Challenges Facing Development in Pakistan’s FATA

By Dr. Ijaz Khan

This essay finds that the Pakistani government’s policies cannot bring the fundamental changes required for meaningful development of the region. First, Pakistan’s ambivalent posture toward the fight against terrorism—seeking to contain rather than eliminate militancy—has gradually undermined the country’s ability to pursue successful developmental projects. In addition, the government’s failure to understand and respond to the FATA’s evolving socio-economic landscape and power structure has seriously compromised Islamabad’s ability to implement suitable developmental changes.

Policy Implications:

• The most successful changes in the FATA have only favored a small minority of the population. Efforts must be made to ensure that the benefits of development reach the FATA’s predominantly illiterate, isolated, and impoverished population.
• Development strategy must be formulated in such a manner as to transform not just a few tribesmen—who after transformation become isolated from their tribal society, leaving that society unchanged—but rather the entire FATA society.
• Development of the FATA without fundamental changes to its outdated administrative system and isolated constitutional status cannot yield positive results. All efforts must be made to fully integrate the FATA into Pakistan with policies reflecting the FATA’s evolving socio-economic landscape and power structure.
• Pakistan’s government must ensure that various non-governmental developmental agents have secure access to the FATA.
• Political reform is needed that ensures the FATA’s population is involved in developmental decisionmaking institutions.
• Pakistan’s political parties should be allowed to operate within the tribal areas, thus encouraging popular participation in strengthening the FATA’s stake in the federation.
• The writ of the higher judiciary must also be extended to the FATA.

This essay addresses the challenges facing development in Pakistan’s Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA), a special administrative region enjoying vast internal autonomy with minimal state oversight. Due to the area’s special constitutional status, isolation, and proximity to and shared ethnicity with Afghanistan, the FATA has become a safe haven for extremists and terrorists following the overthrow of the Taliban government in Afghanistan in 2001. As a result, the region is now the focus of international concern and the center of the war on terrorism.

With U.S. support and prodding, the Pakistani government has initiated a comprehensive three-pronged political, military, and developmental strategy to break the FATA’s isolation and rid the area of militancy. Focusing on the developmental element of that strategy, this study finds that the government’s policies are not geared to achieve any of the fundamental changes required for meaningful development of the region. Furthermore, Pakistan’s ambivalent posture toward the war on terrorism has gradually undermined Islamabad’s ability even to pursue successful development projects.

This essay begins with a brief summary of the current political-administrative structure of the FATA. It then identifies Pakistan’s strategy for developing the FATA—noting earlier government attempts to develop the area, especially those made during Zulfikar Ali Bhutto’s government (December 1971–April 1977). The next section discusses the FATA’s evolving socio-economic landscape and power structure and points to the futility of the Pakistani government’s reliance on outdated political-administrative structures in light of these changes. Focusing on the deleterious impact of militancy on development initiatives, the essay then examines the rise of militancy in the FATA. The essay concludes by discussing the Pakistani government’s current inability to bring effective change to the region.

FATA’s Political-Administrative Structure

According to the system established by the British, the FATA consists of seven administrative units, which are known as political agencies, and six frontier regions.¹ There is also one Provincially Administered Tribal Area (PATA)—Malakand Agency. The FATA is directly administered by the federal government through the governor of the North-West Frontier Province (NWFP), while each agency is administered by a political agent (PA). The PA is also the judicial officer, against whose decision there is no right of appeal.

The colonial system was characterized by minimum state penetration and aimed only at ensuring security for roads and government posts. The jirga, which is the traditional Pashtun council of elders, was adapted to work as an intermediary between the state and the predominantly Pashtun tribal population. Because the legal code—known as the Frontier Crimes Regulations (FCR)—only dealt with crimes against the state, the PA possessed absolute power. Although this administrative system still exists, most of the socio-economic realities, along with the geostrategic environment, have fundamentally changed, thus severely limiting the system’s effectiveness.

The Government of Pakistan’s Development Policies

The Pakistani government’s development policies in the FATA from 1948 until 1971 were negligible. In the 1970s the government of Zulfikar Ali Bhutto initiated policies aiming at the development of the FATA. Bhutto’s administrative reforms, however, did not effectively alter the existing administrative and legislative system. Bhutto brought the FATA administration under the new federal Ministry of States and Frontier Regions (SA FRON) and established the FATA Development Corporation (FATADC). These organizational changes and initiatives streamlined federal government control of the FATA.

