filed a petition under Article 199, because you could say your fundamental rights had been violated. What will you do today? Nothing. The courts have sworn to uphold the proclamation of the PCO, which says that fundamental rights are out of the window. I know people will suffer, but they will suffer far more, [if they become party to this]. You have to prevent the disease from spreading.
Q:So the fight-back is essentially by an act of omission…
A: I don't know where the constitution of Pakistan says that only the legal community is obligated to uphold the constitution. It is each and every one's duty - not just that of civil society, but of every individual, including those in the military.
As for the lawyers, in one day, 500 lawyers were arrested. This is a world record. Three hundred and forty-four FIRs were lodged in Lahore, in just one police station. And lawyers have been charged with all sorts of offences. They were in court, the police barged in, hit them with batons, tear-gassed them and then lodged FIRs against them.
So the entire leadership of the lawyers has been incarcerated, including the second, third and fourth tiers. Still they are brave souls, they are coming out, and are paying perhaps the biggest price. Apart from the assaults on them, if they don't appear in court, nobody is going to pay them. And it is not as though they will derive any personal benefit from their battle. This battle they are fighting is for Pakistan.
Qo you think the current status-quo will remain?
A: Our faith teaches us patience - one should never give up hope and must speak up against tyranny. But the reality is that a single phone call from Condoleezza Rice ensured that, earlier, no emergency was declared. I'm sure if President Bush, who pretends to want democracy in Pakistan, was to make a phone call, things could be immediately reversed. Unfortunately today, the people of Pakistan are not determining the events that are taking place in Pakistan, it is America who decides what happens in Pakistan.
And now the American nation has to, for once and for all, decide, do they stand by the people of Pakistan or do they stand by one individual?

KP 2018 a broken elite and Frontier myths

This unpublished piece was written shortly before the 2018 election

21 July 2018

PRIOR to the tragic attack on Haroon Bilour, the stronghold of Awami National Party (ANP) in Charsadda was packed with a sea of people waving the red flags of the ANP.

The peculiar nature of the upcoming  Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KP) elections is best described by the story narrated by a young, Pashto broadcast journalist who was covering said ANP rally.

What is striking about his story is that the young worker attending the rally initially said he would be voting in favour of Pakistan Tehrik-e-Insaf (PTI) and he was only at the rally to pacify his father who was an ardent ANP voter, however after the rally he had a change of heart.

Anecdotes like this remind us how this 2018 election is a time when a hand full of myths about KP and especially what has been described as the 'Imran Khan factor' ought to be challenged.

The myths given here are not that difficult to unpack when taking into account the evidence before us.

The first myth is that KP does not re-elect the same government twice.

The province voted against the PPP wave of 1970, in favour of the PNA and PML-N in 1977 and 1993 respectively and voted for the MMA over PML-Q and for ANP over PPP in 2008. It was this pattern that has created the conventional wisdom that no party can win re-election in Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa. The reality is a bit more complicated, in face that the PML-N was re-elected in the 1993 elections but with a different Chief Minister namely, Pir Sabir Shah. Further, by virtue of coalition politics, parties like ANP were elected in 1997, initially working in coalition with other ruling party's.

The second prevalent myth is that KP incumbents are punished for not delivering on promises.

Just over a year ago the odds looked stacked against PTI. Its mandate in 2013 was, contrary to media spin quite fragile. It had only narrowly won a plurality vote share and had formed a weak coalition with the JI, independents and Aftab Sherpaos QWP. Unfortunately, the PTI was driven by factionalism with a Chief Minister of dubious work ethic, whilst being held hostage to the whims of party dissidents and their junior allies within JI. On the ground the province was devastated by TTP linked violence early on and in equal measure struggled with indifference by the Federal government on key projects like CPEC.

So while on the surface although it seems reasonable to assume these myths have a valid basis, when we look a bit deeper we find the key trends that have shifted the sands behind these two calculations.

The first myth is driven by simple demographics, KP has the second highest bloc of young voters in the 18 to 35 years age group, 48 pc against the national average of 43pc in the rest of the country. These are first or second time voters who do not necessarily share the voting preferences of the previous generation. This is further complicated by the high levels of competition amongst voters and candidates reflected in the province having the second highest number of candidates per seat after Balochistan.

This youth bulge has converged with technology and social media to create a voter who absorbs information very differently from the voter from ten years ago. Many following the global trend of taking in information from platforms such as Twitter, Facebook, Instagram and Whatsapp. The numbers of Facebook users alone, is nationally now at 33 million from 8.6 million in 2012 with 35 million smart phone users - a whopping seven fold increase from the 5-6 million in 2012. PTI being an early adopter of these technologies has benefitted by being able bypass the traditional media according to it's needs, to get its message out. So one can presume that for a voter lost due to disillusionment in the government’s performance it offsets that loss with the addition of new voters and that too in areas they did not have support before.

The third myth was that KP's provincial governments were vulnerable to federal government pressure being elected to the province which worked against the winning party. This was proven in the past from 1972-1973 NAP governments toppling and by the challenges faced by the PML-N government in 1993 as well as the MMA from 2002-2007. This myth has been challenged directly as a consequence of the subsequent 18th amendment and the associated devolution of power, which led to an increase in the provincial budget from Rs 170.904 billion for the fiscal year 2008-2009 to Rs 603 billion in 2017-18. This increase provided crucial fiscal space for PTI to spend heavily on a variety of initiatives. An example of this can be seen in the health budget which went from

Rs. 30.3 billion

in 2012-13 to Rs. 66.49 billion in 2017-2018. In relative terms this has been a big change but in absolute terms this has been a modest increase.

For the public, this relative increase influences the perceptions of delivery by the government.

While  initiatives of the government do not stand up to scrutiny, in terms of perception they are enough to ensure the party’s support has broadened. The dark side to this is that the heavy increase in spending on big projects initiated and the increase in salary due to recruitment drives means the provinces finances will face a major economic crisis within the next two or three years. It also leads to disillusioned supporters of the party when the realities of acts of omission and commission by the party are later revealed.

It is pertinent to note here that despite the tragic recent attacks, overall the security situation has largely been improving. The contrast is stark, from a peak of 5497 casualties in 2009 to 29 being the highest number in 2017.

A fourth myth is that the opposition is far more organised this time compared to last time.

There is an element of truth in this as there is no smoke without a fire, especially in the case of the ANP which in the last election was devastated by relentless terrorist attacks, according to one estimate in 2016 they had lost over 500 workers and several legislators too. However, a lack of serious reflection within the party’s after the last election has meant that where workers were well organized, like in the ANP, or where electables have been brought in like with the JUI-F the party’s now lack the ability to attract new voters. Critically the opposition has decided for reasons best known to their leadership to go solo when their biggest anti pti successes have been together.

The ensuing instability created a vacuum that coincided with a generational leadership transition in the PPP towards Bilawal Bhutto Zardari, ANP towards Aimal Wali and Haider Hoti, JUI-F towards Maulana Lutfur Rehman and PML-N towards Maryam Nawaz and Shahbaz Sharif. This has created a vacuum and by virtue of the dictum “nature abhors a vacuum” it has left PTI with a clear advantage.

Next, the 'Imran Khan factor' is probably the most contested myth, with many critics of Imran Khan arguing that one reason for his popularity is the political vacuum of the 2000s. From 2004 till 2013 he received unprecedented levels of media coverage at a time when his electoral support was negligible. This advantage packaged with his populist slogans as key reasons for his support. There is truth to this as his own celebrity status created a platform which helped him to reach out to future supporters. It is true that his populism has certain appeals. But it is also equally true that other politicians have received disproportionate coverage in comparison with Sheikh Rashid for example, and some other politicians also attempting to use populist rhetoric without being able to translate it into mass support. If however, media coverage was the main indicator to measure this, one would expect areas with the highest television penetration and those that spoke in the same language as the electorate like Karachi or Urban Punjab to be areas of highest support for PTI and not Pashto speaking areas with less media penetration, let alone coverage.

The answer to this then comes back to the understanding of populism and the socioeconomic changes KP went through compared to other provinces. Populisms inherently employing an 'us versus them' framing is most successful, when the other side is discredited or fragmented and when it converges with technological change. In case of KP the weakness and fragmentation of the opposition was combined by convergence of unregulated social media with PTI's support within the media, this combination has gave the party crucial advantages for the upcoming elections.

Finally, the myth of the role of the establishment with respect to KP. It’d be a gross untruth to suggest there is no state level interference in this election. However, within the context of KP on its own - for reasons explained earlier - there seems to be little need for large scale interference. Keeping that in mind, what is going on in Punjab or Balochistan is then relatively at a larger scale than what is currently occurring in KP. The only other threat to PTI's re-election is a sympathy wave for PML-N in KP. While that was truly a possibility under Maryam Nawaz - whose keen interest in KP was in contrast to that of her uncle - the ongoing case means no challenge from this party is likely to be seen from there.

In the final calculation PTI's KP victory looks comfortable. In a time of the 2018 elections - short of some major misstep. Demography, populism, technology circumstances and Imran Khan in a time of political vacuum. The misreading of what is to come is a consequence of a provincial political elite that does not as yet fully understand all factors which can potentially lead to this.

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QK Archives: Wali Khan demise of a dream

Wali Khan — demise of a dream

By Adil Zareef

“Only a dead nation remembers its heroes when they die. Real nations respect them when they are alive.” These golden words were famously uttered by the great Bacha Khan of the Pakhtuns; Khan Abdul Ghaffar Khan as known to the rest of the world and nicknamed the “Frontier Gandhi” by admirers and foes alike.

I learnt this quote from Baba (Wali Khan) during one of his lengthy discourses on the freedom struggle, and what became of the subcontinent after the birth of India and Pakistan. This “special relationship” was conferred upon a few others besides me, being class fellows of Gulalai Wali Khan, herself an idealist and a dreamer like the rest of our generation. Che Guevara’s icon was our trademark, being a symbol of resistance for the rest of the world.

Many a time, I thought of writing a biography of this great and dignified man who shaped my political and social thought during my formative years. But the exigencies of the world took me away from this indulgent idea and today, I am left vexing to write an obituary to this legend known to the world as Khan Abdul Wali Khan.

As numerous cable networks scramble to make headlines of his sad demise, the above-mentioned quote compels me to write this.

It is indeed a difficult task to write about a political titan who earnestly shared his thoughts and ideas, and whose courage and principled life will serve as a beacon to many who watch political pygmies and charlatans straddling the political horizon change colour more easily than any chameleon.

But the national press will assuredly lavish praise on this great legend for standing stiff against a string of dictators from Ayub Khan to Pervez Musharraf. Perhaps resilience was in his blood, as was the resistance to Kalabagh Dam and the Afghan War, the détente with India and the resolution of the Kashmir dispute, which diverts precious human and economic resources away from the development and progress of the subcontinent.

These causes symbolised Bacha Khan’s struggle for justice and fair play, and moulded Wali Khan’s political career. Thankfully, the legacy seems to carry on in the political heirs of ANP.

On closer scrutiny, one can identify the unifying strain of resistance against injustice and inequality in all these struggles, just as Kalabagh Dam seems to unify nationalists of all hues against the World Bank-led hegemony of international consortiums to plunder the resources of third world nations in the name of development and progress, giving them in return a lasting legacy of debt, perpetual enslavement and environmental and social catastrophes.

Kashmir and Indo-Pak détente was Wali Khan’s theme as well as his father’s. With the end of the Cold War, the subcontinent offered an opportunity for a huge market for the western world. It is strange to see Pakistan and India dancing the proverbial foxtrot with Western prodding, albeit with a few missed steps, while the Iron Wall on the Afghan border remains as high as ever, if not more pronounced.

It sends the discomfiting message that one is free to dance the bhangra with fellow Punjabis across the border, but Pakhtuns cannot do the Atanh together and are destined to remain divided along the Durand Line! Wali Khan’s dream of a united Pakhtun nation remains unfulfilled despite their Punjabi compatriots jump-frogging the Wagah border.

The Afghan conflict was a defining moment in Afghan and Pakistani politics. Wali Khan, like his compatriots, had objected to a super power meddling in the region, arguing that it would “bleed the Pakhtuns”. Watching the turmoil in Waziristan and Bajaur and the rest of NWFP, this prophecy seems to have come true.

Now the religious right seems more vociferous in anti-Americanism than the left was during the bygone yeas of the Cold War. But the lesson of non-violence and peace was never a Pakhtun trait, or else ours would have been a happier world.

Wali Khan bade farewell to politics after his defeat to Maulana Hasan Jan. He left the political scene simply, a graceful act in this dastardly world of politics. When asked his reason for retirement, he said that he had no place in politics “when the mullahs and ISI decide our destiny and politics”.