In addition, the Bhutto administration gave constitutional sanction to quotas for FATA inhabitants in educational institutions throughout Pakistan as well as in federal jobs, including the coveted Central Superior Services. Degree colleges for men were also established in all agencies and a number of high schools were established. Some industries were constructed in the state sector, while various incentives were offered to the private sector. The Bhutto administration initiated new schemes for agricultural development and paid greater attention to roads and communications in the FATA in an attempt to transform the economy and gradually integrate the FATA with the rest of the country.

Facilitating the acquisition of passports and thus travel abroad for FATA residents constituted another very important step in the development of the FATA. This policy paved the way for tribesmen to travel to the Gulf region, East Asia, Europe, and the United States—with far reaching socio-economic and political implications.

Post-2001 development policies: With the exception of the introduction of adult franchise in 1997, no major initiative was undertaken in the 1980s or 1990s in the FATA.² The introduction of adult franchise, however, was not accompanied by the government’s permission for political parties to operate in the FATA. In the wake of September 11 the FATA suddenly became the center of global attention. With international prodding and support, the Pakistani government has initiated a number of developmental schemes and policies.

In 2002 a FATA secretariat was set up. Four years later this secretariat was expanded to the civil secretariat of the FATA, which was established to take over decisionmaking functions. Project implementation is now carried out by the departments of the FATA’s civil secretariat. The NWFP governor’s secretariat plays a coordinating role between the federal and provincial governments and the FATA’s civil secretariat. The Pakistani government has abolished the FATADC.

Since 2004 the Pakistani government has introduced agency councils to serve as local representative bodies in the FATA. These councils are composed of both elected members—only government-recognized maliks—and PA-nominated members. Not only do agency councils have almost no authority, but there is still no clear delimitation of their functions and powers. The thrust of the government’s development policies post-2001 thus seems to be on reviving and strengthening—rather than changing—the existing FATA system.

With that said, a number of development schemes relying mainly on international assistance, especially from the United States, have been announced. In addition, the construction of roads has begun, and some health units are emerging in the FATA. The most important project completed after 2002 is the road connecting the Khyber and Kurram agencies. Though school buildings have been constructed in most of the agencies, most of these schools have yet to start functioning. Even the older existing schools are closed in North and South Waziristan as well as in Bajaur Agency and most of Malakand Division.

The limited role of NGOs: There is a real need for NGO activity in the FATA. Although Pakistani law does not permit the establishment of NGOs in the tribal areas, NGOs from other parts of the country—as well as international NGOs—operate in the tribal areas. The ability of these organizations to act freely and securely is hampered, however, by religious militant forces who regard NGOs as anti-Islamic or as foreign agents promoting Western and U.S. agendas. Nor does the Pakistani state adopt aparticularly friendly view of these NGOs, which Islamabad sees mainly as unwelcome intruders with no sense of the reality on the ground.

In the end the real impact of international aid organizations does not match the level of funds and support given. Owing to the current insurgency and ineffective state authorities, these international organizations are indirect players with extremely limited access at the ground level.³ Addressing this issue of the limited reach of NGOs into the FATA is at least as significant as, if not more significant than, addressing concerns over increasing the amount of foreign aid in the FATA.⁴

The FATA’s Evolving Socio-Economic Landscape and Power Structure

Bhutto’s policies accelerated a process of socio-economic change with political implications that required corresponding administrative and constitutional adjustments. Yet these adjustments, including the extension of political parties into the FATA, did not accompany important Bhutto reforms. The absence of effective political-administrative changes resulted in a vacuum, which has currently been filled by the extremist forces operating in the FATA.

Educational policies and job quotas in the FATA facilitated the emergence of a new class—an educated middle class—integrated into Pakistan’s socio-political structure and administration. Yet the benefits of the FATA’s development are not dispersed evenly to all tribesmen. The beneficiaries of reforms are increasingly the second generation of the earlier beneficiaries who are mostly settled in Pakistani cities outside of the FATA. Therefore, these beneficiaries do not greatly advance the development of the FATA’s society. This new class, however, has altered the malik’s traditional authority on which the whole edifice of the existing FATA system was based. The 1997 introduction of adult franchise served to further erode and transform traditional authority.