Fifteen years on, one wonders who has had the last laugh

QK Archives: Sword and Reason among Pashtuns

Sword and Reason among Pashtuns:

NOTIONS OF INDIVIDUAL HONOUR AND SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY IN
AFGHANISTAN

By Bernt Glatzer (1)
Since its beginning the recent Afghan jihad was not only directed
against an alien invasion and an imported ideology, but also against
obsolete internal political structures which long before 1978 had
encroached on traditional values without improving the standard of
living of most people. After the withdrawal of the Red Army the
country is still under heavy influence from outside powers which do
not allow Afghanistan to come to terms with her own social and
political problems. A case in point is the recent emergence of the
powerful Taliban movement whose success is partly due to the support
by Pakistan. On the other hand the Taliban are an indigenous
movement whose motives of action are rooted in the norms and values
of a large part of the traditional society. In order to analyze the
present civil war in Afghanistan indigenous as well as exogenous
factors have to be taken into consideration as well as the motives
of the acting persons who consciously reflect their role in local,
regional, interregional, inter-ethnic, and international contexts.
In spite of Afghanistan's retrogression into a pre-state situation,
and in spite of all the violence and terror the media are so eager
to report on, there is a remarkable process going on in the country:
in most areas of Afghanistan civil life has returned and
rehabilitation with and without international aid is proceeding
successfully and fast (Christensen 1995, Donini 1996). This proves
that civilian values and practices counterbalance those of the
"Pathan warrior".

This paper will mainly deal with Pashtuns - the largest single
ethnic group in Afghanistan. "Afghan", "Pashtun", "Pukhtun", have
originally been synonyms and are still understood so by a large part
of the local population, although the Afghan state officially
includes all ethnic groups under this term.

Half of the 17 to 20 million Pashtuns live in Afghanistan the other
half in the Pakistani provinces NWFP and Baluchistan.
They were called the world's largest tribal society (Spain 1963)
because of their number and their all embracing genealogical charter
which links the thousands of Pashtun tribes to one apical ancestor.
Although comparative research among different social groups in
Afghanistan is lacking we have no indication that there are
significant differences between the ethnic groups as notions and
concepts of person and Islam is concerned. The reason why I
concentrate on the Pashtuns is that we have more detailed and
elaborate emic and etic sources on personal norms and values of
Pashtuns than on other ethnic groups in Afghanistan, namely the
pashtunwali, a charter of ethnic pride and self understanding many
times written down in a systematic way.
The Pashtun ideology of war and violence, of the martial and heroic
behaviour of the men is named tura (lit. "sword"). However,
readiness for violence and war is but one aspect of the traditional
ideal of a male person; the other aspect is aql: "reason",
particularly in the sense of social responsibility.
A man of aql is one who reasons and acts in an integrative social
way, he is hospitable and generous, he grants asylum, reaches to
balanced social judgments and is able to act as a mediator in
conflicts.

The concept of tura and aql includes to know when to draw the sword
and when to put it back to the sheath, when it is time fight and
when it is time for caring for the welfare and unity of one's
family, clan, tribe or of wider social units, up to the Muslim umma,
depending on one's social horizon.

When we consider the duality of tura and aql we may understand why
bands of anarchic Afghan warriors were able to inflict heavy defeats
to the super powers of their time, and why most tribal warriors laid
down their arms the day after their victory and went home to plough
their fields - some for the first time in their life(2).
The Image of the Noble Warrior
Several times in Afghan history invasion armies, superior in number,
technique, and organisation, received "bleeding wounds"
(Gorbatchev). Persians, Moghuls and the British had to make this
experience. After three major defeats the latter had to give up the
plan to colonize the country. E.g. in 1842 the attempt of the
British General Governor of India to occupy Afghanistan permanently
and to enthrone a puppet Amir ended in complete disaster, the
British ambassador got assassinated and the British garrison with
more than 16,000 soldiers and their attendants perished during
retreat in the gorges of eastern Afghanistan. Even in distant
Germany this event became a subject of poetry:
"Mit dreizehntausend der Zug begann,
Einer kam heim aus Afghanistan."
[with thirteenthousand the campaign began,
one came home from Afghanistan]
(Theodor Fontane quoted from SNOY, p.73)


In London this defeat was felt with particular pain and shame
because it was not the armies of imperial Russia or of another big
power which inflicted this set-back to British expansion but
unorganized bands of "savages". During the following assessments of
the disaster the "savages" soon mutated to noble warriors, to
descendants of Alexander the Great or to "Aryans", i.e. they were
styled as a sort of Europeans against whom to loose was not
considered that shameful. The unspoilt Afghans were said to have
preserved all the male virtues of antique times and were depicted as
a model for the contemporary youth, similarly as Tacitus idealised
the ancient Germanic virtues. It was Mountstuart Elphinstone,
officer of the East India Company, researcher and influential
writer, who in 1815 laid the foundation for the idealization of the
Afghans in his famous "Account of the Kingdom of Caubul". In open
sympathy he compared the anarchic and fiercely egalitarian
("republican" as he called them) Afghaun tribes with the most noble
human groups the Scottish aristocrat and humanist could think of,
that is with Scottish clans and with Greek-Roman republicans.
Afghan intellectuals, poets and authors, traditionally multilingual,
were well aware about what was said and published on their people
and country even in England, they were of cause pleased to see their
people so advantageously characterized and they added to it in their
own writings and teachings. No wonder that the ideal image of the
Pashtun/Afghan as the noble, gallant, dauntless and generous warrior
soon became the subject of legends and elaborated ethnic and tribal
self representations among the Pashtun tribes who lived not too far
from British-Indian cultural influences (the ones between Kabul and
Peshawar, Swat and South Waziristan). From there the image was
taken-up again by European authors and was further elaborated,
particularly when more British military defeats at the North West
Frontier were to be explained. Thus in intercultural collaboration
an elaborate image of the ideal Pashtun personally was created. The
eastern Pashtun tribes who had to deal with their mighty eastern
neighbor merged this personal image with Islam and with their more
traditional tribal law to a canon of Pashtunness, the pashtunwali.
Pashtunwali the Ethnic Self Representation
ELPHINSTONE used "pashtunwali" only in the sense of the customary
law of the Afghans. In RAVERTY's Pashtu Dictionary of 1860
pashtunwali became "...the manners and customs of the Afghan tribes,
the Afghan code." More than hundred years later among eastern
Pashtuns pashtunwali is used as the "... explicitly known part of
their system of values and norms by which they believe to differ
positively from all Non-Pashtuns". In West Afghanistan the term
pashtunwali is unknown, there the traditional norms are called rawaj
which in terminology and content hardly differs from those of their
neighbours.
In West Afghanistan the term for the ideal person is ghairatman, but
Pashtuns there do not claim a monopoly. An Aymaq or Tajik may be as
ghairatman as a Pashtun, differences are considered rather in
degree. (more on ghairatman see JANATA & HASSAS). The pashtunwali of
the eastern Pashtuns serves as a model and an orientation for
education, as a guide line and measure of values for solving
conflicts, as a marker of contrast against ethnic aliens and also as
an invitation card for peaceful visitors (hospitality has first
priority in pashtunwali). With its threatening list of martial
self-characteristics it also serves as a deterrent to less peaceful
visitors.
Eastern Pashtuns have codified their ideal of person, thus offering
us easy access to their scale of values and to their motives for
action, but we may easily overemphasise the more spectacular or
violent aspects of pashtunwali such as tura and place them out of
context neglecting the more subtle points which complete the image
of person and without which we cannot understand complex sequences
of actions.
I base this paper of Pashtun ideals of person mainly on Alfred
JANATA's and Reihanuddin HASSAS's research on "The Good Pashtun", on
Willi STEUL's monograph on the pashtunwali, and on my own
ethnographic research among western Afghan nomads in the years 1970
- 1977 and on my experiences as relief worker from 1990 through 1993
in Afghanistan and Pakistan.
Nang: Dignity, Honour and Shame
The central term in pashtunwali is nang: honour and shame, dignity,
courage and bravery. A nangialay brings honour and fame to his
tribe. To be called benanga ("shameless", "undignified") is the
worst possible insult in Pashtu and a deadly threat to the social
position of the insulted. Killing the insulter is an accepted way of
regaining one's nang and thus of one's social status.
sharm is a decisive part of nang. sharm can well be translated by
the English shame, which encompasses shame in the sense of noble
modesty and its contrary shamelessness. If a boy greedily devours
his meal his father will tell him "sharm nalare?!" ("don't you have
shame?", "aren't you ashamed?"); but if a man does not prevent his
unmarried daughter from flirting with neighbour's son people would
say "sharm nalari" ("he has no shame") which is an extremely serious
insult and can only be answered by a very impressive action. sharm
has mainly to do with the behaviour of the women of the group whose
honour is at stake and with male control over the female half of the
society.
The relation to women can be seen clearer if we analyse the term
namus, which belongs to the complex of nang. It means privacy and
the protection of its sanctity. In the narrower sense namus relates
to the integrity, modesty and respectability of women and to the
absolute duty of men to protect them. In its wider sense namus means
the female part of the family, of the clan, tribe and of the Afghan
society; in the widest sense it is the Afghan home land to be
protected.
Although namus includes the inviolability of women and the duty to
protect their honour it does not imply that women stay passive. In
Pashtun folklore boldly acting heroines are praised such as Malalay
who has played a decisive role to win the battle of Maywand in the
Second Anglo-Afghan war, 1878-80 (more on male-female relations
among Pashtuns see TAPPER, in war see SHALINSKY). Yet in general men
consider young women to be less able to think and act rationally, to
have less self-control and to be more inclined to sexual activity,
in short they are believed to be an easy prey to any seducer who
comes along. Thus men feel obliged to fight for maintaining their
namus, i.e. first of all to keep the women of their families under
tight control, and to protect the women from their own "weaknesses".
Even more feared than the actual behaviour of women is the
neighbours' gossip, that is what erodes namus most effectively and
what is most difficult to control. Better do not let anybody see the
women. In urban areas this leads to an increasing compulsion for
women to wear full veil or to remain hidden behind the walls of the
family compound. Since the early 1970-s I noticed seclusion of women
(parda) to expand into the countryside, a process which gained
momentum during the recent "holy" war. I estimate that more than a
million of women have experienced parda for the first time in their
life when they arrived at the refugee camps in Pakistan.
Very many Afghan consent that parda is not an indicator for strength
and effective maintenance of namus, rather to the contrary, as I was
repeatedly told by nomads and peasants in Northwest Afghanistan: A
strong man can trust his womenfolk and is sure that no outsider
would dare to come near to them, only weaklings need to hide and
lock-up their women (cf. TAPPER 1991: ). In fact the refugee camps
in Pakistan and Iran were places of disturbed social and demographic
relations. During the war ca. 80 % of the camp population were
women, children and very old men, and the relatively small number of
younger men felt quite insecure in that alien environment, thus the
strict observation of parda observed in the camps was indeed a sign
of weakness and people believed they had no alternative how to
maintain namus.
In pashtunwali the inviolability of women and of land is closely
connected or considered as practically identical. Common sayings
are: "The way to the women leads over the land." and "He who cannot
protect the integrity of his family cannot protect anything, anyone
is free to snatch away from him what he wants, his possessions, his
land." Most authors on Afghanistan agree that threatened namus is
the most common cause for violent conflicts. When mujahedin were
recruited for jihad they were told, besides religious arguments,
that the (common) namus of the Afghans was threatened. In fact, in
1978 the first uprisings against the new socialist regime broke out
when the new socialist Afghan regime sent young activists from Kabul
to the provinces in order to force girls and women to school. Not
that people were principally against female education, but they felt
it was neither the state's nor any other's business to interfere in
matters where females are involved. So far the public and the
private spheres were always kept neatly separate. People, though
grudgingly, did pay tributes to rulers or even accepted military
conscription, but the state's transgression of the line between the
public and the private (namus) meant war.
Tura - the Sword
nang the honour and dignity of a Pashtun has two sides:

(1) An aggressive one with readiness to fight until self-sacrifice -
this is symbolised by tura, the sword;
(2) Reason and social responsibility (aql). aql is deliberate and
prudent behaviour which is intended to benefit one's family and
one's wider social entities up to the entire ethnic group, nation
(if such a notion exists) and even up to the entire Muslim umma. It
reaches from material support to participation in councils, to
jurisdiction and mediation in conflicts. These two sides of nang are
connected with different ages in life: The ideal persononality of a
young man is supposed to be dominated by tura he may be hot headed
and ready to draw the sword (tura) (today Kalashnikow) at the
slightest provocation. Aggressiveness is his first reaction,
reasoning comes second. The virtue of tura does not need to be
tempered by the young man's own aql , it is supposed to be checked
by the aql of the elders, the "white beards" (spin giri).
Consequently boys are educated to obey the elders.
Many Pashtun clans/tribes have tribal militias (arbaki, lashkar) to
execute the decisions of the egalitarian councils (jirga), bound by
the discipline of the militia the tura of the youngsters is guided
to socially accepted objectives.
During my time as an aid worker I experienced this in the eastern
Afghan province of Paktia: In spite of a large pre-war German
development project with its deep impact on the local
infra-structure the tribal social organisation remained intact and
functioning; in 1992, after the break-down of the Kabul Najibullah
regime most mujahedin of Paktia went home, participated in the
rehabilitation of their villages and land or rejoined the tribal
militia. Organisations who helped in the rehabilitation task were
provided arbaki (tribal militia) as guards. Thus in a situation
where state and government were absent civilian life returned rather
smoothly.
tura always relates to an individual. It is not sufficient to belong
to a group or unit of bold fighters, every one has to prove his tura
in single actions. The turialay, the man who embodies tura gains his
distinction by individual acts. He fights first of all for his
personal honour and autonomy, then for that of his family and clan.
A strong motive for displaying tura is to demonstrate one's own
equality and autonomy and consequently that of one's family and clan
and to demonstrate one's refusal to bow down before any arbitrary
power.
The mujahedin commanders were usually understood as primi inter
pares, the mujahedin respected their fighting and tactical
experience and most importantly their logistic abilities, every
mujahed considered himself to be on the way to become a commander.
The latter had to prove constantly their superiority, there was no
effective military command structure which could impose a commander
arbitrarily on any band of mujahedin.
Obedience to the tribal elders does not contradict the egalitarian
principle. The elders are understood as the representatives of
reason and tradition, of the collective will of the clan/tribe, but
they have to take care that their decisions are understood by the
younger as just and as in accordance to the generally accepted
values, they cannot expect the younger to obey automatically.
The highly individualistic stile of the Afghan mujahedin's fighting
was feared by the military planners on both sides and considered as
a great strategic problem. Even the Afghan mujahedin parties in
Peshawar lost control, their function was reduced to logistical
tasks and to public relations. I think the success of the Afghan
mujahedin against the hierarchically well organised Red Army lies in
the fact that the anarchic and chaotic actions of the Afghan rebels
were absolutely unpredictable for any professional strategist. On
the side of the mujahedin there was no military command to deal
with, if one commander was eliminated several new ones replaced him
instantly.
Education
Education to tura begins early. Fathers scuffle and mock fight with
their little sons of three to 10 years of age and allow them even to
hit their fathers who would return a friendly clap in order to
encourage the little fighter to another round. Harmless fighting
games between boys are applauded. The education is
non-authoritarian, a father is considered to be an example, not a
penal authority.
Children are present in guest houses, at tribal councils and
whereever serious decisions are made, in this way they are
introduced to pashtunwali and to the traditional values and thier
practical applications.
Girls and boys are educated towards the same values of person,
parents see to it that pashtunwali is internalised by girls as much
as by boys, girls also are present in public councils and listen
carefully. It is generally believed among Pashtuns that women are
more strict at pashtunwali then men and less ready to compromise
when matters of honour and shame are at stake. The following story
of a very popular Pashtun hero may serve as an example for what
Pashtuns conceive of an ideal personality.
It is the story of Ajab Khan an historical figure who has challenged
the British Empire and serves even nowadays as a model for
education:
The Cantonement of Kohat, south of Peshawar was one of the strongest
military fortresses of the British Empire, from here campaigns were
launched against the hostile and rebellious Pashtuns of the tribal
areas along the British-Afghan frontier. Pax Britannica may have
prevailed elsewhere, the garrison of Kohat was constantly at war.
The year 1923 was no different, this time a punitive campaign was
carried out against the Bostikhel, a sub-tribe of the Afridi north
of Kohat. At this occasion British soldiers trampled into the huts
of the Bostikhel and allegedly came too close to the ladies, anyway
the namus of the Bostikhel was serously violated and the clan in
uproar. A few weeks later young Ajab, a Bostikhel together with two
companions, sneaked at night into the Cantonment of Kohat, through
its multiple security cordons. They raided the bungalow of an
officer named Ellis and kidnapped his daughter Molly. The men with
the girl made good their escape and the next days they paraded in
triumph through the Afridi land making a laughingstock of the
Empire. In Kohat, Delhi and London emergency committees were formed
and the media reported wordwide with pitty for the girl and with
mockery for the toothless English Lion.
A military action to save the girl was out of the question, all the
British Government could do was to threaten the Bostikkhel and even
the entire Afridi tribe with frightening consequences.
In the mean time an English nurse walked into Afridi land all alone
and unarmed, met Ajab and persuaded him to release the Girl. After
three weeks Molly Ellis was back to Kohat - unharmed. The British
demanded strongly from the Afridi to hand over Ajab to the British
which the Afridi of course refused, but this was a very serious and
conflicting problem for the Afridi tribal council: The extradition
of Ajab would have been a breach of pashtunwali but not to hand him
over would have had very dire consequesences, there was little doubt
that the British would repeat what they had done in 1919 when their
war planes bombarded Pashtun villages.
Now came Ajab's second act by which he completed his heroic deed and
by which he earned the honorary title of khan: Realising that he had
brought his tribe into serious trouble he voluntarily emigrated to
North Afghanistan where he died a natural death in 1961 as a highly
honoured khan. He had saved his tribe from drastic punitiv actions
of the British by renouncing everything which a tribe offers to the
individual: protection, social security and warmth, in short: social
life. Expulsion from tribal land is the severest punishment a tribal
court can award, and volunary exile is considered the highes
sacrifice a Pashtun can offer.
For the British this was not enough, the Bostikhel had to pay 42,000
Rupees and Ajab's own land and village was destroyed.
As it can be expected from an heroic epic, Ajab Khan and the girl
are believed to have fallen in love to each other, but contrary to
the rest of the story this is not proven (for more on the story see
SPAIN p. 154ff).

Epilogue:

In 1982 I met Miss Ellis in Islamabad, she had followed an
invitation of the Government of Pakistan. Accompanied by the
Governor of the NWFP she was driven triumphantly from Peshawar to
Kohat right through parts of the Afridi country. The streets were
lined by jubilant Pashtuns and relatives of Ajab Khan offered to
carry her on their hands all along the way where she had been
abducted, which she friendly declined.
This story ilustrates tura and the core values of the ideal and
idealised Pashtun person. The colonial power had severely violated
the namus of the Afridi. An impressive symbolic retaliatory action ,
an attack on the namus of the British was seen as the only way out
from disgrace in the eyes of the rest of the Pashtuns. Disgrace is
considered as weakness, as social inferiority, if I cannot kill the
one who disgraced me I have to disgrace him also, otherwise I would
accept my permanent social weakness and inferiority.
By a particularly dare-devil act as the one of Ajab, disgrace can
even be turned into honour and fame. Ajabs deed is considered by the
Pashtuns so brilliant because it was an individual act (with only
two companions). Only individual acts lead to honour and fame which
then may radiate to the whole clan or tribe.
The Whole Man: khan and Commander
As mentioned already the ideal male personality consists not only of
tura but also of aql (reason and wisdom) as Ajab proved by voluntary
exile.
Unchecked tura is expected from boys, later social virtues are
added: responsibility for family and for the wider social world. The
aim of an ambitious Pashtun is to become khan , i.e. one who has
proved tura, who is sharp in thinking and just and prudent in his
judgements, who is an acknowledged expert of pashtunwali , who
exercises generous hospitality and who is ready to share his wealth
with adherents, guests and with people under his protection.
A khan also provides economic benefits to his clients, e.g. a nomad
khan organizes for his people access to pastures and deals with
state authorities, among the peasants the khan cares for irrigation,
provides access to improved seeds or even attracts foreign aid
organizations to carry out projects in his area. The khan 's
oppinion has weight in the local councils and tribal assemblies. His
power and influence is weighed by the number of his clients and of
his guests in his hujra, his guest house, whom he can expect to take
his side in a conflict. A khan is called to settle quarrels and to
act as a speaker of his adherents.
E.g. I met one khan who used his fluent German to speak at
solidarity functions for Afghanistan in Germany in order to raise
funds for his people in Tani (East Afghanistan) - a genuine task for
a khan.
During the last war in many Afghan areas the khan was replaced by
the commander (comandan). Now other leadership qualities were on
demand, e.g. access to wepons, money and to food supplies from
Pakistan or Iran. Commanders had to join one of the mujahedin
parties who were the main distributers of military supplies. The new
leaders needed military abilities and had to be physically able to
march long distances on foot, because the fronts were constantly
moving. Many of the old khans could not cope with these new tasks
and fled along with their clients to Pakistan leaving their place to
the new commanders.
Islam, Martyrs, and Victors
So far Islam was not mentioned much in this paper. The Pashtuns
understand pashtunwali as an expression of practical and true Islam.
Other Muslims may be of a different oppinion. During the war when
Arab mercenaries critisised their Afghan comrades for deviations in
Islamic practice bloody conflicts arose, e.g. when Arabs tore down
flags at Afghan graves. Pashtun claim they are genuine Muslims, not
converts as the Iranians, Turks or Pakistanis. As their legend goes,
Qais Abdurrashid the apical ancestor of all Pashtuns in his Afghan
mountains heard of the Prophet in distant Arabia, went there and
became one of the Prophet's first disciples at a time when most
Arabs still fought against Islam.
In fact the basic values of honour, shame and readiness to fight
(for a just cause, of course) do not contradict the canonic
scriptures of Islam, the pashtunwali rather elaborates on them or
sets slightly different accents. In official Islam fighting without
a "just" cause is not acceptable and also not just for the honour
and fame of an individual. A Pashtun would answer that the unbridled
fighting spirit of young men has to be directed to reason and
responsibility, and this is where Islam comes in.
The Islamic concept of jihad is not new in Afghanistan. Afghan
mullahs called for jihad against the British infidels many times.
After the Soviet invasion in 1979 when jihad was declared again, the
whole complex of the Islamic concept of warfare and its terminology
was available. Now the warrior was not only an arbaki and a turialay
but a mujahed , "the one who fights the jihad". The refugees are not
just pitiable displaced people who lost everything, but they bear
proudly the honorary title muhajer (plural muhajerin) as the Prophet
on his Exodus (hijra) to Madina. The one who aids the mujahedin and
muhajerin and gives asylum to the latter as the Pakistanis and
Iranians is an ansar as the Prophet's friends in Madina (CENTLIVRES
& CENTLIVRES-DEMONT). He who dies in the just war is a martyr of
religion, a shahid ("one who bears witness for his belief"), he goes
to heaven irrespective of his former sins.
NOTES:
(1) Revised text of a paper presented at the 14th European
Conference on Modern South Asian Studies in Copenhagen August 1996,
Panel 4: Concepts of Person, Sainthood and Power in South Asia. The
original title of this paper was "Being Pashtun - Being Muslim:
Local and Translocal Concepts of Person in Afghanistan". During the
process of revision the emphasis of the paper got changed making it
necessary to change the title too.
In the original text some of the Pashtun terms have diacritical
marks which are not possible to produce in this ASCII format.
(2) The size of the "armies" of the present war lords fighting for
Kabul are relatively small in numbers (some ten thousands) compared
to the male population engaged in agriculture (millions). The
atrocities of this civil war are due to sophisticated modern weapons
not to the numbers of fighters.

REFERENCES

DONINI, Antonio: The Policies of Mercy: UN Coordination in
Afghanistan, Mozambique, and Rwanda. Occasional Papers 22, Thomas J.
Watson Jr. Institute for International Studies, Brown University,
Providence, RI, 1996 (150 pp).
CENTLIVRES, Pierre and Micheline CENTLIVRES-DEMONT: The Afghan
Refugee in Pakistan: An Ambiguous Identity. Journal of Refugee
Studies 1,2, 1988, S. 141-152.
CHRISTENSEN, Asger: Aiding Afghanistan: The Background and Prospects
for Reconstruction in a Fragmented Society. Kopenhagen: Nordic
Institute of Asian Studies (NIAS Report, 26) 1995.
ELPHINSTONE, Mountstuart: An Account of the Kingdom of Caubul. 2
Bde. London 1815.
GLATZER, Bernt: Nomaden von Gharjistan: Aspekte der
wirtschaftlichen, sozialen und politischen Organisation nomadischer
Durrani-Paschtunen in Nordwestafghanistan. Wiesbaden: Steiner Verlag
1977.
JANATA, Alfred & Reihanodin HASSAS: Ghairatman - der gute Paschtune:
Exkurs ueber die Grundlagen des Paschtunwali. Afghanistan Journal
II,3, 1975, S. 83-97.
RAVERTY, H.G.: A Dictionary of the Puk'hto, Pus'to or Language of
the Afghans; With Remarks on the Originality of the Language and its
Affinities... London 1860.
SNOY, Peter: "Die Bevoelkerung" in M.R. Nicod (Hrsg.): Afghanistan.
Innsbruck: Pinguin Verlag, 1985, S. 73-88.
SPAIN, James W.: The Pathan Borderland. The Hague: Mouton,
1963.
SHALINSKY, A. C.: Women's Roles in the Afghanistan Jihad.
International Journal of Middle East Studies, 25,1993,
S. 661-75.
STEUL, Willi: Paschtunwali: Ein Ehrenkodex und seine rechtliche
Relevanz. Wiesbaden: Steiner Verlag 1981.
TAPPER, Nancy: Bartered Brides: Politics, Gender, and Marriage in an
Afghan Tribal Society. Cambridge: Cambr.
Univ. Press 1991.