The FATA’s illegal trade has also provided income to a large population and created a new economically powerful class with political ambitions while bringing FATA tribesmen into contact with the outside world. Many tribesmen now send their children to schools and universities in Pakistani cities—and some even to schools in Dubai and the United Kingdom. The tribal diaspora is spread throughout Pakistan and most significantly has reached the Middle East, Far East, Europe, and the United States.

The Rise of Militancy in the FATA and Its Spread into the NWFP

The tribal system suffered a serious blow when the FATA was used as a base from which to wage the mujahideen war against the Soviet Union in Afghanistan.⁵ The 1980s witnessed the mushrooming of militant madrassas (religious schools), funded mostly by Arab money and local philanthropists.

Militants arriving in the FATA following the 2001 NATO intervention in Afghanistan found an administrative and political vacuum that they have since filled in a span of just six years. If the purpose of various development strategies has been to integrate tribesmen into Pakistani society, then this goal has not been achieved; rather, the current situation is marked by a strong disintegrative trend spearheaded by religious militants.

Some FATA residents working in Saudi Arabia—mainly residents from North and South Waziristan—have developed a special connection with Arab jihadis. The relatives of FATA tribesmen in Saudi Arabia are provided secure jobs and support in Saudi Arabia by the relatives of Arabs taking refuge in the FATA.⁶

All agreements reached between the insurgents and the Pakistani government have ultimately failed, resulting in the expansion of the militants’ territorial control.⁷ There has thus emerged a continuous pattern of state erosion and growing militant influence spreading out of the FATA into the settled districts of the NWFP. The militants now have serious influence in most of the southern settled districts of the NWFP, including Bannu, Dera Ismail Khan, and Kohat, as well as Swat, and now have the capability to deliver threats and edicts—rather than just hide bombs—in the central NWFP districts of Peshawar, Mardan, Nowshera, Swabi, and Charsadda.

Pakistan’s Inability to Implement Effective Changes in the FATA

The Pakistani government’s military, political, and economic strategies in the FATA aim to revive state authority through the discredited and outdated PA-jirga system, which consists of the exchange of local autonomy in return for the promised protection of roads and government installations. The government is apparently not pursuing any fundamental changes in the FATA that reflect an understanding of the FATA’s evolving socio-economic landscape and power structure.

There are many explanations for the inability of the Pakistani government to act decisively against the FATA’s militants. The government’s unwillingness to bring effective change to the FATA is the result of a deeply entrenched bureaucracy that enjoys vast and unchecked powers under the existing system. With the ungoverned space of the FATA having emerged as a base for various types of illegal businesses, including drugs and weapons smuggling, bureaucratic appointments in the region have become extremely lucrative.

Another foremost reason is the Pakistani government’s view of these militant forces as policy tools both in external relations with countries such as India and Afghanistan and internally against various secular nationalist forces, especially among the Pashtuns.⁸ An unconcealed sympathy toward the Taliban and its local variants in the establishment leads the government to restrain, but not eliminate, the FATA’s militants while U.S. and NANATO forces are engaged in Afghanistan.

The Pakistan People’s Party (PPP) and Awami National Party (ANP) coalition governments in Islamabad and the NWFP—formed following the February 2008 elections—are committed to peace-building in the FATA and NWFP through a combination of developmental activities and political and administrative reform. Yet due to the military and bureaucratic control of power and decisionmaking in Pakistan, the extent to which the coalition government will succeed depends on the level of real power the coalition is given. Quite telling in this regard is that the new prime minister backtracked on withdrawing the FCR from the FATA in the same inaugural session of the National Assembly in which he announced this policy.

The Pakistani government’s ability to deny the FATA’s space to domestic militancy and international terrorism by successfully implementing development plans to integrate the FATA into mainstream Pakistan is also seriously limited. The government’s unwillingness to confront militants has further increased the militants’ power and influence, thereby debilitating Islamabad’s capacity to bring effective change to the FATA.

Footnotes and References

¹ For an account of the FATA’s governance and legislative structures, see “Pakistan’s Tribal Areas: Appeasing the Militants,” International Crisis Group, Asia Report, no. 125, December 11, 2006, http://www.crisisgroup.org/home/index.cfm?id=4568&l=1
² Adult franchise—or the right of every adult (age 18 and above) to vote—replaced the earlier voting system, which gave that right only to officially recognized maliks. Malik is the term used for tribal elders similar to, though also distinct from, tribal chieftains. Only maliks who suit the state’s policies are recognized by the PA, and only these recognized maliks are invited to official jirgas and given stipends and other privileges.
³ See “Pashtunkhwa—A Developmental Framework—Part One,” National Democratic Consultative Process (NDCP), March 10, 2007, http://khyberwatch.com/nandara/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=300&Itemid=1 37.
⁴ Ibid.
⁵ Mujahideen are religious warriors or those who wage jihad; in an Afghan context the term is used to describe those who fought against the Soviet Union in Afghanistan in the 1980s.
⁶ Massoud Ansari, “Banking on Terror,” Newsline, May 2005, http://www.newsline.com.pk/NewsMay2005/newsbeat3may2005.htm.
⁷ Khalid Aziz, “Return of the Taliban–The North Waziristan Agreement,” http://www.khalidaziz.com/art_detail.php?aid=57. Khalid Aziz is a retired Pakistani bureaucrat who served as PA in some of the FATA agencies and retired in 1991 as the NWFP’s chief secretary.
⁸ Olivier Roy, “The Taliban: A Strategic Tool for Pakistan,” in Pakistan: Nationalism without a Nation? ed. Christophe Jaffrelot (New York: Zed Books, 2002), 149–60. For a detailed treatment, see Ijaz Khan, Pakistan’s Strategic Culture and Foreign Policy Making: A Study of Pakistan’s Post 9/11 Afghan Policy (New York: Nova Science Publishers, 2007).

Ijaz Khan is Assistant Professor at the Department of International Relations, University of Peshawar. Dr. Khan’s research interests include international relations, foreign policy, religious extremism, and terrorism in Pakistan and Pakistan’s Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA). His most recent book is Pakistan’s Strategic Culture and Foreign Policy Making (2007). He tweets with @ijazkhan and blogs at http://ijazk.blogspot.com/

My Hero: Safwat Ghayur

Postcard from Delhi: Aneela Babar tells her child the story of her hero Safwat Ghayur 

by Aneela Z. Babar

Dear Child,

Three days into the month had me waking up one night in tears. A long time believer in signs and dreams I spent some time calling up your father cautioning him to be careful in the coming days. I was still not restful and woke you up a couple of times in the night as I paced about the room, praying for mercy. In my selfishness I feared the Purvey of the Horrors To Come to visit only my boys. I never imagined that my sister of the heart who as a child would finish that offensive mug of milk for me would now put her lips to the poisoned cup of pain for us as well. I am glad we were here in Pakistan for this my son, and that at some level you  too absorbed some semblance of what service to the nation beyond the call of duty means. That you could register the different colours of love, of valor, of courage, of facing pain with dignity. You were in the presence of a very brave woman that was generous with her compassion and patience. At a time when I raged and ranted (the tears were yet to come) it was only the touch of her cool hand in mine that reminded me how very blessed I am to have her and hers in my life. In the years to come you will hear many stories of a very brave man who smiled his ways into all our lives. He was our hero, now he will be yours. His story is not over, he was a most unusual person for our times and our world, I wait to see how the next chapter unfolds.

 Sarfaroshi ki tamanna ab hamaare dil mein hai.

Dekhna hai zor kitna baazuay qaatil mein hai

Karta nahin kyun doosra kuch baat cheet,

                             Dekhta hun main jise voh chup teri mehfil mein hai 

Aye shaheed-e-mulk-o-millat main tere oopar nisaar,

Ab teri himmat ka charcha ghair ki mehfil mein hai

Sarfaroshi ki tamanna ab hamaare dil mein hai.

 The desire for sacrifice is now in our hearts

We shall now see what strength there is in the boughs of the enemy.