QK Archives: Frontier rage

Published March 2001 by NEWSLINE republished for educational purposes solely

Frontier Rage

By Behroz Khan

For the first time in its 15-year existence, the offices of The Frontier Post and its sister-publication, Maidan, were sealed by the Frontier government for publishing a highly blasphemous letter against the Holy Prophet (PBUH). Five employees of the paper were arrested and indicted under the blasphemy law. Moreover, the letter's publication sparked a spate of violence and angry reprisal in the city of Peshawar. Student activists of various religious parties torched the paper's printing press, newsprint and furniture. Meanwhile, unruly mobs went on the rampage destroying private property as religious leaders delivered inflammatory speeches against the journalist community.

The Post's problems began when a letter from one BenDzac, apparently a Jew, arrived by e-mail for the letters' page. The letter went to the acting head of the section, who upon interrogation told police, that he did not bother to go through its contents but approved its publication simply after reading the heading titled, 'Why Muslims Hate Jews?' Reportedly, this staffer had been under treatment at a drug rehabilitation centre at a Peshawar hospital.

The Peshawar police has lodged FIRS against the five employees of The Frontier Post under Section 295 A,B,C/505 of the Pakistan Penal Code and 16 MPO. The offenders face life imprisonment and fine if convicted under Section 295 C, commonly known as the blasphemy law. Those arrested include the news editor, Aftab Ahmad, chief reporter Imtiaz Hussain, an 80-year old feature writer, Qazi Ghulam Sarwar, sub-editor Munawar Mohsin and the computer section head, Wajihul Hassan. The armed guard of the paper is also in police custody for carrying an unlicensed Kalashnikov. The owner of the paper, Rehmat Shah Afridi, has been in prison for the past one year on drug smuggling charges. Arrest warrants have also been issued for his son, Shah Mehmud Afridi, the acting chief executive of the paper, who was in Islamabad on the day the letter appeared in The Frontier Post.

Strangely enough, the district administration closed down the offices of the group's Urdu daily as well, although it had nothing to do with the incident, and arrested seven of its employees. The government has ordered a judicial inquiry into the incident. Journalists, meanwhile, are demanding that the arrested journalists be released immediately and the law be allowed to take its course. At a meeting in Peshawar, they criticised the government's failure to protect the Post's printing press from the wrath of the young students, who were led by the Jamaat's provincial naib amir, Hakeem Abdul Waheed, and Dr. Muhammad Iqbal, the party's district president for Peshawar, along with other leaders including Haji Dost Muhammad and an, advocate Israrullah. The police, meanwhile, made no attempts to stop the mob at any point as they smashed and gutted their way through the Post's offices. Next, the student activists smashed the windows of the Peshawar Press Club and then headed for a nearby government high school damaging furniture in classrooms and smashing doors and windows. The charged activists demanded death for the publisher of the letter. Even the ANP got into the act: Sardar Ahmad Khan Yousafzai, provincial president of the ANP students wing, announced a two-million rupee reward for the killer of the letter's author.

Meanwhile, the government's action of charging innocent staffers of the paper under the blasphemy law endangers the lives of these journalists in such a highly charged scenario. In the past, religious groups and party activists have been known to attack and intimidate journalists, quite often, for sins not of their own making. Fakhr-i-Alam, a reporter with The Muslim's Peshawar bureau, was manhandled by JUI (Fazal) workers who attacked the office for publishing Maulana Fazl-ur-Rehman's cartoon with his election rival and former film heroine, Mussarat Shaheen. The cartoon was published from Islamabad. Saeed Hashmi, a reporter of the Urdu daily, Mashriq, was forced to seek political asylum in France after he was persecuted by religious parties for reproducing material on the sexual abuse of children at religious seminaries. The research work was done by the Islamabad-based NGO, Sahil, and Saeed Hashmi had merely translated the material that was published without his byline.

Curiously enough, the Jamaat-i-Islami which was in the forefront of demanding capital punishment for the persons responsible for printing the sacrilegious letter has printed the same letter in its own newspaper, Jasarat. The government has yet to move against Jasarat while journalists have passed a resolution condemning the letter's reproduction in Urdu which they felt was aimed at arousing more outrage against the press from people on the streets.

QK Archives: Mariam Bibi and Khwendo Kor

published by Newline April 2000
Profile


Against All Odds

- By Mehnaz Akber




From being an abused wife and unwanted daughter, Mariam Bibi rose to being a role model for women as head of a Frontier-based NGO that is striving to improve the status of women in a conservative society.


Despite receiving the 'Nishan-e-Imtiaz' for public service and being nominated a member of the Commission on the Status of Women, Mariam Bibi remains what she always was � a simple chaddar-clad Pathan woman dedicated to changing the status of women in the NWFP. Her vehicle for change is Khewendo-Kor (Home for Sisters), a broad-based NGO in the NWFP, known nationally and internationally for its efforts to improve the image and profile of women. Mariam Bibi manages a staff of over 70 people at Khewendo Kor, as well as three regional offices in the most conservative area of Pakistan.
Today Mariam Bibi is held up as a role model for women in her area. It is difficult to imagine that when she was born 45 years ago in Janni Khel, a village in Bannu, her birth as an unwanted third daughter was mourned by the whole village. Her mother writhed in pain as she was left alone on the floor of the mud adobe room to mourn her third daughter. Her wails for water and help remained unanswered till a few hours later when she gave birth to a twin son. The mourning quickly changed to the gunfire of celebration. It was only at the end of the day that someone thought of the baby girl who lay in the corner, to check whether she was still alive. "My resilience to survive was created that day by God," says Mariam Bibi.

Despite being born into a conservative tribal household, Mariam Bibi and her five sisters received a proper education. They had their father, who served the British Raj, to thank for this. Surprisingly, it was Mariam Bibi's mother who opposed the daughters' education but their father's insistence saw little Mariam go through school and then on to college where she got a BA degree.

At the age of 19, Mariam's life changed when she was promised in marriage to her paternal first cousin. A lively, vivacious Mariam looked forward to all the trappings of marriage: the pretty clothes, jewellery and most of all, independence. When her brother-in-law joked with her on the mad ways of her groom to be, she joined in the laughter fantasising about how she would spend her days laughing with the 'Khan Bahadur's son'. Her dreams were soon to be shattered. On the day of the wedding, instead of the traditional salaami, the new bride received medicines for her groom's mental illness and instructions never to demand anything of him. Mariam Bibi recalls how she intuitively knew that day that she faced a hard life ahead. Consistently subjected to violent beatings by her husband, she was refused comfort and shelter in her father's home. "I saw the look change in my father's eye from being a gentle person to the tribal Pathan living for his izzat," says Mariam Bibi. In her new home, Mariam was treated scarcely better than a servant by the entire household.