O country, Why does no other speak?

Whoever I see, is gathered quiet in your party...

O martyr of country, of nation, I submit myself to thee

For yet even the unacquainted speaks of thy courage

The desire for struggle is in our hearts

We shall now see what strength there is in the boughs of the enemies.

When the time comes, we shall show thee, O heaven

For why should we tell thee now, what lurks in our hearts? 

Though I could have also played around with another famous dialogue from the film

Safwat Ghayur ke dushman ka sirf ek hi kasoor hai ......ki woh Safwat ka dushman hai! ...

    You can charge Safwat's enemy of but one crime...that he is Safwat's enemy

but you get the gist:

(July 14, 1959 – August 4, 2010) 

But going back to the enigmatic Mr Ghayur. Yes, I don’t think his fan group was remiss in placing him on a pedestal, not for him the human vices of sloth, pride, vulgarity, boorish behaviour or pettiness and laziness as someone who was born to such good fortune as him could have succumbed to—somehow this suave French speaking, globetrotting, head strong, incorruptible law enforcer reminded you of the heroes from popular cinema who would battle baddies, dodge bullets, with not a crease in their well stitched suit – and here I am leaning towards a certain Secret Service Agent and not the Jat, for our hero preferred to deliver his killer lines at a lower decibel. 

Interesting aside: Mr Ghayur has been to the local cinemas, well at least for one Pushto movie when he chaperoned a visiting friend. The said friend was pretty scandalized with our domestic fare and declared it made French erotica seem like a training manual by the Taleban for virtuous behaviour (or words to that effect). But I guess this excursion of his, gives us just cause to add the line “he was a patron of the local arts” to his resume, lest he sounds too pucca saheb for you.

Yes, yes nothing got to our debonair man in uniform, not battling the thugs, nor sweating out in the thanas, and the various encounters he found himself in--- or made sure that he made a detour to “find" himself in. Yes, not even the most hair raising adventure of all --that has people tearing out their hair ,  running out of the house in their pyjamas. Raising two under-twos!! Yup, he did that too. Unfazed, and as quite the dapper gentleman.

I first encountered this gentleman as the paramapada of an elaborate game of snakes and ladders a very charming young woman outlined on the dining table for her elder sister. That the young woman went on to marry the hero of our tale is- well -another story. She is a bit vague with the details, but how fortuitous for someone who answered  a "police officer" (when asked what she wanted to be when she grew up), to marry one when she ended up  in medical school instead.

But the same person who introduced us to Hotel California, played Everyone Loves Kung fu Fighting in a band in Bangkok. He had friends who set up restaurants in Islamabad THAT WERE OPEN AT 9 pm (which was really cool for a city where you walked on the wild side if you spoke to someone in a different BPS grade than you),  who drove off with his new bride in a car come rukhsati time, and a very nice car I should add! ALONE! gasp!(with no sisters, cousins, and the ubiquitous five year old niece who will tug at the bride’s veil for the entire journey) in the process scandalizing all the old aunts and well the not so old amongst us as well.

He was also the good son who abandoned a really good first job offer (yes teaching karate is a pretty fine job) to accompany his family back to Pakistan, who might have dreamed of joining the foreign service (and would have been very good at it ) but chose instead the police so he could be around when his family needed him –and in turn took care of a family far far larger than his own. Ok, fine! maybe, we should go ahead and call him the desi hero after all!

I don’t think I am the stage in my life when I can find meaning in the things that happen to our heroes—but I do find comfort and a lot of laughter in the image of the foolish young man who goes up there believing himself to be a martyr with all the 70 houris and rivers of milk and honey it brings and encounters Safwat Ghayur instead. 

Yes, perhaps there is some divine justice after all...

Aneela Z. Babar (Pindi/Delhi/Melbourne). When she is not busy being the bane of her three year old's existence, Babar works on gender, culture, religion and militarism (with a heady dose of Bollywood trivia).


ed note: some months ago, a man was stopped by the police at a crossing in Peshawar. ' Why can't I pass?' Sorry Sir he replied his boss was passing, his boss you see was a brave man you see and the target of the Taliban. 'A brave man? You only had one brave boss his name was Safwat Ghayur and he is dead!'
RIP Safwat Ghayur and all those who have fought the good fight

Comments from Khyber

The fall of Tirah valley to the Taliban in Pakistan's Federally administered tribal areas has triggered a wave of internally displaced refugees. As part of our focus on challenging the narrative; local researchers Farooq and Shabir with help from writer  Noreen Nasser compiles information on the region for Qissa Khwani.

The mandatory orientalist reference for any article on the tribal areas

Some information and names have been changed to protect the identities of people.

Background: Located in the northwest of the Khyber Agency is the  beautiful and fertile Tirah Valley, the original home of all the Afridi and Orakzai tribes. Tirah Valley has two parts: one is in  Khyber agency and other is in Orakzai Agency.  In Khyber agency, eight tribes of Afridis are residing and are at war with each other for power between the militants groups ( Qamber Khail, Koki Khail, Malak din Khail, Zakha Khail, Aka Khail, Adam Khail, Sipah and Kamar Khail).

Presently in Khyber Tirah there are five major militants groups fighting for power and control: Lashkar- e -Islam (Mangal Bagh group, Mangal Bagh a bus conductor by profession). Ansar –ul- islam     (Mehboob group, Mehboob an imam of local Madrassa). Tehrik- e- Taliban (Tariq Afridi group an extraneous group, Tariq Afridi came from Dara Adam Khel a college graduate and brother of a Judge, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Judiciary), Tauheed-e- Islam (Aman lashkar of Zakha Khel sponsored by Pakistan Army: sarcastically referred to as ' good taliban' ) and 'Amar bil maroof wa nahi ul munkar' ( Haji Namdar group controlling lower Khyber Agency).  Lashkar- e- Islam apparent agenda is to implement Islamic Sharia but according to local people Mangal Bagh has no knowledge of Islam, he simply wants to control Khyber Agency. This group has people from  all the tribes of Afridis, it was controlling Bara area but now due to military presence they are carrying out their activities covertly.

In Tirah, it is presently occupying Aka Khail and Sipah tribes and also has some presence in small pockets of Malak din Khail and Kamar Khail areas. No body exactly knows about this group hideouts as they are constantly changing places. But it is believed that Mangal Bagh a Sipah himself resides near Pak-Afghan border in the area of Sipah tribe and guarded by young boys age 15-21.Ansar- ul- islam group is the main militant group in Tirah. It controls Tirah Zakha Khail, partial Qamber Khail area, Malak din Khail, Adam Khail and Shalobar (was part of Qamber Khail now known as independent tribe area). They are staunch rivals of Mangal Bagh group in the valley. Due to their skirmishes and differences hundreds of people lost their lives and thousands were displaced in lower parts of Khyber Agency. Tehrik-Taliban Tariq Afridi group of Dara Adam Khel is presently stationed and controlling Koki Khail area of Tirah Valley. It is also one of the strongest opponent of Mangal Bagh in the valley as well as in the lower parts of Khyber Agency. Tariq Afridi group moved to Tirah valley due to Pakistan Army operation in Dera Adam Khel. This group influenced by Sipah-e-Sahaba was involved in sectarian violence and kidnapping. Besides kidnapping and killing, Tariq Afridi was also fighting another group back in Dara known as Momin Afridi Group supported by Pakistan Military (good Taliban). Momin Afridi group stationed in Dara Adam Khel has Pakistan Army’s support against Tariq because its activities are more based in Afghanistan. Tauheed-e-Islam (good taliban) is a newly formed group with the blessing of Pakistan Army to counter Lashkar -e -Islam also called Aman lashkar. It has limited control over the territory of Zakha Khail and failed to contain Lashkar-e-Islam in Tirah. Amar bil Maroof Wa Nahi Ul Munkar group founder was Haji Namdar later assassinated by a young boy while praying in 2008. In Khyber Agency, it was the pioneer militant group created to fight evils of the society. Lashkar-e-Islam is its splinter group but even they are not on good terms, clashes occurred several times between them.  Amar bil Maroof Wa Nahi Ul Munkar control Qamber Khail Bara area and some parts of Tirah.
  