A born survivor, Mariam Bibi resorted to many failed business ventures desperately trying to make a life for herself. Today, she laughs as she recalls how she bought a rickshaw with borrowed money, but was cheated of all the earnings by her driver as she was confined to the four walls of her home. A second attempt was a buffalo shipped in from Faisalabad, which got sick and was taken over by the local milkman who in return, provided Mariam Bibi's household free milk for four years. The third and last attempt was a knitting machine which never worked. Then Mariam Bibi decided to start a tuition centre for children at home, but the neighbours protested because of the noise. She then took the bold step of venturing out of the char deewari and into the public arena by accepting a teaching job in Peshawar.

Her decision shook all the men of the household and her father and brothers, who otherwise ignored her miserable existence, threatened to kill her if she did not back down. She clearly remembers being told by her father: "Lead a quiet life and consider yourself a dead woman with no aspirations." Confined to the house, she looked out at the world through the crevices in the boundary wall and found her inspiration: a washer-woman who walked daily to the river with a huge load of laundry on her head and at sundown walked back tired, but with a look of satisfaction on her face. That woman was to be Mariam Bibi's role model as she continued her struggle.

The atmosphere in the household eased when her sister, who had qualified as a lady doctor from the Fatima Jinnah Medical college in Lahore, returned home. She was instantly accepted as a professional and given due respect. Pressure eased on Mariam Bibi's attempts to take charge of her life. She joined the All Pakistan Women's Association (APWA) in 1987, where she worked as a councillor for family planning. It was a relief to earn a monthly salary of 1200 rupees which she saved to indulge her four children. In 1989, she applied for a field job in a German agency, GTZ, working for Afghan refugee women. Based on her hard work, she was promoted in just six months, first to field supervisor and then to director of the energy and environment programmes. Mariam Bibi was advised to set up her own NGO by a German professional who had come to appraise the program on its completion in 1992. "I laughed at the proposition," recalls Mariam Bibi. However, later, on GTZ's insistence and the insistence of her female colleagues who were losing their jobs, she gave it serious thought. Khewendo Kor began in her garage in 1993 with a staff of three women and a loan from GTZ. With a 40,000 rupee loan from her mother, together with her own savings of 20,000 rupees, Mariam Bibi began work on a need-based development initiative for the women of NWFP.

When she speaks of her long struggle, Mariam Bibi barely mentions her husband. Her marriage was, and still remains, the most painful chapter of her life. Shutting out the pain, she remained focused on her struggle. Parallel to her commitment to achieve her goal, ran a deep desire to be accepted by her family and society. Being married to a schizophrenic, a misfit in the company of other housewives content to talk of jewellery, travel, building houses etc, Mariam tried various means to win their acceptance. "I tried socialising with women in the neighbourhood, but the scorn was unbearable," she remembers. Later, when she started working outside her home, she continued her struggle for recognition as a "clean working woman as opposed to a cheap woman out to have a good time." To this day Mariam Bibi remains apprehensive about how she is perceived by her children and her family.

Despite all her achievements she continues to work and live within the parameters of a conservative social code. Mariam Bibi still resides with her in-laws, even though her husband died of cancer last year. Her four children, fortunately, escaped the hardship and trauma their mother faced. The eldest daughter, 26-year-old Aleema is happily married in Rawalpindi; her second child, Farid did his Masters from Quaid-e-Azam University, Islamabad and teaches in a government college, while the two youngest twins, Faiqa and Asad, are still studying.

A woman who has never been driven by ambition, Mariam Bibi is deeply spiritual. She has a strong conviction in God and believes that external forces guided the direction her life has taken. "Nothing is in my hands, it is God's will. It is like a programme on television. Any programme you see has many producers and directors working in the background. I never really planned for anything to happen," says Mariam Bibi. Religion, which gives her spiritual strength today, was anything but a source of solace in the early years of her marriage. The family used religion to confine her to the home. She was told that it was the role of the man to earn and the woman to remain subordinate and in purdah at home. She was convinced that religion was being used against her and started to educate herself on what Islam actually prescribed on the role and status of women. What she learnt strengthened her inner self and created a strong belief that she should do something for humanity.

At 45, Mariam Bibi is very aware of the limitations of her age. Describing herself as a slow learner, Mariam Bibi finds herself most productive at an age that society considers close to retirement. She drew seven lines on the wall of her room, each line depicting a decade of her life. Crossing out the first four lines, she thought deeply of the remaining three lines and how her life could be made more productive. A woman who mastered the skills of communicating in English in her forties, she is still hungry for knowledge. "I have just learnt computer skills and feel very empowered," says Mariam Bibi proudly.

Life has just begun to unfold for Mariam Bibi and her struggle and commitment have helped create different avenues and options for the empowerment of tribal women in the NWFP. In a society where women are only given respect if they hold positions of authority in an accepted profession, Mariam Bibi maintains that her current status is due to publicity rather than her work. "Today Mariam is something because her name appears at national forums," says she. "Take it away and again I would be just another woman."

Khewendo Kor is now known in far-flung villages for its integrated programmes for women. It has strictly need-based programmes for girls education, micro-enterprise development, and primary healthcare for women. The organisation, which started in a garage with a budget of 200,000 rupees per year, has now grown to three regional offices and a monthly budget of 500,000 rupees. Many international donor groups have also extended financial as well as technical support to Khewendo Kor, which now runs 50 schools in the area and has a current enrolment of 1700 girls.

The organisation works on empowerment processes and provides women a forum through village-based women's groups. "We are encouraging women to contest in the forthcoming local bodies elections too," says Mariam. Khewendo Kor's impact on the changing attitudes in the communities it is working in is evident from a recent incident in Dir where certain religious parties tried to stop the organisation's work for female literacy. Despite open hostility and threats by the mullahs, it was the parents of the students who fought for the NGO to continue. "Our work can only become meaningful when the people themselves take charge, especially the women," insists Mariam Bibi.

A woman who has battled criticism on both personal and professional levels, Mariam wants to expand work options for older women who get even less support from their families. She wants to give something back to her tribal area by starting a scholarship programme for girls. Not content with what she has achieved, Mariam Bibi is constantly studying ways to improve the organisation and make Khewendo Kor a model organisation working towards improving the status of women in the Frontier.