The major questions are : who are fighting and killing thousands of innocent people of  Tirah, Khyber Agency? why they are fighting?, where they are fighting? and who suffers the most in their lust for power?


Lashkar- e -islam and Ansar –ul- Islam are the two major militant groups in confrontation with each other. Initially their clashes started in Malak din Khail area of Tirah Maidan and according to local people it was the peak of their cruelty and violence, brothers and cousin were forced to fight against each other. Here I would like to narrate a tragic story of Najib hailing from Tirah Valley. He was a student of intermediate (computer science),studious, humble, calm and a normal boy of eighteen and never harmed any one. He was forced to fight for Lashkar-e-Islam against Ansar- ul –Islam as he was the only young boy in his family, his elder brother was in United Kingdom and father was too old.
 It is mandatory for the people living in these militant controlled areas to handover one young man to fight the rival group. Najib was not trained for war, therefore he was used as a shield to protect the trained militants. This strategy was adopted by both the groups that untrained would be in the front line to protect the trained militants and if anyone tried to escape or leave, either his family would be harmed or that person would be slaughtered. Najib fate was no different from those who tried to escape, he was cut into pieces and delivered to his family in a sack. These  atrocities terrorized Tirah people so much that they never tried or had the courage to oppose any group. After taking over the Malak din Khail areas in Tirah, Ansar- ul -islam started its aggression in  Kamar Khail (Sokh Area), Akka Khail (Dars Jummat), Sipah (Saanda paal). But again after furious fighting with Lashkar-e-Islam surrendered back these areas except Shalobar.  According to informal sources more than 1500 people are killed from both sides and nearly 2500 were injured (these are estimates of militant death toll, local population is not included that was killed in a collateral damage). Interestingly both groups claimed their dead as martyred of Islam (Shaheed) and the other “murdaar”,(derogatory word of Pashtu used for dead).

In Zakha Khail area rein of terror was unleashed when Lashkar- e -Islam killed a religious scholar . In reaction to the assassination of their scholar Zakha Khail tribe formed a group with the help of Pakistan Army Tauheed-ul-Islam (good taliban). Before the emergence of this group Zakha Khail area was under Lashkar-e-Islam, major conflict areas are Nari Baba and Sur Ghar. During their skirmishes almost three hundred people lost their lives.

Who suffered the most?

All Afridi tribes were affected but we have tried to generally categorize on the basis of death toll, displacement, and other financial and property losses: Malak din Khail is the most affected tribe in terms  human, financial losses and displacement. Sipah tribe was affected financially due to closure of Bara Market since 2007, human losses are also there as they were forced to take part in those clashes. Shalobar is the second largest tribe in terms of human losses and also suffered a lot due to displacement. Kamar Khail occupies the third position in death toll and financial losses. Aka Khail can be placed at fourth position that suffered a lot after Kamar Khail Zakha khail their losses are less as compare to other tribes but after creating its own group suffered human losses recently from Mangal Bagh group (local people are quite skeptic about this army supported group).

Pakistan Military and its role?


Pakistan Army for the first time enter into the area of Tirah Valley in 2002, formed several check posts at Pak-Afghan border and also in Morga ( which connects with Tora Bora via Kurram Agency).

In 2007-8, army pulled out of Tirah and now there is no army camp, post or base. The FC and Militia is looking after the Pak-Afghan border and whenever needed Pakistan Air force is called upon to target militants causing huge casualties and displacement.  According to locals a Pakistan Army major excuse for pulling back was the lack of facilities in the hard terrain which creates problem in the supply for the security forces.

Why government  and army failed in controlling the situation:

According to local opinion government and army is not interested to eliminate militancy in Tirah. Government and Army excuse is that Tirah is a difficult terrain and they don’t have the resources to combat militants. The recent fighting in the Tirah Valley between Lashkar-i-Islam and Ansar -ul -Islam is for the control of Saanda paal. This area is strategically important because through Saanda paal peak the whole valley of Tirah can be guarded and controlled. Whoever gets the control of this peak, can control and if needed target Tirah areas.  Nowadays it is under the control of Mangal Bagh. It is pertinent to mention that Pakistan Army has left these groups to their own devices, waiting and watching but in this process of indifference hundreds of innocent people have lost their lives.